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Abstract   
 
Key Words: organisational change; electric utility industry; exploratory case 
study research; industry deregulation; organisational culture 
 
 
This research inquiry aimed to determine whether accepted organisational change 
models and strategic theory were the appropriate mechanisms to increase 
understanding the electric utility industry. Exploratory research into the U.S. electric 
utility industry provided several key findings and conclusions. The three case studies 
included in this document illustrated the difficulties of adjusting to transformational 
change, both internally and externally. Industry experts provided additional insight 
regarding the barriers these utilities faced in developing a successful change strategy 
and the shortcomings that resulted from a lack of clear and well-implemented 
strategy. This inquiry identified an industry segment – the U.S. investor-owned 
electric utility industry – that had not been examined in any depth regarding the nature 
and effect of organisational change.  
 
The findings revealed some areas for further investigation, most importantly focusing 
on the unique nature, culture and structure of this industry, which could lead to the 
greater understanding of the effects of organisational change and the corporate 
strategies for deregulating industries.  
 
The results from this study identified several opportunities for additional research in 
the areas of strategic management and organisational change:  
a) the role of organisational change models for deregulating industries 
b) negative consequences of organisational change 
c) validity of the Reactor strategy 
d) alternative approaches for organisations that do not want to change 
 
This research inquiry provides managers with insights regarding the challenges of 
implementing organisational change in highly rigid and bureaucratic cultures while 
also providing researchers additional insights into better understanding the unique 
culture of investor-owned electric utilities in the United States. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
DOE:  Department of Energy 
 
DSM: Demand Side Management, an energy conservation approach that focuses on 
curtailing energy use through customers (i.e. demand) rather than focusing on 
optimizing generation (i.e. supply) 
 
EEI: Edison Electric Institute, a trade association of investor-owned utilities 
 
EIA: Energy Information Administration, an agency in the U.S. Department of Energy 
that compiles historical data on energy activities in the United States 
 
FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
 
IOU: Investor-owned utility, the largest group of electric utilities operating in the 
United States. 
 
ISOs: Independent system operators 
 
PUHCA: Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
 
RTOs: Regional transmission organisations (these organisations coordinate, control 




Deregulation:  Easing or eliminating government restrictions in the firm‟s freedom of 
entry into markets, freedom of action within a market and its profitability within the 
market. Deregulation describes an increasing reliance on markets to guide economic 
activity.  
 
Investor-owned utilities: (IOUs): These utilities account for about three-quarters of 
all utility generation and capacity. There are 239 in the United States, and they 
operate in all states except Nebraska. They are also referred to as privately-owned 
utilities. 
 
Learning organisation: An organisation in which everyone is engaged in identifying 
and solving problems, enabling the organisation to continuously experiment, improve 
and increase its capability (Daft 2001, p. 608). 
 
Organisational change: The adoption of a new behaviour or idea by an organisation 
(Daft 2001, p 609). 
 
Transformational change: Radical change that requires a shift in assumptions made 
by the organisation and its members. Transformation can result in an organisation that 
differs significantly in terms of structure, processes, culture and strategy (Iles & 
Sutherland 2001). 
 
Unbundling: This describes the separation of the industry into transmission, 
generation, distribution and supply, and introduces a system for the allocation of costs 
and the introduction of structural and tariff regulators to protect the consumer. 
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION  
 
The U.S. electric utility industry experienced industry deregulation in the late 1990s
1
 
(Warwick 2000). This deregulation led to a fundamental shift in the ways electric 
utilities operated, both internally and externally. This research inquiry focuses 
specifically on how three investor-owned electric utilities in the United States 
developed strategies to manage the organisational
2
 change forced upon them by the 
transformational change of industry deregulation. The fundamental issue explored in 
this research is whether these three electric utilities would use this transformational 
change to become closer to the ‘learning organisation model’ developed by Senge 
(1990).  
 
The theoretical framework developed through this research viewed the adjustments 
made by the utilities that were caused by external change. Of specific interest were 
changes that were a result of electric utility deregulation, viewed through the lens of 
three separate electric utilities and selected industry experts. The findings are 
examined from two perspectives: 
• Context (external and internal environment) 
• Process (how change was implemented) 
 
Traditionally, the fields of organisational change and strategic management have 
focused on competitive industries. However, there has been little research into the 
effects of organisational change and the appropriate strategic responses among 
recently deregulated industries. The specific areas and research questions are further 
discussed in Section 1.2. 
 
Organisational change theory is based on the premise that when companies 
experience a transformational change (Daft 2001), this leads to fundamental and 
lasting changes in the organisation‟s structure, processes, policies and reward 
systems. Pettigrew and Whipp (1998) view the effects of organisational change as 
                                                 
1 Please refer to Appendix A: Summary of legislative activities that led to industry deregulation. 
2 Organisation and organisational change have alternative spellings in the U.S. These words will be 
spelled according to Australian style unless it is referencing a specific publication that uses the 
American spelling (i.e. organization or organizational). All other words will follow Australian spelling 
conventions.  
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driven externally, through political and legal factors, as well as internally, by the ways 
in which an organisation‟s strategic focus and internal corporate culture must change 
and adapt. However, these theories have not been viewed from the perspective of the 
electric utility industry, an industry that was highly resistant to change, with a strong 
insular corporate culture, and a rigid and bureaucratic operational structure. Tichy 
(1982) provided a template to better understand and manage change by examining the 
technical, political and cultural pressures that occur during organisational change. 
This exploratory research study is designed to investigate the effects of organisational 
change on deregulated industries, and to identify additional areas to consider in future 
research studies.  
 
The purpose of this research is to understand how this transformational change, 
which was beyond the organisation‟s control, influenced both its external and internal 
reactions to change. External reactions are ways the organisation developed strategies 
to deal with various environments, such as the political and social forces driving this 
change. Internal reactions are methods by which organisations modified their 
resources, capabilities, structures and culture.  
 
The selection of the electric utility industry was based on this researcher‟s experience, 
background and industry contacts. Since 1991, this researcher has been working with 
investor-owned electric utilities – including the three selected for in-depth case 
studies – in various consulting positions, witnessing firsthand the effects of industry 
deregulation. Accordingly, this research inquiry has not been approached with the 
perspective of a regulator or an economist (who would tend to view the macro effects 
of deregulation) but rather through the eyes of a strategic management consultant, 
with a pragmatic perspective of helping these organisations solve the problems caused 
by electric utility deregulation.  
 
This chapter has eight main sections, covering: 
 background information to the electric utility industry (section 1.1) 
 research issue and research issues (section 1.2) 
 justification for the research (section 1.3) 
 a brief description of the methodology (section 1.4) 
 an outline of the report (section 1.5) 
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 key definitions (section 1.6) 
 delimitations of scope and key assumptions (section 1.7)  
 a conclusion (section 1.8). 
 
 
1.1. Electric utility industry overview 
The electric power industry is a $342 billion industry that employs nearly 400,000 
American workers. It represents 3 percent of the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
in the United States (Edison Electric Institute 2009). This industry serves more than 
143 million customers, and revenues continue to expand despite economic declines in 
other industries. This is due largely to the fact that these utilities provide Americans 
with a fundamental service: delivering electricity for their homes and businesses.  
The electric utility industry consists of 3,170 investor-owned, publicly owned, 
cooperative and federal electric utilities (Warwick 2000). Table 1-1 summarizes the 
generation and market share for each type of utility company and shows that investor-
owned utilities (IOUs) dominate both the generation and customer market segments 
of the electric utility industry. Therefore, industry deregulation had a profound effect 
on the entire country‟s electric supply.  
 
Table 1-1: Generation and Customer Share Among Electric Utilities 
Share of Generation (%) Share of Customer Served (%) 
Investor-owned 76 Investor-owned 75 
Government-owned 19 Government-owned 14 
Rural cooperatives 5 Rural cooperatives 11 
 
(Source: Edison Electric Institute’s web page: www.eia.org) 
 
Since all utilities serve a vital need, regardless of ownership status, state and federal 
lawmakers determined that it would be in the public interest to regulate utilities 
beginning in 1879 (EIA 2000). Government regulation of utilities gradually increased 
during the 1950s and 1960s. To prevent price gouging and encourage widespread 
access, the government granted individual utilities certain monopoly rights, 
accompanied by the right to regulate price as well as service terms and conditions 
(Geddes 1992). In exchange for providing service to all customers, utilities received 
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an exclusive right to sell energy to retail customers in a specific service area or 
franchise territory.  
Since they are monopolies, utilities are regulated at both state and federal levels. 
Federal jurisdiction regulates wholesale interstate transactions and state regulation 
addresses consumer-level issues (EIA 2000). State regulation of electric utilities 
began in the early 1900s and by 1907, 23 states had established public service 
commissions. Basic state powers included the authority to franchise the utilities and 
establish utility accounting systems as well as regulating their rates, financing and 
service (EIA 2000; Geddes 1992).  
The federal government became more fully involved in electric utility regulation in 
the 1930s during the Great Depression. The federal government established the Public 
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA, P.L. 74-333), empowering the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate utility holding companies in a 
way to prevent abuse of monopoly power.  
The Federal Power Act of 1935 (Title II of PUHCA) established the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC), which regulates utilities involved in interstate wholesale 
transmission and sale of electric power (EIA 2000; Geddes 1992).
3
 
One fundamental goal of investor-owned utilities is to produce a return for investors. 
Investor-owned utilities are the focus of this study. Table 1-2  summarizes the 
characteristics of investor-owned utilities operating within the United States prior to 







                                                 
3
 The federal government also established other laws and regulations regarding the governance of rural 
electric cooperatives and municipally-owned electric utilities (Geddes 1992); however, those 
organisations are beyond the scope of this study, which focuses exclusively on the effects of 




Table 1-2: Ownership Characteristics of Investor-Owned Electric Utilities 
Ownership Major Characteristics 
Investor-owned utilities 
(IOUs) account for about 
three-quarters of all utility 
generation and capacity.  
 
There are 239 IOUs in the 
United States, operating in 
all states except Nebraska.  
 
They are also referred to as 
privately-owned utilities. 
Earn a return for investors; either distribute their profits to 
stockholders as dividends or reinvest the profits. 
  
Are granted service monopolies in certain geographic areas. 
  
Have obligation to serve and to provide reliable electric power. 
  
Are regulated by state and sometimes federal governments, 
which in turn approve rates that allow a fair rate of return on 
investment. 
  
Most are operating companies that provide basic services for 
generation, transmission, and distribution.  
(Source: Warwick 2000, p. 4) 
 
 
Deregulation of the U.S. electric industry was driven by a variety of economic and 
technological factors including: 
 A re-evaluation of the nature of competition within regulated industries 
caused, in part, by the changes in the telecommunications and banking 
industries since deregulation. 
 The disparity of electricity prices in the United States. In a regulated market, 
customers in New York paid more than two-and-a-half times the rate of 
Kentucky customers.  
 Improvements in generation capabilities that required less time to build 
capacity and less capital investment (EIA 2001). 
These factors led to regulatory reform by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) that promoted the development of competitive wholesale power markets and 
opened access to all electric transmission systems. Since the 1980s, FERC has 
approved more than 800 applications to sell power competitively at the wholesale 
level. In December 1999, FERC required electric utilities to form regional 
transmission organisations (RTOs) that would operate, control and own power 
transmission systems in the U.S. Electric utilities also created Independent System 
Operators (ISOs) to operate the transmission grid and regional transmission groups. 
ISOs also opened access to same-time information systems that inform competitors of 
available capacity on their line. These changes have resulted in a major consolidation 
within the electric utility industry, divestiture of generation assets by many utilities 
and an overall re-examination of the market barriers to full competition (Liggett 
2001). Deregulation also compelled utilities to change their current value chain by 
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forcing them to divest of specific assets in generation, transmission or distribution 
(EIA 2001; Liggett 2001). Figure 1-1 illustrates the basic structure of a typical 
investor-owned utility prior to deregulation, while Figure 1-2 displays the more 
complex electric industry value chain after deregulation. 
 
Figure 1-1: Traditional Electric Utility Industry Value Chain 
      





Figure 1-2: Electric Utility Industry After Deregulation  
 
               Generation  →   Transmission   →   Distributors  →   Customers 
 
 Generation from 
multiple locations and 
sources 
Transmission may be 
owned by a third party or 
continued to be owned by 
the utility 
Local utilities remain providers 
but the customer now must 




(Source: Expanded from Warwick 2000 for this study) 
 






As Figure 1-2 illustrates, deregulation created a complicated industry structure which 
included an increased role of third-party providers for generation and distribution of 
electricity. This new structure fundamentally changed the traditional role of investor-
owned utilities. The ways in which this structure changed for three utilities is the 
focus of this research inquiry.   
 
1.2 Background to the research 
 
The theoretical framework which guides this study is based on the blending of 
components from five major theories about competition and organisational change. 
Briefly, the theories forming the framework for this study are: 
• Context, Process, and Content Model (Pettigrew & Whipp 1998) 
• Five Change Factors (Pettigrew &Whipp 1998)4   
• Model of Transformational Change (Daft 2001) 
• Learning Organisations (Senge 1990) 
• Strategic Tasks for Successful Management (Tichy 1982) 
 
 
The theories forming the analytical structure of this study provide a framework with 
which to examine the electric utility industry, given their focus on the nature of 
organisational change and the special emphasis of examining other industries facing 
radical change. For example, research by Pettigrew & Whipp (1998) examined 
competitive change in selected industry sectors, including industries facing 
deregulation. Daft (2001) provided a model to explore the paradigm shift associated 
with the transformational change of deregulation while Tichy (1982) offered  insights 
into the internal key success factors needed to implement widespread organisational 
change. Lastly, the learning organisation theory developed by Senge (1990) is in 
contrast to the traditional investor-owned utility corporate structure and therefore was 
viewed as the „ideal‟ corporate structure in the electric utility industry‟s evolution. 
 
This research inquiry also draws on the broader scope of research in organisational 
change and includes additional insights regarding the development of competitive 
strategies, which are discussed in Chapter 2. These insights, as theorized by Porter 
                                                 
4 This is a subset of the Context, Process and Content Model and is used to explain the interplay 
among these forces.  
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(1980) and Miles and Snow (1978), confirm the results of previous research exploring 
the electric utility industry, specifically studies by Hirsh (1989) and Emmons (2000). 
  
The conceptual framework developed for this study is guided by two of the three 
elements of strategic change identified in the model by Pettigrew and Whipp (1998): 
• Context (external and internal environment) 
• Process (how change was implemented) 
 
External context is discussed in terms of the environmental, political, legal and 
economic factors that led to electric utility deregulation. This provides a backdrop to 
understanding the electric utility industry. Internal context focuses on describing the 
ways in which these electric utilities must adapt their organisational cultures, 
structures, policies, resources and capabilities to match the external environment. The 
Process component of Pettigrew and Whipp (1998) explores more fully the type of 
change experienced by these utilities and their likely responses. 
 
This framework blends the most appropriate theories in strategic management and 
organisational change as a way to better understand how deregulation affected the 
three selected utilities. However, it was not an easy fit to match organisational theory 
against actual industry practices; it was therefore necessary to identify the most 
appropriate elements of each theory and use those components to create the 
theoretical framework.  
 
It was also necessary to understand how this change was implemented (i.e. the 
process) in terms addressing both external and internal drivers (i.e. context). 
Therefore, the process component of this model is discussed in terms of how it was 
affected by external factors and then used to direct internal change. 
 
1.3 Research problem and research issues  
1.3.1 Research problem 
The research problem in this study is: How did deregulation change the strategic 
focus and internal operating culture of U.S. investor-owned electric utilities?  
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This study‟s proposition is that successful electric utilities need to develop and 
cultivate vision, commitment and resources in order to adapt to the constantly 
changing electric utility environment. This study is designed to accomplish the 
following objectives: 
 Identify current changes regarding change management in the electric 
utility industry in the United States. 
Contribute to the understanding organisational change and culture 
theories as they apply to regulated businesses experiencing 
transformational change. 
1.3.2 Research issues  
Seven major research issues are covered in this study. Research Issue #1 applies to the 
general industry overview; the remaining research issues apply to the selected electric 
utilities examined in the study.   
 
 Research Issue #1: What is the evolution of the US electric utility industry, 
focusing particularly on the external forces leading to deregulation? 
 Research Issue #2: How were the managers‟ decision-making processes 
affected by deregulation?  
 Research Issue #3: How did deregulation affect the strategic focus of these 
electric utilities?    
 Research Issue #4:  What were the specific mechanisms these utilities used to 
manage change?    
 Research Issue #5:  What are the managers‟ perspectives of electric utilities 
as “learning organisations?”   
 Research Issue #6: What are the managers‟ perspectives of an ideal electric 
utility in terms of vision, commitment and resources?  
 Research Issue #7: What is the gap between the current utility and ideal 
utility of the future?  
 
1.4 Justification for the research 
 
This area of inquiry is important for the reasons as discussed in the following sections.  
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1.4.1 Importance of the electric utility industry  
The electric utility industry is one of the largest industry segments in the United 
States. As Figure 1-3 shows, growth of the electric utility industry is linked to the 
overall growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States (EEI 2001).  
 











                    (Source: EEI 2001) 
 
 
This trend continues and in 2007, major investor-owned electric utility operating 
revenues (from sales to ultimate customers, sales for resale and other electric income) 
were $283 billion, a 2.1 percent increase from 2006 (EIA 2009). By 2030, average 
household consumption is expected to increase by more than 11 percent compared to 
2007 levels. This increase will be entirely driven by appliance-related consumption, 
reflecting the use of computers and other digital technologies (EEI 2006). 
 
However, industry deregulation, which began in the early 1990s and continued to 
2000 (EIA 2001), led to profound changes both externally and internally among 
investor-owned electric utilities. This study will provide an opportunity to expand the 
traditional boundaries of strategic management theory and explore the appropriateness 
of the theory of learning organisations in this traditionally closed environment. It also 
provides the opportunity for new levels of analysis, by synthesizing the experiences 
from both internal and external experts. 
 
 22 
1.4.2 The lack of current information about the electric utility industry 
Organisational change theory has traditionally focused on companies operating in a 
competitive marketplace. As the literature review will explore more fully in Chapter 
2, there is not much current information available that explores organisational change 
in the context of a deregulating industry, such as the electric utility industry. 
Furthermore, there has been little research conducted specifically in the context of 
electric utilities in general, and U.S. investor-owned electric utilities, in particular. 
This study is relevant because it provides additional insight into determining if the 
current strategic typologies developed by Miles and Snow (1978), specifically the 
„reactor‟ strategy, are a viable strategic response for electric utilities. This study will 
also provide additional information regarding the validity of theories by Kim and Mc 
Intosh (1999) regarding organisational responses among recently deregulated 
companies.  
1.4.3 Exploring organisational change in change-resistant companies 
The three selected case studies explore the unique culture of the investor-owned 
utility. The closed and insular nature of the U.S. electric utility industry makes in-
depth research challenging and this type of study would be difficult for an „outsider‟ 
to conduct, given the close-knit culture of the industry. The electric utility industry 
has developed a unique change-resistant culture which will be more fully explored in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.7.2.2). Because its managers were dealing with electricity, a 
„mysterious yet awesome‟ product (Hirsh 1989), the electric utility industry has 
created its own unique culture that is based on a perceived superiority This superiority 
resulted in the developing a culture that valued engineering and technical superiority 
and excluded outsiders who did not share their viewpoint or technical understanding. 
Therefore, this research provides other researchers, who may be interested in but have 
not developed the necessary contacts to gain a better understanding of the electric 
utility industry, and further examine the validity of theories developed by both Hirsh 





The exploratory nature of this inquiry is suited to qualitative data methods, primarily 
case studies and in-depth interviewing. The case study is a research methodology 
based on „interviews … involving a body of knowledge‟ (Perry 1998). Riege (1996, p. 
42) defines case study as „a methodology in research which focuses on a particular 
part of an organisation or an industry within its context in order to rigorously explore 
and analyse contemporary real-life experiences in-depth using a variety of evidence‟.   
 
This statement applies to this study because it: 
a. Focuses on an industry, the investor-owned U.S. electric industry 
b. Explores and analyses contemporary real-life experiences, the effects of 
industry deregulation  
Case studies also help researchers to answer the complex how and why questions   
about dynamic business phenomena such as project, personal or specific organisation 
success in today‟s turbulent global environment. Given that the subject of this 
investigation is the electric utility industry, the case study approach provided the best 
way to capture the turbulent effects of electric deregulation. Yin (2003) concurs by 
describing that a case study inquiry: 
 Copes with the technically disruptive situation in which there will be many 
more variables of interest than  data points, and as one result ... 
 Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result ... 
 Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis (Yin 2003). 
The goal of this research is to investigate the following: „How did deregulation 
change the strategic focus and internal operating culture of investor-owned U.S. 
electric utilities?’ Thus the three in-depth case studies were exploratory in nature. The 
goal of an exploratory case study is to „develop pertinent hypotheses and propositions 
for further inquiry‟ (Yin 2003). This research focused on how these organisations 
reacted to the outside events (over which they had no control) and their responses, 
both internally and externally in the context of organisational change (Yin 2003).  
This study focuses on specific case studies drawn from the 239 investor-owned 
electric utilities. These case studies were selected because they represented three 
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different responses to industry deregulation. Rather than focusing on only one 
„exceptional‟ case, this inquiry focused on the effects of organisational change on 
three electric utilities which adopted responses that clearly distinguished them from 
other utilities in the industry. The research design allowed for cross-case comparisons 
between companies pursuing different types of strategy, yielding information-rich 
detail. The companies were selected using a combination of judgment and snowball 
methodologies as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994). They were not 
intended to be a statistically representative sample of the companies within the 
industry. They were selected in order to facilitate information-rich comparisons 
between three different identifiable responses to deregulation within the industry. 
As a way to supplement the information gathered in the case studies and to further 
understand the content and context of the effects of organisational change in the 
electric utility industry, a series of in-depth interviews with experts was also 
conducted. The experts were selected based on their interest and expertise in 
organisational change, the electric utility industry, or both.  
 
1.6 Delimitations of scope and key assumptions 
This research focuses on the effects that electric utility deregulation had on three 
specific utilities. It is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of the effects of 
deregulation on the entire investor-owned utility industry. The study also focuses on 
utilities with differing sizes, geographical locations and regulatory environments. 
However, given the complex nature of the research study and the sheer number of 
electric utilities that experienced industry deregulation, it would be cost-prohibitive to 
conduct a more comprehensive industry-wide analysis. It has never been the intention 
of this study to address quantitative issues. The companies selected were not designed 
to be representative in any way, but rather they were good illustrative examples of the 
types of responses adopted by investor-owned utilities during industry deregulation.  
 
Another delimitation of this study is that there is limited information currently 
available regarding the effects of deregulation on the electric utility industry in the 
context of organisational change. While there is a significant amount of literature 
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documenting the economic impacts of industry deregulation, there is significantly less 
information regarding the effects on the internal corporate culture and organisational 
strategies of these utilities. Therefore, the inclusion of industry experts and 
discussions with authors specializing in deregulation (Emmons) and the utility 
corporate culture (Hirsh) seeks to provide a greater understanding of this specific 
industry in the context of the research issues addressed in this study. 
 
Another delimitation of this study may be the selection of the key theories, 
specifically Pettigrew & Whipp (1998), Senge (1990) and Tichy (1982). These 
theories may not adequately address the complexity associated with organisational 
change experienced by these three utilities. However, the theories were selected 
because they focused on deregulating industries (Pettigrew & Whipp), the 
development of an „ideal organisation‟ (Senge 1990) and the blending of key 
organisational structure and theory.  
 
A final delimitation of this study is the notion that the theories selected are old and 
therefore outdated. But this is not necessarily a shortcoming. Millett (2000) argued 
that, although Tichy‟s work was more than 20 years old, it still provided a range of 
„important and insightful comments about managing change strategically‟. Many of 
the best and most relevant theories about organisational change and management 
strategy have their foundations in philosophies that are more than 2,000 years old. 
The Greeks coined the term „chaos‟ and now chaos theory is one of the new types of 
theories emerging to explain organisational change in the 21
st
 century. Therefore, just 
because a theory or an article is cited as „old‟ that does not necessarily indicate a loss 
of relevance or usefulness to this inquiry. Rather, it demonstrates that good theories 
can stand the test of time.  
 
1.7 Outline of this dissertation 
This dissertation is organised into five chapters. Chapter 1 is the foundation for this 
dissertation, providing a brief overview the electric utility industry and introducing 
the conceptual framework that will be used to guide this research. It also provides a 
discussion of the methodology and justification for this research, and concludes with 
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an acknowledgement of the study‟s limitations. Chapter 2 provides a summary of 
reviewed literature which guided the development and testing of this theoretical 
framework. It also summarizes the current body of knowledge regarding two 
academic fields framing this study: organisational theory and strategic management. 
The literature review also provides additional insight into the electric utility industry.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the methods used to investigate the seven research issues posed in 
this inquiry. It also provides a justification for the case study approach which was 
supplemented with in-depth expert interviews. Chapter 4 presents the results from 
these case studies and selected findings from the expert interviews. The results are 
summarized on an individual case basis and also through cross-case analysis. Chapter 
5 interprets the results from this investigation against the backdrop of the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter 2. It also identifies areas for future investigations 
and indicates which theories have been proven or disproven as a result of this 





Chapter 1 provides a road map for the reader to understand the theoretical framework 
that guided this research investigation, and provides an introduction into the overall 
methodology used for this research study. It also provides a summary of the key events 
that affected the development of the electric utility industry. The remaining chapters, 
which build on this foundation and provide additional guidance and insight, address the 
basic research issue of this study: How did deregulation change the strategic focus and 
internal operating culture of U.S. investor-owned electric utilities? The exploration 
and the answers to this issue are provided in the remaining four chapters. 
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The purpose of the literature review was twofold. First, it identified the major issues 
in organisational change and strategic management as a way to understand the breadth 
and depth of the effect of organisational change in the electric utility industry – in 
both its historical and current contexts. Additionally, the literature review identified 
potential models on which to develop this research inquiry, focusing on those that 
were most appropriate in analysing the effects of deregulation on selected U.S. 
investor-owned utilities (IOUs). Thus the purpose of this research was to understand 
how this transformational change, which was beyond the organisation‟s control, 
influenced its external and internal reactions to change. Reactions often include 
emergent strategies as well as deliberately planned ones. The external reactions 
involved the development of strategies dealing with the various environments, such as 
the political and social forces driving this change; the internal reactions involved the 
methods by which these organisations modified their resources, capabilities, 
structures and culture.  
 
 
2.2  Theoretical framework for study 
 
The literature review uncovered a wealth of theories regarding the ways in which 
organisations experience, implement and adapt to change. This review also focused 
on the ways that organisations develop competitive strategies and adjust to 
accommodate internal and external change. As a result of this review, several theories 
emerged that seemed appropriate to explore more fully in the context of this research 
investigation; further exploration of certain theory components would help to interpret 
the effects of change and recommend appropriate courses of action. Although no 
single theory provided the components for addressing all the research issues in this 
study, components of these theories were used to investigate separate research issues. 
In Section 2.6, this literature review demonstrated that there does not yet seem to be 
one over-arching theory explaining the complex and dynamic interrelationships that 
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occur among organisations experiencing change. This seemed especially relevant for 
the three investor-owned utilities (IOUs) selected for this study.  
 
The theoretical framework which guides this study is based on the blending of 
components from five major theories about competition and organisational change. 
Each theory will be examined more fully in this review to provide the appropriate 
background and justification for its inclusion in this research study. The theories 
forming the framework for this study, and thus the major outcome of this literature 
review, are: 
• Context, Process, and Content Model (Pettigrew & Whipp 1998) 
• Five Change Factors (Pettigrew & Whipp 1998)5   
• Model of Transformational Change (Daft 2001) 
• Learning Organisations (Senge 1990) 
• Strategic Tasks for Successful Management (Tichy 1982) 
 
Given their focus on the nature of organisational change and the special emphasis of 
examining other industries facing radical change, the five theories forming the 
analytical structure of this study provide a framework that examines the electric utility 
industry. Theories by Pettigrew & Whipp (1998) examined competitive change in 
selected industry sectors including industries facing deregulation. Daft (2001) 
provided a model to explore the paradigm shift associated with the transformational 
change of deregulation while Tichy (1982) provided  insights into the key internal 
success factors needed to implement widespread organisational change. The learning 
organisation theory by Senge (1990) contrasts the traditional investor-owned utility 
corporate structure and was viewed as the „ideal‟ corporate structure in the electric 
utility industry‟s shift from regulation to deregulation. 
 
Figure 2-1 displays the key components of these five models and also indicates where 
these models overlap. For example, external context described by Pettigrew and 
Whipp (1998) is similar to the theories of developing a mission and strategy as 
described by Daft (2001), Senge (1990) and Tichy (1982). This figure also illustrates 
the gaps in these theories. In those cases, the gaps identified in one theory are then 
                                                 
5 This is a subset of the Context, Process and Content Model and is used to explain the interplay 
among these forces.  
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explored using the perspective of another theory. This is especially true when shifting 
from the strategic focus of the model by Pettigrew and Whipp (1998) to focus on the 
implementation tactics which are examined through Tichy‟s (1982) model.  
 
Lastly, some components are simply not addressed in this research investigation. The 
content portion of the Pettigrew and Whipp model (1998) was not appropriate to 
include, given the other features of this theory, namely the process and context pieces. 
The notion of coherence is over-arching enough to be addressed in the other elements 
of the model by Pettigrew and Whipp (1998) as well as other models on which the 
research issues are based. 
 
Therefore, the theoretical framework developed for this study is guided by two of the 
three elements of strategic change identified in the model by Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1998): 
• Context (external and internal environment) 
• Process (how change was implemented) 
 
External context is defined as the environmental, political, legal and economic 
factors that led to electric utility deregulation. This provided the backdrop for 
understanding the unique nature of the electric utility industry.  
 
Internal context is described as the focus on how each organisation views its internal 
environment by specifically focusing on the culture, structure, structures, policies, 
resources, and capabilities to match the external environment. It made for an easier 
progression of ideas to first discuss context before addressing process issues.   
Table 2-1 summarises the Research Issues by topic area and section in this review.  
 
The Process component of Pettigrew and Whipp‟s (1998) theory is discussed in 
Section 2.6 by summarizing the major organisational change theories before focusing 
specifically on those that are most appropriate to the electric utilities in this 





Table 2-1: Summary of Research Issues by Topic Area in the Literature 
Review 
Research Issue Section in Literature Review Topic Area  
R1: What is the evolution of 
the U.S. electric utility 
industry, focusing particularly 
on the external forces leading 
to deregulation? 
2.4.3 
Effects of deregulation 
on electric utility’s 
strategies and 
operations 
R2: How were the managers’ 
decision-making processes 




R3: How did deregulation 
affect the strategic focus of 




R4: What were the specific 
mechanisms these utilities 
used to manage change?    
  2.6.5 
Types of 
organisational change 
R5: What are the managers’ 
perspectives of electric 




change and the learning 
organisation 
R6: What are the managers’ 
perspectives of an ideal 
electric utility in terms of 
vision, commitment and 
resources?  
2.7.2.1 Internal context 
R7: What is the gap between 
the current utility and ideal 
utility of the future? 
2.7.3.1 Organisational structure 
 
 
Figure 2-1 (next page) provides a road map to help document the logic and flow of 
this literature review.  
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Figure 2-1: Comparisons of Models Used to Form the Theoretical Framework for this Inquiry 
Pettigrew & Whipp 
Context, Process,  
Content 
Pettigrew & Whipp  
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R1: What is the evolution of the U.S. electric utility industry, focusing particularly on the external forces leading to deregulation? 
R2: How were the managers’ decision-making processes affected by deregulation? 
R3: How did deregulation affect the strategic focus of these electric utilities?  
R4: What were the specific mechanisms these utilities used to manage change? 
R5: What are the managers’ perspectives of electric utilities as ‘learning organisations’?  
R6: What are the managers’ perspectives of an ideal electric utility in terms of vision, commitment and resources?  
R7: What is the gap between the current utility and ideal utility of the future?   
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2.3 Pettigrew and Whipp’s Model 
The framework developed by Pettigrew and Whipp (1998) involves a multi-level concept of 
competition (see Figure 2-2). This model blends both organisational change and strategic 
management theories, by viewing the context, process and content of change, both internally 
and externally. The model theorizes that successful change is a result of the interaction 
between: the context of change (the internal and external environment), the process or how of 
change was implemented and the content or what of change (objectives, purpose and goals) 
(Iles & Sutherland 2001).   
 













(Source: Pettigrew & Whipp 1998, p. 26) 
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This model was developed as a response to help manage strategic and operational change in 
four mature industries (Pettigrew and Whipp 1998). Since the electric utility industry is also a 
mature industry, it seemed a suitable model in which to analyse the effects of change on the 
Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs). This model forms the primary basis for this research 
inquiry (see Figure 2-2). The next section expands the discussion of this model to address the 
external context driving the electric utility industry. 
 
 
2.3.1 External context of change 
 
The first component of this analysis is to determine the context of the organisation, which 
includes understanding both the external and internal drivers of change for IOUs. This section 
discusses the environmental factors driving change in electric utility industry. It begins with 
an overview of the electric utility industry, to provide sufficient background, followed by a 
discussion of the timeline of events leading up to the industry deregulation.  
Table 2-2 provides a brief summary of the history of the electric utility industry, which 
provides additional context necessary to understand the political, economic and social 
factors facing this industry. For example, in the 1990s many utilities started advocating for 
deregulation and reform as a way to retain and attract more industrial customers (who 
would provide higher revenues). These actions culminated in the passage of the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, which paved the way for retail choice among large customers and 
created a more open market at the wholesale level.  
 Table 2-2:  History of the Electric Utility Industry 
Years Characteristics and Major Events 
Mid-1700s Interest in harnessing power of electricity. 






Industry had characteristics of a ‘natural monopoly’ where, for technical and social 
reasons, it is most efficient to have only one provider of a good or service. 
Provided service regarded as vital to economic and social fabric of community (i.e.  a 
‘public utility’). 
Operated through large, integrated networks.  
Highly capital-intensive.  








Regulation spreads to two-thirds of states.  
Most urban areas are electrified. 
Exclusive utility franchises (monopoly rights) also came with an ‘obligation’ to serve 
all customers in the defined regions. 
Limited federal regulation of multi-state utilities.  
Many small utilities were consolidated and became parts of larger ‘holding 
companies’. 
The rapid growth, consolidation, and complexity of the utility industry outpaced the 
ability of many local regulators. 
1929 Stock market crash revealed that many holding companies were over-leveraged. As a 










Congress passed federal legislation addressing interstate utility operations. 
The Federal Power Act, which regulates interstate sales of electricity, goes into effect. 
Primarily regulates shareholder-owned utilities.  
The Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) regulates the corporate structure of 
utilities. 
The federal government regulates interstate power sales and services, mergers and 
corporate structure. 
State governments regulate retail electric service, mergers, facility planning and 
siting. 
Other federal and state laws, rules and regulations also apply to the electric utility 
industry, including, but not limited to: 
• Anti-trust laws/Department of Justice 
• FTC-SEC requirements 







Electricity finds many new applications in homes and businesses. 
New power plants are built to meet customer needs. 
Because of economies of scale, electricity prices actually go down as larger and more 
efficient power plants come on line. 




Rate regulation re-examined. 





Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). 
Requires utilities to purchase electricity produced by co-generators and small power 
producers. 
Federal government expands regulatory role in state rate policies. 
1990s 
  
Some states move to retail choice. 
During the 1990s, a number of states adopted different models to encourage 









Energy Policy Act of 1992. 
Creates new class of ‘exempt wholesale generators’ to sell power in competitive 
wholesale markets. 
Expands FERC’s authority to order transmission-owning utilities to provide 
transmission access to other wholesale market players. 
Increases energy efficiency standards for buildings, appliances, and federal 
government. 
Encourages development of alternative fuels and renewable energy. 
Expands clean coal programs. 
Reforms and streamlines nuclear plant licensing. 
  (Source:  http://www.eei.org/industry_issues/industry_overview_and_statistics/Electricity_101.pdf) 
2.3.2 Political/legal factors  
The move toward deregulation began in 1978 when the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act (PURPA) created „qualifying facilities‟. This meant that entities other than electric 
utilities could actually generate electricity and the utilities had to pay for it at agreed upon 
rates. In 1992, the door opened wider and non-utility entities were allowed access to electric 
transmission lines. Therefore, non-utilities could start offering power to retail customers 
through retail wheeling. This act also required electric utilities to divest themselves of 
interstate holdings and limited their competition to prescribed geographic areas. Appendix 
A provides a full summary of legislative activities that led to industry deregulation. In 1996, 
the Federal Regulatory Energy Commission (FERC) issued Order 888, opening up 
transmission access to non-utilities and creating wholesale competition. Order 889 required 
utilities to establish electronic systems to share vital market information about transmission 
capabilities (Warwick 2000). The three utilities (East Coast Utility, West Coast Utility and 
Midwestern Utility) in this study faced three different regulatory environments.  
2.3.2.1 The deregulation experience in Massachusetts 
In 1997, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted a comprehensive electric restructuring law 
with the intention of creating a competitive electric-supply market that would lower 
consumer electric rates and still provide for a reliable source of energy (Transmission & 
Distribution World 2001). 
The Massachusetts Legislature provided for mechanisms within the electric restructuring law 
to guarantee rate reductions while providing flexibility within that rate structure to allow for 
inflationary cost-of-energy adjustments. In 1998, customers realized an immediate 10 percent 
price reduction and in 1999, a further reduction of 5 percent.  
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The Massachusetts Restructuring Act sought to encourage efficiency by utilities and to 
promote the development of more generating capacity as ways to improve competition and 
thereby lower consumer costs (Transmission & Distribution World 2001). 
Historically, Massachusetts has had higher fuel costs than other regions. For example, in 
2000 Massachusetts consumers paid 9 to 11 cents per kWh, 55 percent more than the national 
average and more than three times the price in regions such as the Northwest. In the industrial 
sector, Massachusetts prices were more than 65 percent above the national average and more 
than four times the rate charged in low-cost regions. 
 
To address the problem, utilities and their regulators expanded their reliance on capital-
intensive nuclear power. When the regional economic boom collapsed in the late 1980s, 
electricity consumption – especially by commercial and industrial businesses – fell and the 
region had excess capacity. Under the dynamics of current regulation, excess capacity 
produces higher prices, which drives more businesses away, creating more overcapacity and 
even higher prices (Navarro 1996).  
 
The Massachusetts Restructuring Act took four-plus years to develop. Proponents touted it as 
the most significant piece of economic-development legislation to hit Massachusetts in years. 
The „standard offer‟ is priced so low few competitors will be able to beat it – especially for 
residential customers. Only the generation side of the electric business has been opened to 
competition. Transmission, distribution, billing and service still will be handled by the same 
utilities (Munroe 1998). 
2.3.2.2 The deregulation experience in California 
In 1998, California became the third state in the nation, following Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island, to restructure its electric sector, allow retail competition and force its investor-owned 
utilities to sell their generating assets (Ferrey 2002).  
 
California's decision to restructure its electricity market was driven by two factors:   
 Changing federal regulation, a trend that began in the 1970s, and 
 Criticism of the state‟s market in the early 1990s  
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There was a general belief that the regulated utilities delivered electricity at too high a price, 
and this, in turn, dimmed future prospects for business investment in California 
(Congressional Budget Office Report 2001). The electricity prices were higher in California, 
particularly compared to other western states, due to the regulatory guarantees of a high rate 
of return on investment. Due to these incentives, the regulatory model also encouraged 
electric utilities to build too much generating capacity. Given this excess capacity, California 
regulators believed they could safely restructure the market without adversely affecting 
customer or electric providers (Congressional Budget Office 2001). 
 
The plan required the state‟s three large investor-owned utilities to sell part of their 
generating capacity. It also discouraged them from entering into long-term supply contracts 
with independent power producers. As a result, the utilities had to rely on the newly created 
spot wholesale market for about half of the electricity that their customers demanded. 
Requiring California utilities to sell off their generation plants – while still maintaining an 
obligation to serve all customers – was an inherent flaw in the plan (Tomain 2002). The 
deregulation efforts also established, ironically, two new regulatory entities: the California 
Power Exchange (PX), which established electric prices, and the California Independent 
System Operator (ISO), which directed the flow of electricity through the system (Tomain 
2002).  
This plan forced utilities to purchase wholesale electricity at the day-ahead or hour-ahead 
markets, rather than locking in long-term contracts. These spot markets have much higher 
price volatility and led to unheard of prices for electricity while the prices at the retail level 
were still capped. The plan created a credit problem for the utilities while retail customers 
had little incentive to conserve.  
Eventually, utilities were forced into bankruptcy because they could not pay the mounting 
bills for electric supply purchases. For example, Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in April 2001 to stem ongoing losses exceeding $300 
million a month (Ferrey 2002).  
The net effects of restructuring in California were higher electric prices across the board, and 
bankrupt and bereft investor-owned utilities. According to a survey conducted by J.D. Power 
and Associates, the average California electricity bill increased by 36 percent (Ferrey 2002).  
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2.3.2.3 The deregulation experience in Wisconsin 
Wisconsin regulators credit their progressive regulation for the state‟s relatively low electric 
rates. To ensure that the state retains its competitive edge, the Wisconsin Public Service 
Commission (PSC) began to examine whether the electric industry‟s „fundamental structural 
and regulatory underpinnings‟ should be changed. 
The PSC outlined the objectives and principles to guide its investigation. The objectives were 
to create a system „that sends accurate price signals to customers‟, maximizes „the number 
and diversity of service offerings‟ and „provides maximum economic efficiency and 
environmental stewardship‟ (Gish 1994). 
In the state of Wisconsin there was very little generation built over the course of the 1990s. 
The Commission focused on assuring customers and utilities that the necessary infrastructure 
improvements (generation, transmission and distribution) were being made. Therefore, 
restructuring, at least as it relates to implementing retail competition, was put on hold 
(Wisconsin Energy Corporation Brief 2004). Instead, the legislature passed two bills that 
changed utility ownership in Wisconsin, without deregulating its electric utilities completely. 
The first was Wisconsin Act 204 (enacted in May 1998) which: 
1) Required transmission-owning utilities in Wisconsin to join an independent system 
operator (ISO) by June 30, 2000. 
2) Streamlined the review and approval process and established time limits on the review 
of wholesale merchant power plants proposed by independent power producers 
(IPPs). 
The second was Wisconsin Act 9 (enacted October 1999) which: 
1) Provided for less restrictive statutory limitations on non-utility investments by electric 
utilities. This legislation applied only to utilities divesting their transmission assets to 
a state transmission company by January 1, 2001. 
2) Included provisions for public benefits demand-side management (DSM), low income 
energy assistance and renewable energy. 
 
Several of the state‟s largest utilities were also ordered to divest their transmission assets to 
the American Transmission Company LLC (ATCLLC), effective January 1, 2001 (Wisconsin 
Energy Brief 2004). 
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2.3.3 Economic factors 
The economic justification for the electric utility regulation has been that utilities are 
„natural monopolies‟. The economies of scale and scope discourage competition. Given its 
cost structure, an established utility could undercut its rivals and drive them from the market 
(Morehouse 1995). Legislators, regulators, economists and customers argued that 
deregulating electricity generation would result in a more efficient and economical market 
place. However, they still wanted to keep distribution and transmission elements of the 
industry regulated and non-competitive (Warwick 2000, p. 1).  
The reorganisation and restructuring of the U.S. electric industry were driven by economic 
and technological factors. The primary catalysts for change were:  
 A re-evaluation of the nature of competition within regulated industries, such as 
the changes in the telecommunications and banking industries since deregulation. 
 The disparity of electricity prices in the United States. In a regulated market, 
customers in New York paid more than two-and-a-half times the rates of 
customers in Kentucky. 
 Improvements in generation capabilities that required less time to build capacity 
and less capital investment (EIA 2001, p. 6). 
These changes resulted in a major consolidation within the electric utility industry, the 
divestiture of generation assets by many utilities and an overall re-examination of the market 
barriers to full competition (Liggett 2001). The three electric utilities (East Coast, Midwest 
and West Coast) were selected because they represented three different responses to these 
challenges as they moved to a more competitive market. These utilities were representative of 
the overall picture in their respective states. Utilities in these states faced similar challenges 
and thus the three case studies provide insight into answering the research issues posed in this 
investigation.  
Smeloff and Asmus (1997) observed two critical characteristics of the electric power industry 
make it different from other industries that have been deregulated. The electric power 
industry is both capital intensive and decentralized, which is a unique combination in the U.S. 
market. This history makes it difficult for electric utilities to adapt quickly to the changes 
caused by restructuring. 
 
In their study, Smeloff and Asmus (1997) noted: 
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We are used to operating in a judicial environment. We make our case and so does the 
opposition and a judge splits the different. This process (California restructuring) was more 
like surfing. 
 
Emmons (2000) argued that the industry deregulation experienced by the IOUs was actually 
paradoxical because:  
 Regulation continues to exist in the wake of deregulation.  
 Entry of new market actors is mandated on established firms so there is no „free 
market‟.  
 Deregulation assumes greater competition, when in fact the industry contracts 
through mergers and acquisitions. 
 
The paradox that exists will be illustrated in this study. Before deregulation, two of these 
utilities had fostered an organisational culture that would have facilitated the development of 
a learning organisation. However, by the end of this deregulation experience, all three utilities 
had become rigid and hierarchical. Furthermore, according to Emmons (2000), four generic 
market patterns emerge in the short-term, following some type of industry reform:  
 
 Competitive free-for-all: vigorous rivalry among new and established industry 
players because of the reduction of high market barriers (industry examples: U.S. 
airline industry). 
 Incumbent on top: the established producers continue to dominate the reform 
bargains and retain wealth and power (e.g. British power generation reform). 
 Black hole pattern: the primary producers become very unprofitable under the 
reform bargain as costs are higher than revenues (industry examples: deregulation 
of the U.S. electric utilities, especially in California). 
 Pie-sharing scenario: balanced sharing of economic value among the participants.  
 
While the utility regulators and commissions anticipated that deregulating the electric utility 
industry would create a situation in which there would be competitive rivalries, the opposite 
happened. Rather than creating a competitive market, the electric utility industry became a 
black hole. The market contracted and some of the largest utilities in the country, such as 
those in California, were forced into bankruptcy. Deregulation produced the opposite of a 
free market as smaller utilities were bought out or disappeared (Emmons 2000).  
 
The three utilities selected also represented a small, medium and large utility. However, in 
going through this experience, they all experienced similar challenges, both internally and 
externally. These utilities ranged in size from 4,000 employees at the Midwest Utility to more 
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than 20,000 employees at the West Coast utility. The East Coast utility employed 6,500 
employees prior to deregulation. (Note: Chapter 3 provides additional information about the 
characteristics and features of the three utility case studies and discusses more fully the 
criteria used for their selection.) 
 
This section provided a summary of the external components of Pettigrew & Whipp‟s (1998) 
model. It also provided a brief historical overview of the transformational effect that 
deregulation had on the three states addressed in the selected case studies. Now that the 
literature review has addressed the „why‟ of organisational change, the discussion will now 
shift to the „how‟ and focus on the competitive strategies that also played a role in these 
utilities‟ responses to industry transformation. Section 2.4 provides a context for 
understanding competitive strategies against the backdrop of industry deregulation.  
   
2.4  An overview of competitive strategies 
The previous discussion provided a brief summary of industry deregulation. This section 
provides a brief summary of the strategies organisations use to cope with a changing 
environment, with a special emphasis on strategies used by deregulating industries. „Strategy‟ 
refers to a complex web of thoughts, ideas, insights, experiences, goals, expertise, memories, 
perceptions and expectations that provides general guidance for specific actions in pursuit of 
particular ends. 
    
According to Porter (1980, p. xvi), competitive strategy is often  defined as „developing a 
broad formula for how a business is going to compete, what its goals will be, and what 
policies are needed to carry out those goals‟. Porter views strategy as making choices (Parnell 
& Menefee 2007) or as „a combination of the ends (goals) for which the firm is striving and 
the means (policies) by which it is seeking to get there‟ (Porter 1980 cited by Parnell & 
Menefee 2007). Therefore Porter views strategy as both plan and position. Porter‟s 
conceptual typology (1980; 1985) identifies three generic competitive strategies – cost 
leadership, differentiation and focus – which are viewed as ways of developing a sustainable 
competitive advantage so as to „out-compete‟ other businesses in the industry. Porter (1980) 
described basic strategic approaches as a trade-off between focus and strategic targets (see 
Figure 2-3). Additional support for Porter‟s generic management theories have been further 
developed and expanded in the literature (Chrisman, Hofer & Bolton, 1988; Porter 1980). 
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Porter‟s generic strategies are still viewed as relevant and valuable as they were featured in 
numerous strategic management textbooks (Dess, Lumpkin & Taylor 2004; David 2003; 
Wheelen & Hunger 2004; Thompson & Stickland 2003 as cited by Allen et al. 2007).   
 
Strategic research has its roots in industrial organisation (IO) theory. IO has been studied 
extensively in traditional fields in economics and there have been many models developed to 
understand both competition and competitive change (Pettigrew & Whipp 1998). Within Bain 
and Mason (as cited by Porter 1980), the IO framework of industry behaviour, firm 
performance or profitability is seen as a function of the industry structure. To investigate the 
strategy and performance relationship, many researchers used approaches that were 
generalisable across industries, specifically those proposed by Porter (1980, and 1985).  
 
Another school of business research has focused on the concept of strategy types (Fahey & 
Christensen 1986), and one school of inquiry examines the relationship between strategy type 
and firm performance (Dess & Davis 1984; Kim & Lim 1988; Miller 1987; Porter 1980). 
These strategy types, sometimes called generic strategies (Porter 1980), simplify a myriad of 
possible strategies into a limited set of strategy types.  
 
This study‟s framework investigates the tensions between these two strategies, examining the 
scope of the target market (i.e. broad vs. narrow) and the strategic competitive advantage (i.e. 
lowest cost position vs. perceived product differentiation (Douglas & Rhee 1989; Porter 
1980). Historically, the electric utility industry has assumed a position of overall cost 
leadership. This was because the industry consisted of regulated monopolies with a 
guaranteed rate of return. Given the economies of scale required to generate, transmit and 
deliver electricity, regulation provided the economic incentive to make the capital 
investments required to provide electricity to all customer classes. Deregulation was an 
attempt to move these electric utilities from their industry-wide, low-cost leadership position 
to become more focused on the higher-margin business and industrial customers. In effect, 
they wanted to develop a more narrow focus. However, that desire clashed with the basic 
premise that regulated monopolies needed to provide service to all customer classes. Hence, 
there was a division within the industry between the electric utility owners and stockholders, 
who wanted to focus on the more profitable customer classes (i.e. a focused strategy), and 
those regulators who wanted to ensure that all customers benefited from lower prices (broad 
strategy).  
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Figure 2-3: Porter’s Three Generic Strategies 
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There have been a number of studies (Dess & Davis 1984; Galbraith & Schendel 1983; 
Hambrick 1983a) that have tested the validity of Porter's generic strategies. Since these 
generic strategies are essentially „ideal‟ types, these studies rely on Porter‟s conceptual 
framework to identify the essential strategic components necessary for successful execution 
(Douglas & Rhee 1989). Various types of organisational strategies have been identified over 
the years (Miles & Snow 1978; Porter 1980). Porter's generic strategies remain the most 
commonly supported (David 1999; Miller 1988; Thompson & Stickland 1998) and in the 
literature (Kim & Lim 1988; Miller & Dess 1993).  
 
Other researchers (Dess & Davis 1984; Hambrick 1981; Nayyar 1993; Parker & Helms 1992; 
Reitsperger et al. 1993) have found support for Porter‟s (1980; 1985) original generic 
strategies. As a result, Hill (1988) theorized that the generic business-level strategies of 
differentiation and overall cost leadership may be combined in some firms to achieve 
competitive advantage. It is postulated that the three utilities (East Coast Utility, West Coast 
Utility and Midwestern Utility) in this study have the same generic strategy that was 




Another widely viewed generic strategy was developed a by Miles and Snow (1978) and 
shares some of the same characteristics as Porter‟s generic strategies (see Figure 2-3). Miles 
and Snow (1978) identified four business strategy types: defender, prospector, analyser and 
reactor. Defenders usually direct their products or services to a clearly defined segment of the 
total market, offering their target market a full range of products or services and striving to 
build satisfied customers. Growth is achieved cautiously and incrementally through market 
penetration. Having chosen stable products and markets, the defender organisation protects 
its domain by offering higher-quality, superior service and competitive prices.  
 
Prospectors have a broad product/market domain that is in a continuous state of development. 
Growth is achieved through product development and market development. Multiple 
technologies are developed for the different products and the prospector‟s technological 
processes are flexible in order to constantly produce new products. Analysers are a 
combination of the prospector and defender types of organisations. The analyser‟s domain 
consists of products and markets, some of which are stable while others are changing. It has a 
dual technological core to meet the demands of its stable and changing domains. The analyser 
is an avid follower of change and imitates the best products and markets of the prospector 
through extensive market surveillance. Growth occurs through market penetration as well as 
market development and product development. Reactors respond inappropriately to 
environment change and uncertainty because they do not have mechanisms to respond 
consistently to their environment. 
 
Miles and Snow‟s (1978) typology in Figure 2-4 reflects a complex view of organisational 
and environmental processes, as well as the attributes of product, market, technology, 
organisational structure and management characteristics (Smith & Grimm 1987).  
 














    Figure 2-4:  Miles and Snow’s Generic Strategies  
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This approach and typology are still relevant in more recent investigations (Ghoshal 2003; 
Hambrick 2003). The typology describes four types of organisational strategic positions – 
prospectors, defenders, analysers and reactors – each with its own distinctive strategy. 
Defenders pursue narrow product market domains, rarely make adjustments in their 
technology, structure or methods of operation, and devote primary attention to improving 
efficiency. In contrast, prospectors almost continuously search for market opportunities, 
possess flexible technologies, and are creators of change and uncertainty to which their 
competitors must respond.  
 
Analysers operate in two types of product/market domains, one stable and the other changing; 
they behave like defenders in the more stable areas and like prospectors in the more turbulent 
areas. Their organisational structures and processes are a combination of those found among 
prospectors and defenders. Hence, prospectors and defenders reside at opposite ends of a 




Firms that fail to achieve a consistent environment-strategy-structure alignment are termed 
reactors (Blumentritt et al. 2006). This failure may result from management‟s inability to 
articulate a clear strategy, difficulty in shaping the organisation‟s structures and processes to 
fit a chosen strategy, or maintaining the organisation‟s strategy-structure relationship despite 
overwhelming changes in environmental conditions.  
Boyne and Walker (2004) argue that organisations‟ strategies are messy and complex rather 
than neat and simple and thus the „analyser‟ category is redundant because all organisations 
are both prospectors and defenders to some extent (although the balance will vary with the 
priority attached to these stances and preferences to a reactor strategy).  
 
The Miles and Snow (1978) typologies offer another perspective for which to examine the 
three case studies. Therefore, this study will investigate whether the East Coast Utility, West 
Coast Utility and Midwestern Utility have implemented defender, analyser, prospector or 
reactor strategies. 
 
Another offshoot of strategic theory is the development of emergent strategy, as described by 
Mintzberg (1994). Emergent strategy is based on the organisation‟s interaction with its 
environment. It is a process interwoven with all that it takes to manage an organisation. These 
strategies can appear at any time or place within the organisation and usually occur 
informally by a variety of staff at various levels within the organisation (Mintzberg 1994). A 
key feature of emergent strategy is that it must combine some level of flexible learning with 
some degree of cerebral control (Mintzberg 1994).   
 
2.4.1 Critique of current management theories 
Recent studies have, however, challenged Porter's typology and questioned his claims about 
the exclusivity of the generic strategies. Hill (1988) challenged Porter's claim about the 
exclusivity of cost leadership and differentiation, and argued that sustainable competitive 
advantage rests on the successful combination of these two strategies. Murray (1988) 
criticized Porter's typology, and observed that the development of any successful business 
strategy must reflect the larger competitive environment. Since industry environments do not 
specifically prescribe the need for cost leadership or differentiation, Murray (1988) found 
little reason to conclude that only one strategy should be employed in response to any 
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particular environment. Similarly, Wright (1990) concluded that multiple strategies are 
needed to respond effectively to any business environment. Miller and Dess (1993) could not 
confirm the proposition that a combination strategy would be associated with lower 
performance.  
Furthermore, these strategies are not always applicable to organisations operating in either 
turbulent (Kim & Mc Intosh 1999) or global environments (Chan & Wong 1999) that require 
flexible combinations of strategies. Karnani (1984) proved that a combination strategy was 
feasible using game theory while Glazer (1991) predicted that firms would not need to choose 
between strategies of low cost and differentiation.  
 
Rapidly changing competitive environments call for more flexibility and also the ability to 
mix more than one generic strategy. Mass customization and the development of network 
organisation concepts now allow flexible combinations of strategies that were not possible a 
decade ago (Anderson 1997; Goldman et al. 1995; Pine 1993; Preiss et al. 1996). These 
theories also tend to overlap. Miles and Snow‟s prospector is similar to Porter‟s strategy of 
differentiation; Miles and Snow‟s defender and Hambrick‟s (1983b) and Dess and Davis‟ 
(1984) cost leadership strategies are similar to Porter‟s strategy of cost leadership. Miller and 
Friesen‟s (1986) niche innovator strategy is similar to Porter‟s (1980; 1985) strategy of focus.  
 
There have also been some drawbacks using Miles and Snow‟s (1978) typology in recent 
years. The first major criticism is based on the author‟s own conflicting assertions that the 
reactor strategy is a fourth „ideal‟ type. However, the authors describe the reactor as a 
„residual‟ type of behaviour in that organisations are forced into this response mode when 
they are unable to pursue a defender, prospector  or analyser strategy (Miles & Snow 1978, p. 
93). Also, the authors state that an organisation may be classified as a reactor when 
„management fails to align strategy, structure, and context in a consistent fashion‟ (Miles & 
Snow 1978, p. 12). Organisations having a reactor strategy have been addressed as both a 
residual and as a unique type of strategy. While Hambrick (1983c) and Zajac and Shortell 
(1989) simply assumed that the reactor is a residual category, other researchers have 
identified organisations with a strategy that closely resembled the status of a reactor. Segev 
(1989) concluded that prospectors, defenders, analysers and reactors are four ideal types of 
strategy that are unique. Doty et al. (1993) argue that the reactor should be treated as a unique 
ideal type of strategy.  
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As Pettigrew et al. (1998) argue, these generic approaches, especially Porter‟s, have tended to 
over-simplify the organisation‟s response to change. They presume that the manager has a 
passive role in implementing management change. The literature also underestimates the 
importance of the internal operation and they ignore the critical dimension of the process, 
which led Pettigrew and his colleagues to develop a model that requires a more adaptive and 
interpretive perspective (Ginter & White 1982; Lewis 1988; Pettigrew 1985a, 1987a;Whipp, 
Rosenfield & Pettigrew 1988; 1989a; 1989b). 
 
Pettigrew‟s (1985; Pettigrew et al. 2001) criticism of the literature about  strategic change 
was viewed without a proper understanding of the context, history and processes driving 
change, and thus led to the development of the change model discussed in Section 2.3 and 
subsequent sections.  
 
 
2.4.2 Generic strategies for deregulating industries 
 
Kim and Mc Intosh (1999) examined strategies that firms used when they were shifting from 
a regulated to a deregulated environment. Their work, which built upon a variety of strategic 
management theories, revealed a finding relevant to electric utilities: Focused strategies are 
not relevant to utilities in a regulated environment. Kim and Mc Intosh (1999) argue that 
firms operating in a regulated market do not have to rely on focused competitive strategies, 
such as those described in the previous figures. Rather, these authors contend that focus is 
less important for regulated companies because they are controlled by governmental 
authorities. Since regulated industries do not face the same penalties for market failures as do 
competitive companies, they are not penalized for their failure to pursue focused strategies 
(Mahon & Murray, 1980). 
 
Regulated firms have less experience with focused competitive strategies. While it seems 
reasonable to believe that newly deregulated industries would change their competitive 
strategies to meet new market demands, Kim and Mc Intosh (1999) found that just the 
opposite occurs. Rather than developing a more focused strategy, instead they continue to do 
„business as usual‟ even after deregulation (Kim & Mc Intosh 1999 citing Smith & Grimm 
1987 and Zajac & Shortell 1989). Furthermore, these authors believe that these organisations 
do not have the resources to implement a focused strategy that is more closely aligned with a 
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post-deregulated market (Boeker 1996; Kim & Mc Intosh 1999, citing Bettis & Prahald 
1995).  
 
Kim and Mc Intosh (1999) further identified competitive strategies that have been the most 
productive for industries in a post-regulated market. Their research concluded that 
organisations pursing a defender strategy were significantly less profitable than organisations 
pursuing analyser and prospector strategies (Kim and Mc Intosh 1999, citing Zajac & 
Shortell‟s 1989). They also concluded that analysers and prospectors were more profitable 
because their strategies allowed them to adopt a proactive posture to the environment. 
According to Kim and Mc Intosh (1999), if utilities choose to keep the status quo, then most 
would remain „reactors‟.   
In contrast to these perspectives of Kim and Mc Intosh (1999) and according to the META 
Group Research, 10 percent of existing electric utilities believe that the traditional regulated 
business model will return and that survival depends on waiting out the „experiment‟ with 
competition. Seventy percent are struggling to define a future state of the industry and 20 
percent have a vision of the future and coherent program (Nicholson 2000, p. 80). One major 
challenge is that IOUs have to stop thinking like monopolies (Smeloff & Asmus 1997). Many 
utilities still believe that they are in a commodity business and they will expect government 
regulators or the courts to protect them from the discipline of the wholesale power market 
(Smeloff & Asmus 1997). It is postulated that deregulation had a profound effect on the 
strategic focus and direction for the East Coast Utility, West Coast Utility and Midwestern 
Utility. Each utility differs from the other in how it was affected by deregulation.  This leads to 
the development of the first research issue addressed in this inquiry: 
 
R1: What is the evolution of the U.S. electric utility industry, focusing particularly on 
the external forces leading to deregulation?  
 
 
2.4.3  Effects of deregulation on electric utility’s strategies and operations 
Given the contextual background of both industry deregulation and the likely strategies used 
by electric utilities to adapt to these external changes, the foundation is now laid to begin 
exploring more fully the effects of deregulation on these electric utilities‟ operations by 
examining their strategic focus and decision-making processes. Pettigrew‟s model also 
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recognizes the importance the strategic decision-making in the within the context of 
organisational change. This is discussed more fully in the next section.  
 
 
2.5  Strategic decision-making 
 
Pettigrew (1987) suggests that researchers should consider the role and significance of the 
nature of the decision problem in shaping the process. As Frederickson (1984) observed, 
strategic decision-making is often viewed as a sequence of steps or phases rather than a static 
checklist of prescribed steps.  
 
The way managers categorize and label a decision in the early stages of the decision-making 
process (DMP) strongly influences the organisation‟s subsequent responses (Papadakis et al. 
1998). There is evidence that if a decision is perceived as a crisis, different actions will be 
taken than if the decision is perceived as an opportunity (Milburn, Schuler & Watman 1983; 
Papadakis et al. 1998 citing Jackson & Dutton, 1988). Papadakis et al. found that when 
decisions were interpreted as threats, as opposed to opportunities, the ensuing DMP was 
characterized by greater comprehensiveness. It is postulated that the decision-making 
processes in the East Coast Utility, West Coast Utility and Midwestern Utility differ from each 
other and were affected by deregulation.  
 
 
This leads to the development of the second research issue addressed in this inquiry: 
 
R2: How were the managers’ decision-making processes affected by deregulation? 
 
The analysis will explore the utility manager‟s decision-making process in factors described 
by Papadakis et al. 1998 (citing Schneider & De Meyer 1991) as well as others (Beach & 
Mitchell 1978; Billings, Milburn & Schaalman 1980; Bryson & Bromiley 1993; Dutton, 
Fahey & Narayanan1983; Hitt & Tylder, 1991; Rajagopalan et al. 1993). These factors 
provide additional context to better understand the influence on strategic decision-making 
process in determining an organisation‟s strategy:  
 managers‟ individual characteristics and group dynamics   
 internal organisational context   
 environmental factors. 
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Another method to understand the context of organisational change is to identify the ways in 
which these external forces affected the strategic focus of these utilities as they developed a 
response to industry deregulation. It is postulated that the strategic focus in the East Coast 
Utility, West Coast Utility and Midwestern Utility differ from each other and were affected by 
deregulation. This is summarized in the third research issue:  
 
R3: How did deregulation affect the strategic focus of these electric utilities?    
 
Pettigrew and Whipp (1998) argue that strategic change and competition are continuous 
processes, not steady states. Strategic change is also an organisation-wide activity that 
requires the firm to develop a thorough understanding of its environment.  
 
Chandler‟s (1962, p.13) classic definition stated that: „Strategy is the determination of the 
basic long-term goals of an enterprise and the adoption of a course of action and the 
allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals.‟ Strategic change is the primary 
result of an organisation executing strategic initiatives like the adaptation to environmental 
changes (Kanter et al. 1992). One such environmental change is industry deregulation, which 
has been discussed previously. 
 
This section summarized how industry deregulation affected the strategic decisions made by 
managers within the electric utility industry. This section specifically explored the new types 
of strategies that these organisations must develop in order to compete in a deregulated 
market. But that is only part of the picture. There is also a need to understand the process of 




2.6 Process of change 
 
The second component of Pettigrew‟s model is to focus on the process or how change was 
implemented (Iles & Sutherland 2001) in these organisations. This section provides an 
overview of organisational change theories, with a special focus on those that are most 
appropriate for IOUs. Morgan (1996 as cited by MacPhail 2001) described organisations: 
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• Creating social reality: Organisations as cultures in which their members view 
organisations as systems of meanings, values and beliefs.  
• Unfolding logics of change: Organisations as flux and transformation. In this 
metaphor, organisations are viewed as dynamic and subject to evolutionary and 
revolutionary changes.  
 
IOUs create their own social realities and deep-rooted organisational cultures as discussed in 
Section 2.6.2.1. These institutions are also subject to revolutionary and evolutionary change 
as a result of the industry deregulation and restructuring (see Section 2.5.2.1).  
2.6.1 Summary of organisational change models  
 
An organisation model that provides a useful framework for categorizing the dimensions of 
an organisation should enable planning, implementation and tracking of change to be more 
effective (Burke 2002). Since the end of World War II, organisational change models have 
been in development as organisations became larger and more complex (Iles & Sutherland 
2001). Change models have evolved from simple approaches, focusing on change 
implemented at the top of organisation, to more complex change models that reach across all 
organisational levels. Table 2-3 summarizes this evolution. The basis for most organisational 
change theories begins with Lewin‟s Change Model (1), which focused on unfreezing, 
changing and refreezing. The subsequent models (2-7) build on this simple premise and 
expand to include more steps. They also focus on more on ways to implement organisational 
change. 
 
However, change is not a linear process and therefore is not easily classified into one model 
(Burke 2002). This shortcoming led to the development of a new theoretical emphasis that is 
represented in models 8-11 in Table 2-3 and include the analytical framework for this study: 
Pettigrew‟s Content, Context, and Process Model. These newer change models better reflect 
the complexity of the changing business environment and emphasize the need to reach out to 







Table 2-3:  Organisational Change Models 
 Theory Description  
1. Lewin’s Change  
    Model 
The foundation of organisational change models consist of three 
steps:  
1. Unfreezing: Reducing the resistance to change, often by 
‘psychological disconfirmation,’ which creates a motive to 
engage in change activities. 
2. 2.  Moving: Shifts organisational behaviours by changing 
organisational structures and processes. 
3. Refreezing: Stabilizes the organisation at the new change 
level and reinforces change through a supportive culture, 
norms, policies, and structures (Cummings & Worley 
2001). 
2. Action Research   
    Model 
Views planned change as cyclical process relying on iterative 
research to identify and diagnose the effectiveness of action 
planning and implementation. Consists of eight steps: 
1. Problem identification among senior/key executives. 
2. Consultation with behavioural science expert. 
3. Data gathering and initial diagnosis. 
4. Feedback to organisation (creates a feedback loop). 
5. Joint diagnosis of problem and identification of areas of  
    additional inquiry.  
6. Joint action planning to determine best change strategy. 
7. Action. 
8. Diagnosis after action (Cummings & Worley 2001).     
3. Contemporary  
    Adaptation to  
    Action Research 
Focuses on involving individuals directly in implementing change 
through active participation and emphasising the positive nature 
of change.  
1. Choose positive subjects. 
2. Collect positive stories with broad participation. 
3. Examine data and develop possibilities. 
4. Develop a vision with broad participation. 
5. Develop action plans. 
6. Evaluate (and return to Step 5 as required).  
    (Cummings & Worley 2001)    
4. General Model of  
    Planned Change 
Adapted from Lewin to develop a general framework for change 
based on implementing four steps: 
1. Entering and Contracting. 
2. Diagnosing. 
3. Planning and Implementing Change. 
4. Evaluating and Institutionalizing Change (Cummings &  
    Worley 2001).    
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5. Kotter: Eight-Stage  









Kotter developed an eight-stage process associated with large-
scale transformation: 
1. Increase urgency.  
2. Build the guiding team.  
3. Get the right vision.  
4. Communicate for buy-in.  
5. Empower action.  
6. Create short-term wins.  
7. Do not let up.  
8. Make change stick.  
(Kotter, 1996)   
6. 7S Model   Developed by Waterman, Peters and Phillips (1980), this theory 
suggests there are seven aspects of an organisation that need to 
harmonise with each other, to point in the same direction:  
1. Strategy 





7. Skills   
7. Dunphy-Stace  
    Contingency Model 
This mode’s premise that the most appropriate response is the 
one that is best suited to the particular environment experiencing 
change. The types of change identified in this model are: 
• Scale of Change – Fine-tuning, Incremental, Modular   
• Transformation or Corporate  Transformation  
• Leadership Styles – Collaborative, Consultative, Directive  
           or 
• Coercive (Dunphy & Stace 1993)   
8. Soft Systems  
    Models for Change 
Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) provides a means of 
articulating complex social processes in a participatory way. This 
allows employees’ viewpoints and assumptions about the world 
to be brought to light, challenged and tested (Iles & Sutherland 
2001).  
9. Context, Process,  
    and Content Model 
Developed by Pettigrew and Whipp (1998) as a way to discern 
why some private sector organisations were better able than 
others to manage strategic change and improve their competitive 
performance. The model suggests there are five interrelated 
factors that are important in shaping a firm’s performance: 
1. Environmental assessment. 
2. Human resources as assets and liabilities. 
3. Linking strategic and operational change. 
4. Leading change. 
5. Overall coherence (Iles & Sutherland 2001).  
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10. Learning  
      Organisations 
This specialized model expands upon the SSM. Its central theory 
is that learning organisations are made up of the following 
strategic building blocks:  
1. Mission and Vision – Clarity and employee support of the    
          mission, strategy, and espoused values of the organisation.   
2. Leadership – Leadership that is perceived as empowering  
    employees, encouraging an experimenting culture, and   
    showing strong commitment to the organisation.  
3. Experimentation – A strong culture of experimentation that  
    is rewarded and supported at all levels in the organisation.  
4. Transfer of Knowledge – The ability of an organisation to  
    transfer knowledge within and from outside the organisation   
    and to learn from failures.  
5. Teamwork and Cooperation – An emphasis on teamwork  
    and group problem-solving as the mode of operation and  
    for developing innovative ideas (Goh 1998; Senge 1990). 
11. Patching In patching, senior corporate executives routinely adjust their 
strategies to changing markets. It takes a variety of forms 
including: adding, splitting, transferring, exiting, or combining 
chunks of businesses. Patching changes are small and made 
frequently. They focus on evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
change. It is most appropriate for organisations facing turbulent 
change (Eisenhardt & Brown 1999).    
12. Chaos Theory Chaos theory states that in certain circumstances iterative, 
recursive and nonlinear systems operate in a paradoxical 
dynamic which makes it impractical to make long-term forecasts 
(Stacy 2007).  
 
            (Source: Adapted and Expanded from Banham 2006; pp. 31-32) 
 
These change models all have valid components but none has been demonstrated to be 
superior to others (Iles & Sutherland 2001). The Lewin Model (Table 2-3, item 1) assumes 
these change activities happen in a linear fashion, when, in fact, they could be occurring at 
the same time. Thus, there is no time for refreezing before the requirement for another 
change. Modern organisations are unable to keep a level of stability for very long (Zeffane 
1996). These linear models focus more on a planned approach to change, which is not 
appropriate to IOUs that are facing widespread, and continuous, organisational change.  
 
The scale of change is another perspective provided by some models. The Dunphy-Stace 
Contingency (Table 2-3, item 7) views the wide-scale, structural change as experienced by 
the IOUs. The Soft Systems (Table 2-3, item 8) and Context, Process, and Content models 
(Table 2-3, item 9) also consider the politics, historical context and the culture of 
organisations experiencing change (Iles & Sutherland 2001; Weick & Quinn, 1999). These 
models factor in more features that apply to a wider range of organisations. In their review of 
change theory, Iles & Sutherland (2001) summarise that change is a complex and dynamic 
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process, and emphasise the political and contextual influences within organisations. 
Therefore, these change models are more relevant given the historical, political, and cultural 
issues that surrounded the widespread organisational change faced by the IOUs.  
 
Chaos theory (item 12) originates from the mathematical theory first discussed by (Gleick 
1988: Stewart 1989 as cited in Stacey 2007). Chaos theory suggests that the behaviour of 
complex, non-linear dynamic systems will never be entirely predictable and that outcomes 
may be dependent on tiny changes to initial conditions (Iles & Sutherland 2001). Its goal is to 
explain the paradoxical elements of change or, as Stacey writes, to understand what is 
„predictably unpredictable‟ (2007, p. 190). Chaos theory is now considered to be a subset of 
complexity theory and as such has been applied more successfully to organisational research 
(Battram 1998). Chaos theory is useful in helping to explain why organisational change may 
not occur in a linear fashion and with paradoxical results. In practice, however, organisational 
change is chaotic, often involving shifting goals, discontinuous activities, surprising events 
and unexpected combinations of changes and outcomes (Cummings et al., 1985; Dawson 
1996 cited in Iles & Sutherland 2001). 
 
The organisational change models presented earlier provide the foundation to explore more 
fully one model that incorporates many of features highlighted in the later change models, 
with a special emphasis on identifying a model that can adapt to the types of internal and 
external changes faced by these electric utilities. 
 
2.6.2  Types of change 
Change theorists describe organisational change in a number of ways. One definition is any 
change, „whether planned or unplanned action that attempts to improve an organisation‟ 
(MacPhail 2001). The focus of this inquiry is to examine how the planned changes in the 
electric utility industry affected the selected utilities. Change may be understood in relation to 
its extent and scope. Iles and Sutherland (2001) citing Ackerman (1997) have distinguished 
three types of change: developmental, transitional and transformational.  
   
 Developmental or continuous change may either be planned or emergent; it is first 
order, or incremental. It is change that enhances or corrects existing aspects of an 
organisation, often focusing on the improvement of a skill or process. 
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 Transitional or episodic change seeks to achieve a known desired state that is 
different from the existing one. It is episodic, planned and second order, or radical. 
The model of transitional change forms much of the basis of the organisational 




 Transformational change is radical or second order in nature. It requires a shift in 
assumptions made by the organisation and its members. Transformation can result in 
an organisation that differs significantly in terms of structure, processes, culture and 
strategy. It may therefore result in the creation of an organisation that operates in 
developmental mode, one that continuously learns, adapts and improves. (Iles & 
Sutherland 2001). 
 
Developmental change is also viewed as continuous in some change theory models. These 
theories describe continuous change as „ongoing, evolving, and cumulative‟ (Weick & Quinn 
1999, p. 361). Continuous change focuses on small continuous adjustments, created 
simultaneously across units. Over time, these changes can culminate into substantial change 
(Weick & Quinn 1999). 
 
More radical change is referred to in the literature by a variety of terms such as „episodic‟ and 
„transitional.‟ Episodic change is viewed as discontinuous and intermittent. Episodic change 
tends to be infrequent, slower because of its wide scope, less complete because it is seldom 
fully implemented, more strategic in its content, more deliberate and formal than other types 
of emergent change. It is also more disruptive because programs are replaced rather than 
altered, and initiated at higher levels in the organisation (Mintzberg & Westley 1992).  
Episodic change is also linked closely with the organisational change models viewing the 
non-linearity of change as outlined in chaos and complexity theories. Tushman and 
Romanelli‟s (1994) „theory of punctuated equilibrium‟ is a way to describe episodic change. 
In this theory, organisations move between calm and radical change states. The periods of 
equilibrium are focused on maintaining the existing organisational structures and only small 
incremental change occurs. However, organisations also experience revolutionary periods of 
change when there are significant changes in the environment that result in significant 
structural changes within the organisation, creating chaos and disarray until the period ends 
and new structures are created (Gersick 1991).  
The theory of punctuated equilibrium is not quite compatible with the investor-owned electric 
utility industry. According to Weick and Quinn (1999), organisations that can easily adapt to 
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the theory of punctuated equilibrium are those with very tight-knit organisational structures. 
These organisations are nimble enough to adjust to radical change in the external 
environment, such as the IT industry (Tushman, Virany & Romanelli 1985 cited in Weick & 
Quinn 1999).  
 
In contrast, organisations struggling with episodic change have the following characteristics: 
tightly-coupled interdependencies within organisational departments or sub-departments; the 
value of efficiency; a preoccupation with short-run adaptation rather than long-run 
adaptability; constraints on action in the form of the „invisible hand‟ of institutionalization; 
powerful norms embedded in strong subcultures; and imitation as a major motivation for 
change (Pfeifer 1998; Miller 1990; Tushman & O‟Reilly 1996 cited in Weick & Quinn 
1999). These characteristics capture many of the critical characteristics shared by IOUs. 
 
 
2.6.3 Discussion of transformational change  
 
Transformational change is defined the emergence of a „new organisation‟ that is unknown 
until it takes shape. It is built out of the ashes from the chaotic death of the old state (Battram 
1998).  
 
Transformational change more closely describes the effects that industry deregulation had on 
the electric utility industry in general, and the companies studied in the three case studies in 
particular. 
 
Transformational change occurs when there has been a change in the firm‟s operating 
environment. For the three electric utilities in this study, this outside event was industry 
deregulation (discussed in Section 2.3). Daft‟s (2001) organisational model has been adapted 
to reflect the electric utility industry (see Figure 2-5). This model is based on change 
occurring in the following ways within this deregulated utility: 
• Vertical to horizontal structure: Authority rests at the top in a vertical structure; in a 





• Routine tasks to empowered roles: Tasks, defined as specific pieces of work, are broken 
down into separate pieces and employees are expected to do what they are told; in 
learning organisations, employees have roles that allow for discretion and responsibility 
and those roles constantly change. 
 
• Formal control systems to shared information: Formal structures with rigid 
communication channels give way to a sharing of information. This information is not 
used to control employees but rather to enhance the overall organisation (Daft 2001, p. 
28). 
 
• Competitive (top-down) strategy to collaborative strategy: Strategy is developed at the 
top and forced down, in a collaborative environment; all employees contribute to strategy 
development. 
 
• Rigid to adaptive culture: Culture is set in concrete; it must adapt to culture that 
encourages openness, equality, continuous improvement and change; one that encourages 






The change most applicable in this inquiry is defined as „revolutionary change‟ as described 
by Porter and Rivkin (2000, p. 6): 
 In times of revolutionary change, in contract, many, related elements of industry structure 
change simultaneously. Industry structure comes „unfrozen‟ and relative positions within an 
industry are shuffled. After the period of transformation, competitive forces bear little 
resemblance to those that held sway before. 
 
Porter and Rivkin (2000) further explain that these periods of transformation also provide 
companies with „unusual latitude to influence future industry structure‟. Industry 
transformations are caused by triggers, experimentation or convergence. The triggers can be a 
Figure 2-5: The effect of transformational change in the electric utility market 
 
(Source: Adapted from Daft 2001) 
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change in technology, customer needs or wants, or a change in regulation. This last trigger is 
especially important in the context of this investigation:  
 
 
A change in regulation can alter the mix of buyer value and cost that companies are permitted 
to offer ... [It can] set the stage for transformation of an industry but the metamorphosis does 
not actually occur until individual managers and companies see the potential for change and 
act upon it (Porter & Rivkin 2000; emphasis added). 
 
The task of transforming established firms is similar to re-engineering failed organisations. 
The major obstacles include (Emmons 2000, p. 64):   
 Magnitude of the task: Most existing structures, including top management, 
organisational structure, internal systems and other resources are ill-suited to new market. 
 Challenge of managing the evolution of the reform bargain from the political 
perspective: Too often incumbents underemphasize the importance of managing the 
political process involved in managing the mechanics of deregulation. 
2.6.4  Critique of organisational change models 
 
There has been a growth of change models to explain both the process (how to change) and 
the content (what to change) as a way to more closely model the reality of organisational 
change (Burke 2002). For example, the Dunphy-Stace (1996), Pettigrew & Whipp (1998), 
Eisenhart & Brown (1999) models view change as too complex and non-linear to be cast into 
a number of steps or limited to a set of principles. Dawson (2001) addresses the difficulty in 
conceptualizing organisational change and presents the definition of „new ways of organizing 
and working‟ along with four critical dimensions of time, scale, political environment and 
substance. Dawson (2001) addresses the difficulty in conceptualizing organisational change 
and presents the definition of „new ways of organizing and working‟ along with four critical 
dimensions of time, scale, political environment and substance.  
 
These gaps suggest that additional studies in organisational change will need to focus on 
these areas, and the inter-relationships between these internal factors and the external factors 
driving change. 
 
Change theorists concede that while organisations may want to adopt an approach of 
emergent change as advocated by Mintzberg (1994), this may be impossible if they 
previously operated in a rigid bureaucratic structure, which describes the IOUs in this 
investigation. Therefore, successful organisational change will require a complete 
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restructuring of every organisational component and a radical transformation at every 
organisational level (Allaire & Firsirotu 1984; Benjamin & Mabey 1993; Clarke 1994; 
Dawson 1994; Handy 1993; Wilson 1992).  
 
Recent work, e.g. complexity, has focused specifically upon emergence. There is a growing 
body of research which attempts to apply complexity principles to the problem of foretelling 
emergent strategy (McMillian 2008). While complexity offers a perspective on non-linearity 
and emergence, it has been applied with mixed results.  
 
A major shortcoming is that, as Stacey (2007, p. 228) points out, these theories hypothesize 
that the manager can somehow instil order into the chaos by prescribing a simple set of rules, 
which may not be realistic or  appropriate given the various dimensions and factors driving 
organisational change. The theory of punctuated equilibrium theory has been validated in 
certain types of industries (i.e. airlines, Kelly & Amburgey 1991; and  minicomputers, 
(Tushman, Virany & Romanelli 1985). These organisational processes, however, are still not 
well understood because of the limited research in exploring how managers in changing 
environments measure and interpret organisational response (Sastry 1997). Moreover, a 
major shortcoming of the theory of punctuated equilibrium (Romanelli & Tushman 1994) is 
that the environmental change leading to the changes in the organisation‟s state is caused by 
technological innovation. The changes caused within the electric utility industry were brought 
about through political forces rather than technological innovations. Therefore, while chaos 
and complexity theories may describe the non-linear nature of electric utility deregulation, 
they are not appropriate theories in this research framework.  
 
Instead, the theories forming the basis of this research inquiry are driven by senior 
management views of industry deregulation. As Hamel and Prahalad (1985) wrote, 
organisational transformation must be driven by how senior management believes the 
industry will be structured in the next five to 10 years. While this is often difficult to achieve, 
Hamel and Prahalad (1985, p. 46) observe that:  
… The senior manager‟s first task is to develop a process for pulling together for the 
collective wisdom within an organisation. [There must be a] concern for the future, a sense of 
where opportunities lie, and an understanding of organisational change are not the province of 
any group, [but rather] people from all levels of a company can help define the future. 
 




R4: What were the specific mechanisms these utilities used to manage change?    
 
 
2.6.5  Transformational change and the learning organisation 
 
A fundamental premise of this research inquiry is to determine if the specific mechanisms 
developed and deployed by the three selected electric utilities were sufficient to address the 
transformational change experienced at these organisations. More specifically, did these 
mechanisms encourage the development and progression towards a learning organisation, or 
instead, stifle it? Another issue is whether the East Coast Utility, West Coast Utility and 
Midwest Utility can be described as learning organisations or have the capabilities to develop 
the features of a learning organisation as a result of this transformational change. A learning 
organisation (Hodgetts & Luthans 1997; see Table 2-3, item 10) is one that is able to 
transform by transferring knowledge, sharing a vision and constantly evolving (Senge 1992). 
Patching (Eisenhart & Brown 1999; see Table 2-3, item 11) also focuses on senior executives 
viewing change as an evolutionary process that requires continual adjustment and refinement.  
 
Organisational learning is a transformational process that seeks to help organisations develop 
and use knowledge to change, and improve themselves on an ongoing basis (Iles & 
Sutherland 2001). A learning organisation is skilled at creating, acquiring and transferring 
knowledge, and at modifying its behaviour to reflect new knowledge and insights (Goh 
1998). Senge (1990, p 6.) takes a similar view by describing organisational learning as 
follows: 
Organisation-wide learning involves change in culture and change in the most basic 
managerial practices, not just within a company, but also within a whole system of 
management. ... I guarantee that when you start to create a learning environment, people will 
not feel as though they are in control.   
 
Cummings and Worley (1997) contend that for an organisation to learn effectively, it must 
address the same elements identified by Pettigrew and Whipp (1998), including the human 
resource practices and the organisation‟s culture. Consistent with Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1998), becoming a learning organisation requires an understanding of the strategic internal 
drivers needed to build a learning capability (Stata 1989). This learning must also be built 
into the fibre of the organisation so that it pervades the daily experiences on the job and 
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becomes an integral part of employees‟ work lives (Argyris 1990). Tannenbaum (1997) 
further maintains that learning needs to be part of a continuous cycle to be effective.   
2.6.6 Critique of organisational learning    
 
Understanding of the processes involved in work-related learning, particularly on the job, is 
incomplete (Schein 1992). Most research on adult learning has investigated circumscribed 
areas, such as the effects of training program (e.g. Rosow & Zager 1988) or methods of 
updating technical knowledge among scientists and engineers (Willis & Dubin 1990). 
However, knowledge about work-related learning has begun to accumulate, based on these 
traditional research streams and more recent investigations of firms that are making the 
transition to learning organisations (e.g. Heckscher 1995; Rosenblum & Keller 1994; 
Tannenbaum 1997).  
 
The danger of the purely „learning‟ approach to change is that managers and others may 
actually recognize the need for change, yet still refuse to „learn‟ because they understand 
perfectly the implications for their power and status. Resistance to change may not be 
„stupid‟ but based on a very shrewd appreciation of the personal consequences (Whittington 
1993, p. 130).  
 
Miller (1993, p. 119) summarises another criticism of the learning organisation: 
Management starts to learn all they can about their organisation‟s environment … and gains 
experience … of what works and why … and as a consequence tend to limit their search for 
information and knowledge ... so experience becomes a barrier to learning. 
 
 
De Geus (1988) argues that successful organisational change depends on the ability of a 
company‟s senior managers to absorb what is going on in the business environment and to act 
on that information with the appropriate business moves. De Geus (1988) added that the only 
relevant learning in a company is done by individuals with the power to make decisions. 
Therefore, organisational learning may be difficult to institutionalize across an entire 
organisation.  
 
This is especially important for the public companies, such as electric utilities, as noted by 
Rifkin and Fulop (1997). According to Rifkin and Fulop (1997), the changes required to 
develop a learning organisation for companies in the public sector depend on „importing 
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management practices from the private sector, even if they have had limited success there‟. 
Furthermore, Rifkin and Fulop (1997 citing Crossan et al. 1993, pp. 230-4) observe that the 
demands and pressures on managers to learn and use these new approaches can be 
overwhelming. These managers may be ill-equipped to respond to changes in proactive and 
creative ways and this may actually inhibit the development of an environment conducive to 
a learning organisation (Rifkin & Fulop 1997). Rifkin and Fulop (1997) also observe that 
these external forces can actually impede the development of fostering a learning 
organisation. 
 
Additionally, Rifkin and Fulop (1997) contend that the ideal learning organisation described 
in the Senge‟s The Fifth Discipline (1990) is both contradictory and paradoxical. They 
conclude that rather than creating a learning organisation that supports creativity and 
diversity, The Fifth Discipline (1990) focuses on consolidating power and eliminating 
diversity, totalizing the learning process so that disruption is not the norm, and silencing 
those that might speak out against the team or dominant corporate culture (Rifkin & Fulop 
1997).  
 
In contrast, Kochan and Useem (1992) suggest that in order to create a successful 
organisation, it must create a corporate culture that supports disruptive accounts of 
organisational life as well as divergent views about the competing and negotiated nature of 
politics and power in organisational processes. The authors argue that power, politics, 
organisational history and managerial discretion (i.e. choices) are the strongest determinants 
of how organisations learn.  
 
This section summarized the key organisational change theories and discussed both their 
strengths and weaknesses. Organisational change theories provide a framework with which to 
examine the effects of changes in the organisational structures of these companies as well as 
describe „ideal‟ structures that should emerge after experiencing revolutionary change, such 
as industry deregulation. But it is also critical to understand how organisational change not 
only affected the internal structures but also the internal culture of these three organisations. 
The next section focuses on describing the human dimensions of organisational change: 
vision, commitment and resources, which are required to implement change successfully for 
IOUs. This leads to the fifth research issue:  
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R5:  What are the managers’ perspectives of electric utilities as ‘learning 
organisations’? 
  
2.7.  Internal context for change 
Before making any strategic decision for an organisation, it is essential to be thoroughly 
familiar with the context of the organisation, such as the culture, resources, structure and 
systems (Miles & Snow 1984 cited in Viljoen, 1994). This section provides an overview of 
these critical components of internal context that are especially relevant for this study. 
 
The analytical framework developed by Tichy (1982) helped to inform this area of the 
investigation because it focuses directly on the inter-relationships between an organisation‟s 
managerial tools and managerial areas (See Figure 2-6). This interplay provides for a deeper 
layer of analysis to understand the internal context of change as envisioned by Pettigrew and 
Whipp‟s (1998) model.  
 






This section focused on determining the ways in which the internal context has been affected 
by organisational change, specifically in terms of an organisation‟s mission and strategy 
(vision), its structure (commitment to change) and its human resources. It is postulated that 
the vision, commitment to change and human resources in the East Coast Utility, West Coast 
Utility and Midwest Utility differ from each other. 
 
2.7.1  Vision  
An organisation‟s vision6 has been described as a powerful competitive tool that creates a 
differentiation in the market from competitors. A successful corporate vision can lead and 




                                                 
6 Vision is also referred to as Mission and Strategy in Senge‟s and Tichy‟s models but the focus seems to be on 
developing an internal coherent response to external factors. 
(Source: Tichy 1982) 
 67 
Nothing is a more powerful agent for attracting and keeping talented people than a clear 
vision. … People are more motivated if they believe they are doing something worthwhile; if 
they believe they can, by working with a company, accomplish something that they could not 
accomplish working on their own.  
 
Kotter (1996) identified the essential elements to creating a successful vision, which are 
summarized in Table 2-4. 
 








          
 
 
(Source: Kotter 1996, p. 72) 
 
Theorists describe vision as comprising two essential building blocks that are required to 
create a successful new organisation (Goh 1998; Stata 1989). Kotter (1996) defines a vision 
as a picture of the future with some implicit or explicit commentary on why people should 
strive to create that future. Defining the vision and strategy takes time and may be a difficult 
process, but it is necessary to form the basis of the change process. A good vision during the 
change process serves three important purposes (Kotter 1996):  
 It clarifies the general direction for change, assisting with simplifying hundreds or thousands 
of more detailed directions.  
 It motivates people to take action in the right direction. 
 It helps to coordinate the actions of different people, in a remarkably fast and efficient way.  
When implementing change, Kotter (1996) advises that a vision for change needs to be 
communicated to gain both the understanding and commitment from the affected people 
during the change process. Kotter (1996) recommends clear, simple, memorable, often 
repeated, consistent communication from multiple sources, modelled by executive behaviour. 
The importance of communicating change is further emphasized by Canterucci (2003), 
Heskett et al. (1997) and Wallington (2000), who recommend that communications need to 
be frequent and open while also motivating employees by trying to create enthusiasm for this 
organisational change. 
 Imaginable: Conveys a picture of what the future will look like. 
 Desirable: Appeals to the long-term interests of employees, 
customers, stockholders, and others. 
 Feasible: Comprises realistic, attainable goals. 
 Focused: Is clear enough to provide guidance in decision-making. 
 Flexible: Is general enough to allow individual initiative and 
alternative responses in light of changing conditions. 
 Communicable: Is easy to communicate; can be successfully 
explained within five minutes. 
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Establishing a sense of urgency is also crucial in gaining the needed cooperation to bring 
about change. Employees at all levels within the organisation need to be aware of the forces 
driving change, and need to be motivated to undertake change that will impact on their 
personal and working environment (Kotter 1996). 
Another aspect of strategic leadership is „self learning‟ (Yukl 1994). Effective leaders quickly 
adapt, based on their experience, and learn from their day-to-day activities. Conversely, 
leaders fail because they fail to learn. The advantage gained from learning is that the 
organisation is able to quickly and effectively respond to opportunities and threats, and to 
satisfy customers‟ needs with new products and improved services. Leaders are reflected by 
the forces they seek to manage and that leading change may not require just a single leader 
but rather involve number of leaders operating at different levels within the firm (Pettigrew & 
Whipp 1998). So if leadership is not embodied in the persona of one visionary, rather the 
leadership style must match the circumstances or environmental threats facing a particular 
organisation (Pettigrew & Whipp 1998). For leaders to be effective during periods of 
transformational change, they must build a climate that is receptive to change by justifying 
why the change should take place and building the internal capability for change (Pettigrew 
& Whipp 1998).  
Therefore, during periods of transformational change, such as that experienced by the IOUs 
in this study, it will be necessary to have leaders at all organisational levels who will 
communicate the message and vision for the change, and create the need the systems and 
supports in place to cultivate competent managers to deal with the change as it occurs 
(Pettigrew & Whipp 1998).  
 
2.7.2 Commitment 
Shared values, attitudes, commitments, beliefs and overall patterns of thinking that are 
socially constructed among members of an organisation have a tremendous influence on its 
long-term effectiveness and performance (Bennett et al. 1994).  
 
Chen and Chen (2008), citing Mowday et al. (1982); O‟Reilly & Chatman (1986) and Porter 
et al. (1972), view organisational commitment as having three components: the acceptance of 
organisational goals and values, the willingness to extend extra effort on behalf of the 
organisation and the desire to remain with the employer.  
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The positive outcomes of organisational commitment have been well documented. People 
who are committed are less likely to quit and accept other jobs (Allen & Meyer, 1996; 
Mathieu & Zajac 1990 cited by Fiorito et al 2007) and are less likely to be tardy or absent 
from work (Angle & Perry 1981; Wasti 2003 cited by Dale & Fox 2008). There is also a 
significant amount of literature demonstrating that organisational commitment is directly and 
negatively related to both role ambiguity and role conflict (Lee 2003; Mathieu & Zajac 1990 
cited by Dale & Fox 2008). This negative relationship has been found across diverse 
vocational groups (Hogan et al. 2006; Johnston et al. 1990 cited by Dale & Fox 2008).  
Brockner et al. (1993 cited by Chen & Chen 2008) found that the extent to which jobs had 
been enriched after downsizing was a significant predictor of the survivors‟ commitment to 
the organisation. Furthermore, Niehoff et al. (2001 cited by Chen & Chen 2008) found that 
the job characteristics such as variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy and feedback 
were significantly associated with loyalty, supporting prior research that found positively 
linked job enrichment is to organisational commitment.  
Knudsen et al. (2003 cited by Chen & Chen 2008) viewed that downsizing results in lower 
levels of organisational commitment among those employees who remain. These „survivors‟  
experience dramatic changes to their work experiences because the downsizing results in an 
altered task structure, with each worker being responsible for a larger amount of work or a 
greater number of tasks (Chen & Chen 2008).  Survivors may resist the increased 
organisational demands by withdrawing or lessening their commitment to their organisation 
(Knudsen et al. 2003 cited in Chen & Chen.) These findings are especially relevant for the 
„survivors‟ of electric utility deregulation and their reaction to the subsequent downsizing of 
their utilities further demonstrates the validity of these findings. 
A key finding of this literature is that the interests and satisfaction of the members of the 
organisation must be a top priority during the implementation phase for change – and this 
change is not possible without cooperation from personnel (Dale & Fox 2008). Therefore, it 
becomes critical for organisations to develop a considerate leadership style, enhancing the 
potential for more social interaction, communication, feedback  and outcome information 
(Pearce 1981 cited by Dale & Fox 2008).  
Organisational change alters basic employee relationships; ensuring that employees will 
follow through requires an ongoing commitment from managers. This is accomplished by 
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leaders who build organisation-wide commitment by taking employees through the three 
stages of the change commitment process (see Figure 2-7). The first stage is preparation, 
when employees hear about change and become aware that change will directly affect their 
work. In the second stage, the leaders should help employees understand the full impact of 
the change and the positive outcomes. The third step is the true commitment to change and 
thus begins a trial process which gives leaders a chance to discuss problems and employee 
concerns. The fourth stage is institutionalization and in this step, employees view change as a 
normal and integral part of organisational operations (Daft 2001, p. 378). 
         Figure 2-7: Stages of Commitment to Change 
(Source: Daft 2001 citing Conner, 1992) 
 
 
This summary of the four stages to commitment to change is also reinforced by others. For 
example, communicating to the staff about upcoming change leads to a greater likelihood of 
acceptance of the change (Dunphy & Stace 1988). This creates a style of leadership that 
provides a significant advantage in that once the change is accepted, it tends to be long 
lasting because the individual tends to be more highly committed to its implementation. It 
encourages all levels of managers to transform their own units in a way that is consistent with 
the vision and strategy (Yukl 1994).  
 


































The institutionalization process (Cummings & Worley 1997, p. 187) also involves 
commitment, which „binds people to behaviours associated with the intervention and includes 
an initial commitment to change as well as recommitment over time which should derive 
from several organisational levels to avoid attempts to thwart change‟. 
This discussion provides the foundation in which to investigate following research issue: 
 
R6: What are the managers’ perspectives of an ideal electric utility in terms of vision, 
commitment and resources?  
 
2.7.2.1  Culture 
This section provides a brief summary of the role of organisational culture in affecting 
organisational change. Schein (1992, p. 12) proposed the following definition of culture:  
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered 
valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 
feel in relation to these problems. 
 
Mannion et al. (2003) examined the ways in which organisational culture has been defined in 
the literature. Drawing on their conclusions, they believe that culture, when viewed as an 
attribute of an organisation, can be changed by using a variety of levers to influence or re-
engineer an organisation‟s value system. This is the approach used to describe organisational 
culture in this study. 
 
Culture is built through its continuing enhancement of an organisation‟s ability to deal with 
its problems in a way that fixes its identity. While culture is a systemic phenomenon, its 
primary architects are those at the very top (Schein 1992). According to Mannion et al. 
(2003), an organisational culture may be generally described as a set of norms, beliefs, 
principles and ways of behaving that gives an organisation its distinctive character. There is 
broad agreement that an organisation responds to and reflects industry characteristics, such as 
the competitive environment and customer requirements. Other factors that may affect 
organisational culture include the wider community values held by its employees, and also 
the values and behaviours of its founders or early leaders (e.g. Millett 1999; Schein 1992). 
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Other definitions of culture describe it as the form of expression that constrains what people 
do and an interpretation that constrains how it is done (Christensen, Marx & Stevenson 2006; 
Schein 1992). Organisational culture can also be viewed from many different levels.  
 
Schein (1992) created well-known typologies by identifying culture through the organisation: 
 artifacts, which include observable daily features of organisational life, such 
as activities, rituals, jargon, office layouts and so forth. 
 values and beliefs, which include an organisation‟s judgments about what is 
good and bad, and make sense of how actions are evaluated as exemplary or 
ineffective. 
 basic assumptions, which include the  most comprehensive explanation of 
reality: the organisation's views of fundamental truths about people and the 
world.  
 
Daft (2001) builds further on this concept, comparing the differences in organisational 
cultures by looking at two extremes: the rigid culture and the adaptive culture (see Table 2-5). 
As this table shows, the traditional utilities are self-absorbed and risk-adverse. The managers 
also tend to be insular and bureaucratic, characteristics that stifle creativity. In contrast, the 
„ideal‟ utility, after deregulation, would evolve into a more open and diverse organisation that 
is focused outward onto the market rather than inward on internal policies and politics. This 
research inquiry will investigate if the three utilities actually moved towards this ideal 
structure as a result of industry deregulation.  
 
Table 2-5: Comparison of Rigid vs. Adaptive Cultures 
 







Core Values Managers care mainly about 
themselves and their immediate work 
group or product associated with that 
workgroup. They value the orderly 
and risk-reducing management 
process much more highly than 
leadership initiatives. 
Managers care deeply about 
customers, stockholders, and 
employees. They strongly value 
people and processes that can 
create useful change, such as 
leadership initiatives up and 
down the management 
hierarchy. 
Common Behaviour Managers tend to be isolated, political 
and bureaucratic. They do not change 
their strategies quickly to adjust or 
take advantage of changes in their 
business environments.  
Managers pay close attention to 
all constituencies, especially 
customers and initiate change 




Organisational culture has a direct impact on the types of new strategies developed and this 
culture can either facilitate or hinder the new organisational strategies (Bennett et al. 1994). 
 
2.7.2.2  The electric utility ‘culture’ 
During the past century, the electric utility industry has created its own unique corporate 
culture. Hirsh (1989, p. 378) noted that „the origins of the electric utility culture derive from 
the sense of mystery and awe associated with the phenomenon of electricity.‟ 
 
Hirsh (1989) believed that electric utility managers developed an aura of arrogance, 
perceiving they were providing a „magic‟ substance that would make the world better. This 
perception led to the development of a unique utility culture. According to Hirsh (1989, p. 
26), „it helps explain why the utility industry managed itself differently from others‟.  
 
The electric utility industry, therefore, rigorously promoted this engineering-oriented culture 
that, at its core, fundamentally believed all problems could be solved using technical 
solutions. In Hirsh‟s study of the evolution of culture within the electric utility industry, he 
describes a greater focus on engineering training as the necessary requirement for all 
managers. The electric utility aimed low – for the lower-performing students in engineering 
schools, rather than aggressively seeking out more-qualified students. Furthermore, regulators 
reinforced this behaviour, because they did not want their utilities to start engaging in risky 
practices either, so this created an insular and closed culture that was reluctant to change 
(Hirsh 1989). 
 
Organisations with strong cultures can be „highly resistant to change‟ as they have developed 
rituals and folklore as a way to maintain the status quo, rather than to embrace change 
(Christensen et al. 2006, p. 10). This discussion provided the necessary context to understand 
the internal forces that these IOUs had to face when adjusting to strategic change.  
 
Culture may be used to help effect change, by giving legitimacy to nonconforming actions 
which improve adaptation and adaptability (Kotter & Heskett 1992), and it embeds the know-
how of adaptation into norms and values (O‟Reilly & Chatman 1996).  
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The adaptive culture, as described in Table 2-4, closely resembles that of a learning 
organisation as described by Senge (1990). It is a culture that lacks boundaries and 
encourages openness, equality, continuous improvement and risk-taking. In contrast, the rigid 
cultures are more commonly found in large bureaucratic organisations, like the IOUs in this 
investigation. This study also investigates the differences in how much the three electrical 
utilities have moved from rigid to adaptive cultures. 
 
Thus it is not enough to acknowledge an organisation‟s culture; it is also important to develop 
strategies to manage that culture as a way to manage organisational change. It is vital to 
identify the attributes of the existing culture so that action can be initiated across various 
leverage points in the organisation (Millett 1999). The management of culture is based on a 
solid understanding of the tacit and explicit aspects that make up the existing culture (Millett 
1999). Cummings and Worley (1993, p. 487) identified the factors that must be addressed to 
affect cultural change:  
 clear strategic vision  
 top-management commitment – managed from the top of the organisation 
 symbolic leadership 
 supporting organisational changes 
 selection and socialization of newcomers and termination of deviants   
 ethical and legal sensitivity 
 
Millett (1999) identified the types of activities that organisations can use to affect these 
changes: 
 recruitment, selection and replacement  
 socialisation 
 communication and teamwork 
 performance management/reward system 
 leadership and modelling 
 decision-making and development activities   
 interpersonal communication   
 effective teamwork  
 
 
Therefore, transforming an organisation requires creating a culture that: supports and rewards 
learning and innovation, and promotes inquiry, dialogue, risk-taking and experimentation. 
This requires developing reward mechanisms, and a supportive culture that accepts a 
„willingness to fail‟,  without fear of repercussion. Allowing managers to be creative frees 
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them from the fear of failure. The results of their actions are viewed not as success or failure, 
but as feedback to be used to learn and to formulate further action (McGill, Slocum & Lei 
1993). 
 
Millett (1999) summarizes that culture is focused on both conforming and transforming 
organisations. Thus, the context determines that a „culture needs to be maintained or changed, 
but the strategies adopted are very much determined by the paradigm and perspective 
subscribed to by the manager or change agent‟ (Millett 1999). However, Cummings and 
Worley (1997) caution against using cultural change as a strategy, per se, for influencing 
organisational change but concede that large-scale cultural change may be necessary in 
certain situations, such as in intensely competitive industries, or changes affecting very large 
organisations.  
 
The IOUs under investigation in this inquiry may have developed strong cultures which are 
highly resistant to change (Hirsh 1997) and will require the development and implementation 
of a variety of strategies, such as those cited by Millett (1999). In contrast, Emmons (2000) 
observes that the corporate culture in these newly deregulated organisations will have to 
become a „more commercially-oriented culture and that includes a greater sense of individual 
accountability, competitive spirit, and entrepreneurship‟. Values such as loyalty support of 
fellow employees and commitment to the broader community may be lost in the process 
(Emmons 2000, p.104). Therefore the investigation included the extent to which the three 
electrical utilities differ in terms of the variety of strategies they have developed (see Table 2-
6). 
 
Table 2-6: Comparison of Organisational Characteristics  
   
 






Status or rank is critical Authority derives from expertise 
Repetition-oriented Creation-oriented 
Rules-oriented Results-oriented 
Pay for status Pay for contribution 
Formal structures Fluid relationships 
Restrict the flow of information Expansion of information 
Seek ownership and control Seek leverage and experimentation 
Stability-based Renewal-oriented 
Order and uniformity Creativity and deal-making 
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2.7.2.3 Overcoming resistance to planned culture change  
Mannion et al. (2003) identified several challenges that organisations face as they try to 
implement planned culture change. These specific challenges are:   
 Lack of ownership: Since change can be unsettling, it is often viewed as negative and 
unpredictable.  
 Complexity: Successful strategies require realistic time frames to implement
 
the types of 
complex and multi-level changes required.  
 Lack of appropriate leadership: Inadequate or inappropriate
 
leadership has been identified as 
a key factor when attempts
 
to change fail. Conversely, Mannion et al. (2003) argue that 
effective change requires transformational leadership.   
 Cultural diversity: A key challenge to successfully implementing cultural change is to foster 
an environment that considers the impact of this change on specific groups
 
and to design 
appropriate policies to accommodate them.  
 Dysfunctional consequences: Organisational culture change policies should not only be 
monitored in terms of the extent to which they foster
 
constructive change, but also in terms of 
the perverse side
 
effects that they inadvertently generate. 
 
This research inquiry will examine the effects that instituting cultural change has had on the 
three selected utility organisations, and determine if they have experienced any of these 
challenges.  
 
2.7.3  Resources (human resources management) 
Human Resources Management (HRM) is another essential element of internal context as 
defined by Pettigrew et al. (see Figure 2-2). Their definition notes that HRM consists of the 
total set of knowledge, skills and attitudes that firms need in order to compete. It also 
involves concern for the action and management of people, selection, training, and 
development, employee relations and compensation (Pettigrew et al. 1998). 
 
Emmons (2000) acknowledged that HRM issues comprise one of the challenges in 
transforming operations, such as electric utilities. Their challenges include determining the 
current workforce size, compensation levels and the changing the terms of the employment 
contract between the organisation and its employees. As Emmons (2000, p. 95) observed, it is 
usual for a workforce to shrink or remain flat during the initial years following reform. The 
fundamental terms of employment will also have changed dramatically for employees facing 
a newly deregulated market, most specifically in terms of the compensation levels and the 
awareness that the job is no longer a lifetime guarantee (Emmons 2000). This also requires 
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developing specific skill sets for employees and managers that will match the desired the 
behavioural skill sets required as a result of organisational change. However, achieving this 
may also require developing a new structure to support these new types of skills and 
capabilities. 
 
2.7.3.1   Structure 
Galbraith (1973), Mintzberg (1989), and Van de Ven (1986) view infrastructure as a 
necessary precondition of effective leadership in organisational change. Infrastructure 
conditions and the interaction of subordinates either facilitate or inhibit participation in 
organisational decisions and actions by specific people and units in the organisation (Manz, 
Bastien & Hostager 1991). The infrastructure can help link the vision with participative input 
and transactions. Consistent with Van de Ven (1986) and Galbraith (1973), the 
communications infrastructure is a precondition to effective leadership during change (Manz 
Bastien, & Hostager 1991). This new structure is created by „realigning organisational 
culture, rewards, policies, procedures, systems, and norms to support such change‟ (Rowden 
2001, p. 11). This requires that an organisation to shift its focus from task-oriented to 
process-oriented. Galbraith (1996) described the traditional function currently used by most 
organisations, including the IOUs in this investigation: 
 Structure: Division of labour, departmentalisation, span of control, and distribution of 
power. 
 Processes: Providing information and communication, planning and budgeting, 
measuring performance, linking departments. 
 Reward systems: Compensation, promotion, leadership style, job design. 
 People: Selection/recruitment, promotion/transfer, training/development. 
 
Galbraith (1996) argues that this structure needs to become more complex and interrelated as 
an organisation becomes more flexible and decentralized. This requires creating complex 
interactions which encourage the innovation and creativity (see Figure 2-8). This new 
structure will involve more risk and thus will require developing appropriate systems that 
reward effort as much as success (Galbraith 1996). In this study the extent to which the three 







Figure 2-8: The New Task Structure  
 
 
         (Source: Galbraith 1996) 
 
 
Galbraith describes the need to develop employees to fill three critical roles: idea 
generators, sponsors and orchestrators. These roles centre on the importance of creating 
vision, commitment and resources within the organisation. Visionaries are idea 
generators, committed ones are sponsors of these ideas and orchestrators are those who 
ensure that the best ideas receive the level of nurturing and visibility required to succeed. 
Creating these new types of employees will involve cultivating a new type of employee in 
the IOUs under investigation in this inquiry. As Emmons (2000) observed earlier, 
developing this type of employee will also require developing a new type of culture and 
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Emmons (2000 pp. 97-8) notes current employee skills: 
are usually inadequate or inappropriate for post-reform world. May have highly 
competent engineering staffs but often lack ability to translate technical expertise into 
significant cost-reducing process innovations … and also lack proper PR and government 
relations skills. 
 
This discussion now brings us to the final research issue. The models developed by both Daft 
(2001) and Tichy (1982) provide an appropriate framework to compare the organisation‟s 
structure pre-and post- transformational change. As Figure 2-9 shows, Daft‟s view of an ideal 
utility encompasses many features of a learning organisation that must adjust its structure, 
roles, strategy, and culture to adapt to the new external environment. These features will be 
examined in the seventh research issue: 
 
R7: What is the gap between the current utility and ideal utility of the future? 
 
  Figure 2-9: View of an ‘Ideal Utility’ Post Regulation 
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   (Source: Adapted from Daft 2001) 
 
This analysis will be complemented by a comparison of the internal differences based on the 
components of Tichy‟s (1982) model regarding internal changes that must occur. By 
assessing both the current situation and the ideal utility through these models, a gap analysis 
may be completed that will address this research issue. Tichy‟s (1982) framework 
complements Daft‟s (2001) and these two outlines provide a way in which to analyse more 




2.7.3.2 Critiques of organisational structure theories 
 
The results of the effectiveness of organisational restructuring and re-engineering are mixed. 
According to Daft (citing Hammer & Champy 1993), nearly 70 percent of the organisations 
attempting to restructure failed to meet their cost, cycle time or productivity objectives. As 
the literature demonstrates, determining and changing the organisational structure is a 
complex task. Moreover, there may not be one appropriate structure or „ideal organisation‟. 
As Pettigrew & Whipp (1998) observe, contextual factors are critical determinants of an 
organisation‟s structure. Clayton (2008) further noted that a particular organisational 
structure may be appropriate for certain tasks, conditions and times. However, the challenge 
remains for managers to test and develop the structure that best suits their tasks, context and 
environment. Furthermore, it is also likely that despite their best efforts to become more 
open, many organisations continue to remain bureaucracies even after restructuring (Clayton 
2008).  
 
There is a lack of understanding the nature of this paradox, which is a central theme in 
complexity theory. Stacey (2007, p. 126) observed that strategic choice and learning 
organisational theory do not recognize the notion of paradox . Yet paradoxes did occur in 
electric utility deregulation so these models may not capture the complexity of industry 
restructuring that was experienced within these three case studies.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no one single theory that can totally explain the nature of 
organisational change that occurs when an electric utility experiences transformational 
change. However, this review identified those theories that may be most relevant to explore 
in-depth with the respondents from the three case studies. In so doing, the goal is to identify 
which theories make sense and which theories need to be revised for this particular industry.  
 
2.8 Conclusions and summary 
The purpose of this literature review was to examine the following major theories in 
organisational change and strategic management in the context of the electric utility industry: 
 Context, Process, and Content Model (Pettigrew & Whipp 1998) 
 Five Change Factors (Pettigrew & Whipp 1998) 
 Model of Transformational Change (Daft 2001) 
 Learning Organisations (Senge 1990) 
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 Strategic Tasks for Successful Management (Tichy 1982) 
These five theories formed the theoretical framework to examine the effects of 
transformational change on the three selected utilities in their respective case studies. This 
research review identified the key concepts and issues to consider when examining how these 
electric utilities reacted both externally and internally to this organisational change. The 
external focus was on the strategic responses to industry deregulation. Therefore, the brief 
summary of regulatory process examined in the three selected utility case studies provided an 
explanation of the external drivers of this transformational change. These external drivers 
were also the focus of the first three research issues. The second part of this review focused 
on the internal processes used to manage this change. The review provided a summary of the 
major organisational change theories before focusing on the specific theory – that of learning 
organisations – which was the model examined in this research inquiry. This literature review 
also provided insights into some internal drivers of change and the process that may be used 
to create the appropriate vision, resources and commitment necessary to make the transition 
from a regulated to a deregulated organisation. Lastly, this literature review identified some 
of the challenges of the theories and models examined in this review. It identified the 
shortcomings of the strategic management theories formulated by Porter (1980) and Senge 
(1990) while also highlighting the difficulties facing organisations challenged by 
transformational change. This literature review ends with a discussion of what would 
constitute an „ideal‟ utility organisation and also describes the difficulties of creating this 
organisation. In conclusion, this literature review provides the analytical framework to more 
fully examine how the three selected electric utilities navigated through deregulation and how 
deregulation affected these organisations both internally and externally.  
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CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to select a paradigm to guide the study and to develop a research 
design and methodology for investigating the research problem and issues introduced in 
Chapter 1 and developed in Chapter 2. This chapter outlines the methodologies, procedures 
and analytical techniques used to conduct this investigation.  
 
The chapter starts with a discussion of the theoretical approaches to qualitative research (in 
Section 3.2) but then focuses on the incorporation of the selected paradigm into the 
appropriate methodology. Section 3.3 discusses the merits of using multiple case studies 
supplemented with in-depth interviews by key informants. Section 3.4 discusses the sampling 
frame and methods used to identify the key informants and case studies used in this 
investigation. Section 3.5 summarizes the data techniques used to collect, condense, verify 
and analyse the data. Section 3.6 identifies the ways in which this investigation addressed the 
concerns about data quality, regarding both reliability and validity. Section 3.7 discusses the 
ethical considerations used to safeguard the respondents. Section 3.8 describes the limitations 
of this study by identifying possible biases and strategies for overcoming them. Section 3.9 
provides a conclusion.   
 
 
3.2  Justification for the paradigm  
 
This section begins with a discussion of research paradigms commonly used in to define 
research inquiries, such as the investigation that is the focus of this study. This section begins 
with a summary of the major research paradigms and concludes with a justification of the 
research paradigm selected for this study. This research is based on qualitative methods 






3.2.1 Definition of paradigms 
Paradigms have evolved as a way for researchers to better describe a framework with which 
to understand the world. Table 3-1 summarizes the theoretical foundations or paradigms that 
are most commonly used in research. The grouping of these paradigms is based on the 
theoretical tradition or over-arching goal of the research investigation. The first five 
paradigms focus on discovering reality, in one form or another. The nature of this reality 
depends upon the framework used, but the fundamental view is that reality, or some part of it, 
can be known. It includes the critical realism paradigm, which is the one selected for this 
study.  
 
The other research paradigms cited in Table 3-1 were viewed as unsuitable given the nature 
and focus of this inquiry. Research perspectives 6-16 focus on interpreting actions or 
activities from groups or individuals based on studying a particular event or phenomena 
(Miles & Huberman 1994; Patton 2002). These studies are more suited to anthropology, 
journalism and historical studies rather than the business focus on this inquiry (Miles & 
Huberman 1994).  
 
The rationale for selecting the critical realism paradigm in favour of other paradigms is 
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Table 3- 1: Summary of Key Research Paradigms 
 
 
(Source: Expanded from McPhail 2000; Patton 2002, p. 132) 
Theoretical Tradition Perspective Central Questions 
Positivism – Focus on 
Discovery of Realty 
1.Positivism What is the reality? What is really going on? 
2.Critical Realism 
What is the truth that we can discern so our 
findings correspond to the real world as much 
as possible? 
3.Critical Theory 
What should reality be? How can the 
researcher guide that discovery? 
4. Constructionism/  
    Constructivism 
How have the people in this setting constructed 
reality? What are their reported perceptions, 
‘truths’? 
5. Grounded theory 
 
 
What theories emerges from systematic 
comparative analysis and is grounded in 
fieldwork so as to explain what has been 
observed? 
Intepretivism – Focus on 
trying to understand the 
actions of others in relation 
to the researcher 
6. Ethnography 




How does my own experience about this 
culture connect with and offer insights about 
this culture, situation, and event? 
8. Phenomenology 
 
What is the meaning, structure, essence of the 
lived experience of this phenomenon for this 
group of people? 
9. Heuristic inquiry 
  
What is my experience with this phenomenon 
and the essential experience of others who 
experienced it intensely? 
10. Ethnomethodology 
 
How do people make sense of their everyday 





What common set of symbols and 
understandings has emerged to give meaning 
to people's actions? 
12. Semitoics 
 




What are the conditions under which a human 
act took place that makes it possible to interpret 
its meaning? 
14. Narrative analysis 





How do individuals attempt to accomplish their 
goals through specific behaviours and 
environments? 
16. Orientational: 
feminist inquiry critical 
theory, queer theory 
How is a specific perspective manifest this 
phenomenon? 
  
Non-Linear Dynamics – 
Trying  to understand 
disorder 
17. Chaos and 
Complexity Theory 
What is the underlying order, if any, of 
disorderly phenomena? 
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3.2.2 Selection and rationale of critical realism paradigm 
This research study is based on the critical realism paradigm (Perspective 2 in Table 3-1), 
which assumes that reality exists but it so complex that it cannot be wholly understood. 
Rather, only parts can be knowable, and this is knowledge is best achieved through the use of 
qualitative methodologies such as interviews and documented in case studies (Guba & 
Lincoln 1994; Perry 1998). There is also a need for the researcher to remain as objective as 
possible, but given human limitations, this is viewed as an ideal, not a practicality (Guba & 
Lincoln 1994). Lastly, this paradigm allows the research to be built on previous knowledge, 
such as that gained from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. This methodology focuses on 
triangulating data from numerous sources (Guba & Lincoln 1994; Perry, Riege & Brown 
1998).  
 
Table 3- 2: Justification for Critical Realism for this Study 
Patton's  (2002) 
Framework 
Realism Paradigm Relevance to this Study Sources 
What do we believe 
about the nature of 
reality?  (Ontology) 
  
Reality is too complex 
to be understood 
completely but parts 
of reality can be 
discovered 
Study focuses on capturing 
the narrow experiences of 
three utilities rather than the 
entire industry 
Patton (2002), Perry 
(1998); Perry et al 
(1998), Guba & 
Lincoln (1994) 
How do we know what 
we know?  
(Epistomology) 
Remain as objective 
as possible  
Research inquiry is to 
describe events and 
document impressions 
Perry et al (1998); 
Guba & Lincoln (1994) 
How should we study 
the world?  What is 
worth knowing? What 
questions should we 
ask?  How do we 
personally engage in 
this inquiry?  
(Methodology) 
Relies on qualitative 
methodologies to 
gather information, 
depth interviews and 
triangulation; allows 
the use of prior 
knowledge to inform 
the study 
Using in-depth interviews 
with both open and closed 
questions to  gather  
information for case studies; 
triangulation by gathering 
data from several sources  
  
Perry et al (1998); 
Guba & Lincoln 




(Source: Developed for this inquiry from sources cited above) 
 
The task of a researcher using the critical realism paradigm is to identify, describe and 
analyse information in a dispassionate manner (Perry 1998). This is a process-oriented 
approach that is based on building a theory rather than confirming an existing theory 
(Neuman 1994, p 405). This paradigm therefore embraces the qualitative nature of this 
inquiry and is suited to explore the reality experienced by the respondents in these electric 
utilities. 
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While there many other valid paradigms that form the theoretical foundation of qualitative 
research, critical realism most closely matched the research inquiry using the selected 
methodology (qualitative analysis via case studies and expert interviews). The purpose of this 
research inquiry was simply to determine what the actual reality was, rather than to form 
impressions about what reality should be (i.e. #3 critical theory), how others view the reality 
through their perceptions (i.e. constructionism/constructivism) or what theories may emerge 
to better explain what has occurred (i.e. #5 grounded theory). 
 
Paradigms 6-10 focus on how to insert the researcher‟s observations into the observed reality 
by documenting specific behavioural or cultural outcomes (i.e. #6 ethnography, #7 
autoethograpy, #8 phenomenology, #9 heuristic inquiry and #10 ethnomethodology). 
However, these paradigms are valid only when researchers can actually observe behaviour; 
the events driving the selected case studies had already occurred and therefore it would be 
impossible to observe these actions using these types of research paradigms.  
 
Similarly, paradigms 11 and 12 (i.e. symbolic interaction and semiotics) are not relevant to 
the selected case studies as symbolology was not a focus of this research inquiry.  
 
Furthermore, paradigms 13-16 are also not suitable for this inquiry as the focus of the case 
studies was not to interpret the actions of the utility employees in a cultural or humanistic 
way (i.e. #13 hermenutics or #14 narrative analysis) or interpret the cultural effects of 
deregulation through a particular lens (i.e. #15 ecological philosophy or #16 orientational). 
Rather, these paradigms are too sophisticated for the straightforward approach used in this 
research inquiry and therefore are not appropriate. 
 
Lastly, the chaos and complexity paradigms view the world in a nonlinear fashion and try to 
make sense of chaos and disorder. While this would seem to be an appropriate paradigm for 
investigating transformational change experienced in the selected utilities, it actually is not a 
good fit for this particular investigation. First of all, chaos theory tends to rely heavily on 
quantitative data analysis (Cambel 1992 cited in Patton 2002). This inquiry is qualitative in 
nature and the data collected would not be suitable for quantitative analysis. Qualitatively, 
chaos theory relies on metaphors to explain the nature of the phenomenon, which makes it 
attractive to understanding particular types of organisational development work (Patton 2002) 
and it does fit well into „real world‟ settings. However, it is important to note that the focus of 
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this inquiry was not to understand the chaos caused by deregulation, but rather to document 
the effects after this event. This research inquiry was too narrowly focused on specific events 




This section summarizes the research methodology selected for this inquiry. Data may be 
collected using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Quantitative data collection offers 
breadth to a research design because it can provide statistically valid conclusions across a 
population. In contrast, qualitative data collection provides depth to a research design 
because it focuses on gathering a large amount of information about a relatively small 
number of units. However, this research was designed as a qualitative inquiry and relied on 
qualitative data techniques and analysis. There was not attempt to select case studies from a 
“statistical “universe” but rather to identify three appropriate case studies for analysis.  
 
The methodologies selected for this research project are well suited to the realism paradigm. 
As Perry et al. (1999, p. 22) observed:  
Within the realism paradigm, the case study research methodology appears to be especially 
appropriate for research about some marketing issues. … Theory is built in case study and 
related qualitative research by making comparisons, looking for similarities and differences 
within the collected data, and for future questions to be examined. ... Several authors have 
looked upon organisations ... whose strategies and policies change ... and they have advocated 
qualitative research such as in-depth case studies to outline the important dynamic dimensions 
of strategy development.  
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Table 3-3: Comparison of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Approaches 







To gain a qualitative 
understanding of the 
underlying reasons and 
motivations 
To quantify data and 
generalize the results 
from the sample to a 
larger population 
To identify qualitatively 
the ways in which three 
electric utilities reacted to 
organisational change 
Sample 
Small number of non 
representative cases 
Large numbers of 
representative cases 
Three selected  cases of 




Structured Combination of open and 
closed-ended  questions 




Non statistical Statistical Mix of simple counts with 
qualitative analysis 
Outcome 
Develop an initial 
understanding 
Recommend a final 
course of action 
Develop an initial 
understanding for further 
exploration 
 (Source: Developed and expanded from McPhail 2001, citing Malhoutra 1996; Patton 2002, p. 349) 
 
 
As Patton (2002, p. 40, 47) observes: 
Qualitative data are observations that yield detailed, thick description, inquiry in depth; 
interviews that capture direct quotations about people‟s personal perspectives and 
experiences, case studies, careful document review. … Qualitative data consists of quotations, 
observations, and excerpts from documents.  
  
The exploratory nature of this inquiry is suited to qualitative data methods, primarily case 
studies and depth interviewing. The case study is a research methodology based on 
„interviews … involving a body of knowledge‟ (Perry 1998).  The primary objective of case 
study research, and related qualitative methods, is to gain an understanding of the specific 
phenomena under investigation and subsequently interpret the respondents‟ experiences and 
beliefs in their own terms (Gilmoare & Carson 1996 cited by Perry 1998 et al.).  
 
3.3.1 Justification for case study methodology 
Riege (1996, p 42) defines case study as „a methodology in research which focuses on a 
particular part of an organisation or an industry within its context in order to rigorously 
explore and analyse contemporary real-life experiences in-depth using a variety of evidence.‟   
This statement applies to this study because it:   
a. focuses on an industry – the investor-owned U.S. electric industry 
b. explores and analyses contemporary real-life experiences – the effect of industry deregulation  
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The strengths of case study research in business are two-fold (Adelman et al. 1982). The first 
is the ability to triangulate the data among multiple analysis methods, thereby ensuring 
reliability and internal and construct validity (Yin 2003; see Section 3.6). Both qualitative 
and quantitative sources may be used, from primary documents (in both hard and „soft‟ copy 
such as Minutes and email), secondary documents (such as media reports), interviews (both 
structured and in-depth) and organisation members‟ stories, archival records (such as 
organisational charts and file notes), direct and participant observation (depending upon the 
relationship of the researcher with the organisation, issue or event being studied,) and 
physical artifacts (such as trophies, framed photographs, awards, lapel pins and memorabilia).  
Case studies also help researchers to answer the complex  how and why questions about 
dynamic business phenomena such as project, personal or specific organisation success in 
today‟s turbulent global environment. Given that the subject of this investigation was the 
electric utility industry, the case study approach provided the best way to capture the 
turbulent effects of electric deregulation. Yin (2003) concurs by describing that case study 
inquiry: 
 Copes with the technically disruptive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than  data points, and as one result ... 
 Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating 
fashion, and as another result ... 
 Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection 
and analysis. 
 
Case studies may also be defined as exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory (Yin 2003).   
The exploratory case study was selected for this research study. Since the goal of this 
research is to document the: Change in the Strategic Focus and Internal Operating Culture of 
Investor-Owned U.S. Electric Utilities due to Deregulation, the case study will be exploratory 
in nature. The goal of an exploratory case study is to „develop pertinent hypotheses and 
propositions for further inquiry‟ (Yin 2003). Three in-depth investigations of U.S. electric 
utilities were examined, and it was explanatory because it focused on how these organisations 
reacted to the outside events over which they had no control and their responses, both 
internally and externally in the context of organisational change (Yin 2003). Exploratory case 
is the method that is most appropriate given the nature of the industry focus, the emphasis on 
a contemporary event, and the reliance on multiple data sources.  
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Another issue in research is whether there is a need for single or multiple case studies. This is 
governed by the unit of analysis (discussed further in Section 3.4.2) chosen by the researcher. 
A single case study using a single unit of analysis would be a critical case, a unique case or 
an extreme case (Yin 2003). Yin (2003) further observes that multiple case studies have 
distinct advantages and disadvantages compared to single case designs. A major advantage is 
that evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling and the overall study 
is therefore considered more robust (Herriott & Firestone, 1983). Conducting a multiple-case 
study, however, does require more extensive resources and time (Yin 2003) and each case 
must be carefully selected so that it either a) „predicts‟ similar results or b) predicts 
contrasting results but for predicable reasons (Yin 2003). This methodology also requires 
developing a rich theoretical framework that is not governed by the size of the sample but 
whether the sample is representative (Yin 2003). (Sample size is discussed in Section 3.4.2)  
Table 3- 4: Summary of Strengths and Weaknesses of Case Study 
Methodology 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Can provide insight into issues that may need 
to be explored in greater depth.  
The study ‘may become merely an extended 
anecdote, without evaluative relevance’ 
(Cheetham et al., 1992 cited in Bannigan 2002).  
Enables a depth of understanding.  It may be biased, as a result of the researcher 
becoming too involved in the collection and 
analysis of data.  
Enables in-depth probing into the case, which 
helps to develop a descriptive picture or, 
depending on the nature of the research, 
facilitates explanations and predictions.  
Case studies – particularly single case designs – 
are not general, so they cannot represent a 
population.  
The researcher considers a real event.   
The researcher is more likely to become aware 
of important factors that did not form part of his 
or her preconceived ideas.  
Uncovers detail in complicated situations.  
Provides quick feedback.  
(Source: Bannigan 2002) 
 












Figure 3-1: Ladder of Analytical Abstraction 
 
Levels
3. Developing and testing Integrating data into
propositions to construct an framework 
explanatory framework
Matrix analysis of major data themes
Cross-checking of tenative findings
2. Repackaging and
aggregating the data Identifying themes and trends in data
Identifying gaps 
1 Summarizing Data coding
and packaging the data
 
Write up of individual interview notes
The Ladder of Analytical Abstraction 
 
 (Source: Adapted from Carney 1990 as cited in Miles & Huberman 1994) 
 
 
3.3.2 Justification for in-depth interviews 
In-depth interviews are a valuable tool in exploring underlying issues. However, it is critical 
that the interview protocol be sufficiently structured to guide the discussion but unstructured 
enough to allow the respondent to identify issues that may not otherwise emerge. The other 
critical factor in conducting in-depth interviews is the role of the interviewer. The interviewer 
must be able to encourage the respondents to speak freely while also able to keep the 
conversation on track (Zikmund 2000).  
 
This research inquiry was divided into three separate case studies, each including an in-depth 
profile of one particular organisation‟s experience with deregulation. As Table 3-5 shows, a 
total of 14 interviews were conducted across these three case studies. The case studies 
included both current and former utility employees at both executive and middle-
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management levels in these organisations. Table 3-5 illustrates the equal distribution among 
the three case studies. 
 


























Table 3-6 summarizes the case study respondents by their corporate level within the 
company. Seven case study respondents held middle management staff level positions within 




















East Coast Midwest West  Coast 
CA 1   
EC 1   
ET 1   
LH 1   
GE  1  
JA  1  
JB  1  
JM  1  
SS  1  
KD   1 
KJ   1 
MB   1 
MO   1 
VR  0 1 





















As a way to supplement the information gathered in the case studies and to further understand 
the content and context of the effects of organisational change in the electric utility industry, 
a series of in-depth interviews with experts was also conducted. The experts were selected 
based on their interest and expertise in organisational change, the electric utility industry, or 
both. Table 3-7 illustrates the core competencies of the experts who constituted the key 
informants for these case studies.  
Respondent 
Initials 
Level in Company 
Total 
Middle Mgmt Executive 
CA 0 1 1 
EC 0 1 1 
ET 1 0 1 
GE 1 0 1 
JA 0 1 1 
JB 1 0 1 
JM 1 0 1 
KD 1 0 1 
KJ 0 1 1 
LH 1 0 1 
MB 0 1 1 
MO 1 0 1 
SS 0 1 1 
VR 0 1 1 
Total 7 7 14 
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Table 3-7: Matrix of Key Competencies from Expert Interviews 
Key Informants 




E1. M. Brown    
E3. S. Coakely    
E2. R. Daft    
E4. W. Emmons    
E5. M. Harrigan    
E6. R. Hirsh    
E7. T. Royal     
E8. P. Van Doren    
 
These eight key informants provided context for examining the effects of deregulation within 
the electric utility industry, particularly among the utilities in this case study. Many of the 
industry experts were familiar with the effects of industry deregulation in at least one of the 
selected cases. Several others were able to provide the historical context of the electric utility 
industry and thus help to discern more fully the issues identified in the literature review. 
Lastly, two were experts in organisational change and could provide another layer of 
information as a way to help better understand the challenges that faced the three electric 
utilities. As a note, this researcher was fortunate to interview some of the pre-eminent thought 
leaders in this investigation. Several – including Dr. Willis Emmons, Dr. Richard Daft, Dr. 
Richard Hirsh and Dr. Peter Van Doren – are all recognized experts in their own fields. 
Moreover, their theories and insights were particularly informative in preparing the literature 
review.  
 
Therefore, this research inquiry captured the insights and impressions from 22 respondents 
and key informants, who were able to speak knowledgably to the central questions of this 
research inquiry. This sample size is sufficiently robust to allow the researcher to draw 
conclusions and inferences qualitatively, both between and among these case studies. The 





3.4  Sampling frame 
Another important consideration for research inquiries is to determine ways in which the 
sample is selected. This section summarizes the types of sampling methodologies used in 
qualitative inquiries and discusses the rationale and approach used for this study. It also 
addresses issues of sample size and the unit of analysis for this study.  
 
This research study focused on three specific case studies; their selection was based on the 
researcher‟s experience with investor-owned electric utilities. The selected case studies 
offered an opportunity to explore in-depth the implications and effects of differing responses 
to industry deregulation. Rather than focusing on only one „exceptional‟ case, this inquiry 
focused on the effects of organisational change on those three electric utilities. The sampling 
frame was therefore designed to focus on much smaller and more manageable subset that 
would facilitate cross-case comparisons while also yielding information-rich detail. The three 
case studies were selected by using a combination of judgment and snowball methodologies 
as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994).  
 
 
3.4.1 Definition of sampling 
The selection of the cases and key informants were driven by factors such as the resources 
available, the advanced knowledge of the population, the availability of the information, the 
focus of the study and the experience of the researcher (Zikmund 2000). Non-probability 
samples are based on drawing a representative sample, based on the researcher‟s experience 
and judgment (Burns & Bush 1998). As Zikmund (2000, p. 351) observed, „An experienced 
researcher selects the sample based upon some appropriate characteristic of the sample 
members‟. The researcher in this investigation has been involved in the investor-owned 
electric utility industry for 16 years, including the periods of pre-and post-electric utility 
deregulation and restructuring. This professional background helped to inform the selection 
of potential cases, which was refined based on additional information from key informant 
interviews and the review of primary and secondary data sources. Table 3-8 summarizes the 





Table 3-8: Types of Non-probability Sampling Methodologies  
(Source: Zikmund 2000, p. 362 and expanded for this study) 
 
The sampling methods used in this study were based on both judgment sampling and 
snowball methods (see items 2 and 3 in Table 3-8). Judgment was used initially to identify 
potential organisations for the case study. The sampling frame was expanded through the use 
of snowball sampling, in which utility respondents were asked to recommend other 
informants in both utility organisations as well as industry experts. This snowball approach 
also identified additional key informants and the identification of an appropriate third utility 
case to examine.  The result was selecting three different types of investor-owned utilities, 
which are differentiated by size (number of employees), geographic region (East, Midwest, 
West) and response to electric utility deregulation. The criteria used in the selection of these 
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used in this 
inquiry 
 97 
Table 3- 9: Criteria for Selection of Case Studies 
Characteristics East Midwest West Coast 
Geographic Location New England Region Wisconsin California 
Number of Employees 7,000 4,900 20,000 
Regulatory climate 
towards utilities 
Moderate – Willing to 
Compromise 
Friendly Hostile – Anti-Utility 
Outcome of Industry 
deregulation 
Acquired by  
larger firms 




Corporate Culture  
pre-deregulation 
Informal and open 
Casual and friendly, 
open 





Rigid and  
hierarchical 
Rigid and hierarchical 
Availability of 
secondary research 
sources to supplement 











employees at middle 
and senior 
management 
Easy based on 
personal contacts 
and referrals 
Easy based on 
industry referrals 
Easy based on personal 
contacts and referrals 
Willingness to 
participate in this case 
study 
Yes, only if promised 
confidentiality 
Yes, only if promised 
confidentiality 




Although the results will not be generalisable across all investor-owned utilities, there are 
similarities that may be confirmed by conducting additional case studies within this industry. 
 
While it may appear that this sample of three utilities and 14 respondents within the utilities 
was actually based more on convenience than any other methodology, this is not an accurate 
impression. The utility case study interviews required permission from the organisation that 
was not always granted. Moreover, it often required several attempts to contact and schedule 
the respondent interviews as many had changed responsibilities in the wake of industry 
deregulation. The approach used was to research the market and then make a judgment 
sample based on characteristics of the sample members. The purpose of the sample was to 
look for „bellwether indicators‟ that would provide information-rich cases (Zikmund 2000). 
An important aspect of selecting these indicators was identifying factors that describe both 
the similarities and differences among these utilities, such as the regulatory climate, the 
corporate culture, total size, and eventual outcome. However, the overriding indicators were 
based on recommendations from industry experts and peers who were able to help guide the 
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researcher to three „information-rich‟ case studies that would provide sufficient detail to 
undertake this research investigation.  
 
3.4.2  Unit of analysis 
In this investigation, the unit of analysis was individual investor-owned electric utilities that 
were affected by deregulation during the period of 1996-2000. This definition led to the 
identification of three cases that will be discussed more fully in the next section.   
 
3.4.3 Sample size 
One major aspect of qualitative inquiry is the focus on „relatively small samples, selected 
purposively to permit inquiry into and understanding of a phenomenon in depth‟ (Patton 
2002, p. 46). For qualitative inquiries, such as this investigation, there is no rule or ideal 
sample size (Patton 2002; Yin 2003). Rather, the sample size is based on the cost of acquiring 
information relative to its value (Burnes & Bush 1998) and the researcher‟s judgment and 
expertise (Burnes & Bush 1998; Patton 2002). Patton summed it up best in the follow excerpt 
(2002, p. 244): 
[There is no] ideal sample size. … It depends on what you know, purpose of the study, what‟s 
at stake, what will be useful, who will have credibility, and what can be done with available 
time and resources.  
 
Another critical decision is whether to select one or multiple case studies. While there are 
times when a single case study is appropriate, such as an extreme or deviant case as described 
by both Yin (2003) and Zikmund (2002), this is generally not the preferred method for 
exploratory case studies. Rather, it is more appropriate to select several information-rich 
cases that will provide meaningful data for analysis and theory building (Patton 2002; Soy 
1997; Yin 2003). In the multiple case design, each case‟s results and conclusions are treated 
individually; however, these findings can be used to inform the study conclusions (Soy 
1997). 
 
Yin (2003) observes that multiple case designs have both advantages and disadvantages. The 
evidence from multiple case studies is viewed as more compelling, and therefore may be 
more robust. It is important to note that each case must be selected carefully. A few cases 
(two or three) would be viewed as literal replication. In any instance, the goal is to select 
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cases that provide a rich theoretical framework, which then becomes the vehicle for 
subsequent analysis. These cases may also represent geographic regions, different 
organisational sizes or other parameters (Soy 1997). This methodology can be achieved by 
referring back to the purpose of the study as a way to identify likely cases and evidence that 
will satisfy the purpose of the study and answer the research issues posed (Soy 1997).  
 
 
3.5 Research procedures  
3.5.1 Discussion of anonymity in case studies 
A significant component of the data analysis for the case studies was the promise of 
confidentiality to the respondents. While Yin (2003) argues that the researcher should seek 
some compromise to allow for the possibility of replication in future studies, he does admit 
there are times when this practice is simply not feasible. This investigation was one such 
exception and therefore the respondents had to be guaranteed anonymity in both their own 
identity and that of their firms. This was required since most of these respondents remain 
employed in these electric utilities or within the electric utility industry. Moreover, the three 
electric utilities selected in these case studies are still operating, and the challenges and 
failures they faced with deregulation, as revealed in this study, are not something that they 
may not want to share with outsiders. Indeed, when approached to participate in this case 
study, several respondents declined because of the controversial nature of this inquiry, even 
with the promise of confidentiality. Therefore, this investigation meets Yin‟s (2003) test to be 
disguised as a way to protect the respondents and to encourage them to speak freely without 
fear of reprisals. While not desirable, the process of disguising these cases was done carefully 
and the disguised case studies were reviewed by respondents to ensure validity and accuracy 
under these conditions.  
 
 
3.5.2 Case Study Analysis Process    
Individual case analysis: The structure of each case study (See Appendix D) matches the 
conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2. The firm‟s case content is based on its 
participant interviews and the firm background information. The triangulation of the case 
data was obtained by using other sources of primary and secondary information, most 
significantly media accounts, and key informant interviews. This additional information 
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helped to support the findings, identify patterns and lead to conclusions as described by 
Patton (2002). The case studies were also reviewed by individual respondents for consistency 
and accuracy to ensure the findings were in the appropriate context (Miles & Huberman 
1994). 
 
Each case study (See Appendix D) was analysed by using inductive content analysis as a way 
to reduce the data into manageable pieces using the techniques described earlier (Patton 
2002). The unit of analysis was each investor-owned electric utility. Therefore, each case 
study was analysed individually prior to the cross-case analyses as a way to maintain the 
overall validity of research findings (Patton 2002).  
 
Cross-Case Analyses: Cross-case analysis provides a method to identify patterns and 
examine both similarities and differences. This was especially important when there were 
discrepancies in the observed patterns (Patton 2002; Miles & Huberman 1994). The cross-
case analysis strategy focused on identifying patterns apparent across more than one case. 
The formalized interview protocols, with a mix of both open- and close-ended questions, help 
to facilitate the identification and examination across the three cases.  
 
The cross-case analysis also reduced and sorted the data further by developing data displays 
as described by Miles and Huberman (1994). Once the individual cases were summarized and 
displayed, then additional data sorting and organizing was undertaken both within and across 
categories. This led to the development of focused and integrated findings that are 
summarized in this chapter. These findings also laid the foundation for the conclusions and 
recommendations discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
This section describes the research procedures used in this investigation including the 
development of the case study protocol, the field procedures and data analysis procedures. 
 
 
3.5.3  Case Study Protocol  
Another issue to consider is the development of the data collection instruments that will be 
used to capture the information and observations collected during the interviews. There are 
some debates over the level of instrumentation required ranging from none to tightly 
structured (Miles & Huberman 1994). This study focused on developing a protocol in order 
to achieve the benefits identified by Miles and Huberman (1994): 
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• The concepts were identified in the literature review. 
• The use of multiple cases. 
• The need for comparability across studies. 
• The need to make efficient use of the respondent‟s time and availability. 
• The prior experience and knowledge of the researcher as a way to minimize bias.  
 
The case study protocol should include the following sections: 
 An overview of the case study project – this will include project objectives, case 
study issues, and presentations about the topic under study.  
 Field procedures – reminders about procedures, credentials for access to data 
sources, location of those sources.  
 Case study questions - the questions that the investigator must keep in mind during 
data collection.  
 A guide for the case study report – the outline and format for the report (Tellus 
1997; Yin 2003). 
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Table 3- 10: Research Issues Categorized by Interview Questions for Case 
Studies 
R1 
What is the evolution of the US electric utility 
industry, focusing particularly on the external 
forces leading to deregulation?  
Q7 
R2 
How were the managers’ decision-making 
processes affected by deregulation?  
Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6 
R3 
How did deregulation affect the strategic focus 
of these electric utilities?    
Q8, Q9, Q10 
R4 
What were the specific mechanisms these 
utilities used to manage change?    
Q11, Q12, Q13, Q14, Q15, 
Q16, Q17 
R5 
What are the managers’ perspectives of electric 
utilities as ‘learning organisations?’   
Q24, Q25, Q26, Q27, Q28 
R6 
What are the managers’ perspectives of an 
ideal electric utility in terms of vision, 
commitment and resources?  
Q18, Q19, Q20 
R7 
What is the gap between the current utility and 
ideal utility of the future? 
Q21, Q22, Q23 
 
The case study protocol used in this research included these features. The interview questions 
were based on the critical issues identified in the literature review and included a mixture of 
both open- and close-ended questions. This interview protocol also addressed the issues of 
ethical research and confidentiality through signed releases. The interview questions also 
followed the parameters defined by Yin (2003):  
• Level 1: questions asked of specific interviewees, based on their background such as whether 
they were industry experts or utility respondents.  
• Level 2: questions asked for specific cases designed to draw out the specific characteristics 
for each separate utility.  
• Level 3: questions asked across all electric utility respondents for all three cases as a way to 
identify patterns.  
• Level 4: questions that were asked to all respondents, based on the literature review.  
• Level 5: questions designed to draw conclusions and recommendations, which were the 
summary questions regarding the future of the industry. 
 
Thus, the interview protocol was developed to achieve two objectives: establish rapport and 
develop a natural flow to the interview, as directed by Yin (2003) while also focusing 
addressing sufficiently the seven research interviews. The following table compares two 





Table 3-11: Case Study Questions Grouped by Question Level and Research 
Issue 
Q# Question Level Research Issue Description 













If not currently employed by the 




How was/has your role been 
influenced or affected 








How did you get involved in this 
role?   
1 R2 
Q6 
How long have you been involved 
in the utility industry? 
1 R2 
Q7 
What are your impressions, so far, 
of deregulation of the U.S. electric 
utility industry? Why? 
2 R1 What is the evolution of 
the US electric utility 
industry, focusing 
particularly on the 
external forces leading 
to deregulation? 
Q7a 
Why? 2 R1 
Q8 
Describe the level of change that 
has occurred within your 
organisation. 
3 R3 
How did deregulation 
affect the strategic focus 
of these electric 
utilities? 
Q8B Why do you say that? 3 R3 
Q9 
What specific strategies has your 
organisation undertaken to adapt 
to competitive changes? 
3 R3 
Q10 
Is your view, have these 
strategies been effective? 
Why/why not?  
2 R3 
Q11 
Best describe the way that change 
has been implemented by 







What were the specific 
mechanisms these 






Q12 Why do you say that? 3 R4 
Q13 Incorporating Change subset 3 R4 
Q13a 




Deploys appropriate resources to 
accomplish its mission. 
3 R4 
Q13c 
Assesses its own strengths and 









Adapts its mission and strategy to 




Fosters an organisational culture 
aligned with its mission.  
3 R4 
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What were the specific 
mechanisms these 










tasks/responsibilities into specific 
and defined roles. 
3 R4 
Q14b 
Integrates these defined roles into 
departments, divisions, or regions. 
3 R4 
Q14c 
Aligns these roles to meet specific 
corporate strategies and goals. 
3 R4 
Q14d 




Balances power across groups of 
roles e.g. sales vs. marketing) 
3 R4 
Q15 Human Resources Management 3 R4 
Q15a 
Staffs appropriately to meet 
current and future needs. 
3 R4 
Q15b 




Measures employee performance 
in objective ways. 
3 R4 
Q15d 








Hires/selects employees who 
reflect the corporate culture. 
3 R4 
Q16 
In your view, what are the biggest 
challenges that your organisation 
faces in terms of managing 
change effectively during the next 
five years?  Why? 
3 R4 
Q17 
In your view, what areas should 
your organisation focus on to 
effectively meet these challenges? 
3 R4 
Q18 Ideal Utility Question Subset 5 R6 
What are the managers’ 
perspectives of an ideal 
electric utility in terms of 
vision, commitment and 
resources? 
Q18a 
If you could design the ideal 
‘electric utility of the future’ 
describe its Vision. 
5 R6 
Q18b Commitment 5 R6 
Q18c Resources 5 R6 
Q19 
Is there anything else that needs 




Do you think this is possible for 
utilities to evolve into this type of 
organisation? What would you call 
this type of ‘new electric utility 
organisation?’ Why or why not? 
5 R6 
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Table 3-11B: Case Study Questions Grouped by Question Level and Research 
Issue (continued) 




Q21 Likely Utility Question subset 5 R7  
 
 
What is the gap 
between the 
current utility 
and ideal utility 
of the future? 
Q21a 
Moving from the ideal, what do you think is the 
likely electric utility of the future in terms of its 
Vision? 
5 R7 
Q21b Commitment 5 R7 
Q21c Resources 5 R7 
Q22 
Which utilities do you think, if any, will evolve into 
an ‘ideal’ utility of the future?  Why? 
5 R7 
Q23 




Have you ever heard of the term ‘learning 
organisation?’ (If not, define: a learning 
organisation fosters continuous problem-solving by 
providing a flat structure, open communications, 
and a culture that promotes adaptability and 
creativity.) 
4 R5 






Q25 Do you think those organisations can really exist? 4 R5 
Q26 
Do you think those types of organisations could 
exist in the electric utility industry? Why/why not? 
4 R5 
Q27 
What would have to change/occur in your 
organisation to become a ‘learning organisation?’ 
5 R5 
Q28 





A similar process was also developed for the expert interview protocol. However, this 
interview protocol relied more heavily on level 2 type questions as a way to capture each 
respondent‟s particular areas of expertise.  
 
The expert or key informant interview protocol was similar to the structure used for the case 
studies. However, rather than focusing on the specifics of any one utility experience, it sought 
to have the respondents provide a broader perspective. The interview protocol included 
sections that were designed to focus specifically on the key informant‟s areas of expertise. 
So, for example, the organisational change experts were asked specific questions on those 
areas while the utility experts were asked questions that focused more on the industry and the 
effects of deregulation. But in all cases, the interview protocol was developed to provide a 
vehicle to facilitate rather than stifle conversation and insight.  
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Table 3-12: Research Issues Categorized by Interview Questions for Expert 
Interviews 
Expert Research Issues 
R1 
What is the evolution of the US electric utility industry,  
focusing particularly on the external forces leading to 
deregulation.  
Q6, Q7, Q8a, Q8b.  
R2 





How did deregulation affect the strategic focus of these electric 
utilities?    
Q16, Q17 
R4 
What were the specific mechanisms these utilities used to 
manage change?    
Q12, Q13, Q14, Q15 
 (OD specialists only) 
R5 
What are the managers’ perspectives of electric utilities as 
‘learning organisations?’  
Q24. Q25, Q26. Q27, 
Q28 
R6 
What are the managers’ perspectives of an ideal electric utility  
in terms of vision, commitment and resources?  
 Q18, Q19 
R7 
What is the gap between the current utility and ideal utility of the 
future? 
Q20, Q21, Q22. Q23 
 
 
The following table provides a link between the research issue, specific questions, and 
question type.  
 
Table 3- 13: Interview Questions Grouped by Question Level and Research 
Issue for Expert Interviews 




Q1. What is your current role? 1 R2 
How were the managers’ 
decision-making processes 
affected by deregulation? 
Q2. 
How has this role been influenced or 
affected deregulation of the Utilities 
industry, if at all? 
1 R2 
Q3. 
Which areas, in particular, are you most 
directly involved in regarding the utilities 
industry? 
1 R2 
Q4 What role do you play? 1 R2 
Q5 How did you get involved in this role? 1 R2 
Q6 
How long have you been involved in the 
utility industry, either directly or indirectly? 
1 R1 
What is the evolution of the 
US electric utility industry, 
focusing particularly on the 
external forces leading to 
deregulation? 
Q7 
What are your impressions, so far, of 




What has been the worst aspect of utilities 
deregulation? 
2 R1 
Q8B Why do you say that? 2 R1 
Q9 
In your experience, have any utility 
companies successfully negotiated the 
transition from a regulated to deregulated 
organisation? 
2 R2 
How were the managers’ 
decision-making processes 
affected by deregulation? 
Q10 
If not, why do you think that these 
companies have not yet successfully 
negotiated the transition from a regulated 




Are there examples of companies in other 
industries that have successfully negotiated 
the transition from regulated to deregulated 
organisations? If so, which companies?  
Why do you say that? 
2 R2 
Q12 
Kotter (1995) identified various economic 
and social forces driving change in 
organisations. What types of factors do you 
see driving organisational change among 
electric companies? 
2 R4 
What were the specific 
mechanisms these utilities 
used to manage change? 
Q13 
What kinds of transformation strategies did 
utilities develop, if any, to cope with this 
large-scale organisational change? 
2 R4 
Q14 
Kim and Mc Intosh (1999) argue that 
‘companies that pursue a focused pre-
deregulation strategy’ may adopt a similar 
strategy after deregulation. Do you agree 
or disagree? Why? 
2 R4 
Q15 
What competitive strategies are the most 
appropriate for companies to adopt in a 
post-regulated market?  
2 R4 What were the specific 
mechanisms these utilities 
used to manage change? 
Q16 
How would you describe the current status 
of the utility industry? 
4 R3 
How did deregulation affect 
the strategic focus of these 
electric utilities? Q17. 
Which theories of organisational change 
seem most relevant or appropriate to 
describing the transition t 
4 R3 
Q18 Ideal Utility Question Subset    
Q18a 
If you could design the ideal ‘electric utility 
of the future’, describe its Vision. 
5 R6  
 
 
What are the managers’ 
perspectives of an ideal 
electric utility in terms of 
vision, commitment and 
resources? 
Q18b Commitment 5 R6 
Q18c Resources 5 R6 
Q19 
Is there anything else that needs to be 




Do you think this is possible for utilities to 
evolve into this type of organisation? What 
would you call this type of ‘new electric 
utility organisation?’ 
5 R6 
Q20a Why or why not? 5 R6 




What is the gap between the 
current utility and ideal utility 
of the future? 
Q21a 
Moving from the ideal, what do you think is 
the likely electric utility of the future in 
terms of its Vision? 
5 R7 
Q21b Commitment 5 R7 
Q21c Resources 5 R7 
Q22 
Which utilities do you think, if any, will 




Which utilities do you think will either stay 
‘stuck’ or disappear? 
5 R7 
Q24 
Have you ever heard of the term ‘learning 
organisation?’ 
4 R5 
What are the managers’ 
perspectives of electric 
utilities as ‘learning 
organisations?’ 
Q25 




Do you think those types of organisations 
could exist in the electric utility industry? 
Why/why not? 
4 R5 
Q27 What would have to change/occur in your 5 R5 
 108 
organisation to become a ‘learning 
organisation?’ 
Q28 
What are the biggest barriers you see to 





The interview protocol was used according to the practices described in Patton (2002). Each 
interview had enough structure to facilitate comparisons and pattern matching but was also 
sufficiently open-ended to allow the respondents to focus on their particular areas of insight. 
The interviews, which were conducted both in person and on the telephone, lasted 
approximately one-and-a-half hours. Throughout, the interviews remained conversational as 
recommended by Patton (2002). 
 
Interviewing. Unstructured probing questions, which originated from the participant‟s 
answers and the interviewer‟s experience, extracted additional details (Davis 2005) and 
motivated communication (Zikmund 2003). Periodically, structured questions employing a 
Likert scale captured a summary of key points (specifically in Questions 13-15) which 
focused on actual changes processes. This more structured approach reduced the 
disadvantages associated with participant reluctance and interviewer bias (Cooper & 
Schindler 2003).  
 
Table 3-14 summarises how the relationship between the interviewer and the respondent 
evolved during the course of the interview. It also illustrates how this process was enhanced 















Table 3-14: Summary of Convergent Interview Stages 
 (Source: Adapted from Dick 1990, p. 50) 
 
Transcribing. The interviews used detailed note-taking. Upon completion, the draft case 
studies were summarized and sent to the participant for review to ensure accuracy and 
completeness, which confirmed content validity. Initially, there was a plan to record 
interviews (as recommended by Patton 2002) but confidentiality issues prevented this 
approach. Patton (2002) suggests that while in-depth interviews are used most effectively 
when tape-recorded, it is not necessary. The most important consideration is using what 
works best for the interviewer. As a trained reporter and qualitative researcher, extensive 
notes were taken during the interview and more importantly, „direct quotes‟ were captured in 
the critical areas (Patton 2002). The data were then assembled into each section of the 
interview guide. The responses were coded in two ways: each respondent‟s answers were 
colour-coded and identified by the respondent‟s last name at the end of each paragraph. By 
identifying each major thought or contribution through this coding, analysis of the interview 
was facilitated and responses were attributed properly to each informant. This process is 
described more fully in Section 3.5.2. 
 
3.5.4 Data analysis procedures 
Data analysis is the process of interpreting the collected data to produce conclusions and also 
ensure that alternative conclusions are considered. The key focus of data analysis is guided 
by the research issue and research issues of the investigation (Miles & Huberman 1994).  
However, this can be a challenging process and relies on the ability of the researcher to 
1. Introduction 
Establish purpose/Small talk 
Rapport not established 
Interview Guide Section 1:  
Respondent’s Background 
and Experience 
2. General Questions 
Unstructured part 
Superficial rapport 
Interview Guide Section 2:  
Respondent’s Experience 
with Organisational Change 
3. Probe Questions 
Structured part 
Deeper rapport 
Interview Sections 3 and 4:  
Electric Utility Scenarios and 





Interview Section 5:  
Other Sources of Information 
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synthesize data from a variety of sources through a systematic approach.  According to 
Neuman (2000, p. 420): 
A qualitative researcher analyses data by organizing it into categories on the basis of themes, 
concepts, or similar features. … As they read through and ask critical questions of data 
through field notes, historical documents, secondary sources … the researcher organizes data 
and applies ideas simultaneously to create or specify a case. … Making or creating a case, 
called „casing‟, brings data and theory together. 
  
Miles and Huberman (1994) define analysis as three concurrent flows of activity- data 
reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. 
 
 
     Figure 3- 2: Components of Data Analysis: Interactive Model 
 
 
(Source: Miles & Huberman 1994) 
 
 
Data reduction. This is the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting and 
transforming the data from field notes into meaningful units. This occurs continuously 
throughout the research process. This process is used to identify themes and patterns that will 
guide the development of the study‟s conclusions (Miles & Huberman 1994; Newman 1997; 
Yin 2003). The exploratory nature of qualitative research leads to the collection of large 
amounts of data which then have to be organized into comprehensible and meaningful units. 
Data reduction provides a systematic method to prevent data overload without sacrificing the 
rich information gathered in the interviews. Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend using a 
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systematic approach that includes developing summary tables, lists and other diagrams to 
facilitate data organisation and to identify emerging themes.  
 
Data display. This refers to the ways in which the data are organized and compressed to 
facilitate conclusion drawing (Miles & Huberman 1994; Neuman 2000; Yin 2000). This is 
accomplished by using codes, based on the research issues and issues. Neuman (2000) 
describes the process of coding used in this investigation as a three-step process, consisting 
of: 
a) open coding 
b) axial coding 
c) selective coding 
 
Open coding is performed during the initial stages of data collection and is designed to locate 
theme or assign labels so as to condense the material into categories. Axial coding takes place 
during a second pass through the data. In this stage, the researcher focuses on actual data and 
assigns code labels for theme. During axial coding, the researcher asks about causes and 
consequences, conditions and interactions and ways in which to organize the data into 
meaningful units. The axial coding process stimulates the thinking about the linkages 
between concepts and themes. The final pass is called selective coding. This involves 
scanning the data to look selectively for cases that illustrate the themes. This is also the time 
in which comparisons and contrasts are drawn, once data collection has been completed 
(Neuman 2000).  
 
The coding scheme used in this study followed the processes described by Neuman (2000) 
and Miles and Huberman (1994). The process for data coding and subsequent analysis was as 
follows: 
1. Typing up of interview notes into a „clean‟ interview guide.  
2. Each interview is saved as a separate file and saved in one of three folders: 
a. East Coast Case Study 
b. Midwest Case Study  
c. West Coast Case Study 
3. The individual files are saved by the respondent‟s full last name.  
4. The Case Study database, which consisted of SPSS files, was organized by Research 
Issue. That means there were seven separate files that contained the responses to each 
Research Issue. 
5. The respondent‟s identifying characteristics were coded as follows in the Case Study 
database, which consisted of an SPSS file.  
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a. The responses were coded by respondent initials (ID).  
b. By Company (1=East Coast, 2=West Coast, 3=Midwest) 
c. Coded by Level in Organisation (1=Executive; 2=Middle Management) 
d. These respondent codes were copied into every Research Issue  
6. All quantitative data, such as the answers to specific questions regarding number of 
years in the industry, and the ratings, were coded accordingly. 
7. All qualitative data were typed directly into the database verbatim, grouped by 
Research Issue.  
8. Each individual case study was analysed using the case study outline that grouped the 
responses by Research Issue.  
9. The responses were then summarized and compared; the findings are displayed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
The coding for the Expert Interviews was slightly different in that these questions were more 
qualitative in nature. Therefore the process for this additional analysis was as follows:  
1. Typing up of interview notes into a „clean‟ interview guide.  
2. Each interview is saved as a separate file and saved in the expert interview folder.  
3. The file was saved by the respondent‟s last name.  
4. The questions were grouped according to Research Issue in the Case Study Outline.  
5. Each response was marked by both the respondent‟s last name and assigned a specific 
type colour. This way it was much easier to recognize patterns of responses from 
these experts. 
6. The verbatim were reviewed for completeness and relevance. The main themes were 
then summarized in Chapter 4, to supplement the findings for case study. 
7. The complete analysis of the Expert Interviews in Appendix D. 
 
The responses were coded by the question response and also by organisation and 
management level. They were initially organized by research issues. During the axial coding, 
the process was expanded to identify emerging themes within each question group. Lastly, 
the responses were then organized by these themes and compared across the various 
organisations and respondents to selectively identify critical themes and patterns.   
 
Data reporting. All interview responses were entered into the case study database and formed 
the basis for individual case study development, and, subsequently, cross-case analyses. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, the case study responses were disguised to protect confidentiality. 
The three case studies, attached to this dissertation as appendices, form the basis for the 
cross-case analysis detailed in Chapter 4 and the conclusions and implications formulated in 
Chapter 5.  
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Conclusion drawing. The problem with qualitative data is the challenge to condense highly 
complex, context-bound information into a format that tells a convincing story (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2004).  
 
This study relied on pattern matching combined with explanation building once the patterns 
or themes emerged. Miles and Huberman (1994) warn that it is important to use this process. 
In the context of the critical realism paradigm used in this study, meaning is developed 
through the analytical reasoning by discerning patterns in the relationships from the data 
gathered in the „real world‟.  
 
Table 3-15 summarizes the analytical techniques used in this research investigation. These 
techniques were facilitated by the use of the SPSS database and the grouping of the responses 
by Research Issue. This allowed the investigator to identify themes or trends (item 1) both 
between and among the case study respondents and expert interviews. This facilitated in 
explanation building for the responses and eventual conclusion drawing (item 2). The SPSS 
database simplified the process for counting (3 and 5) of quantitative databases by computing 
frequency counts for specific responses. Where appropriate, cross-tabulations between two 
question types were conducted to identify trends, patterns and facilitate cross-case analysis 
(5, 6 and 7). The data were also organized chronologically (4) based on the analysis of the 
verbatim responses regarding the informant‟s industry background, knowledge and 
experiences.  
 
   
Table 3-15: Analytical Approaches Used in this Study 
1 Noting patterns or themes 




6 Making contrasts/comparisons  
7 Cross-Case Synthesis 
 (Source: Adapted from Miles & Huberman 1994; Yin 2003) 
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3.6 Research Quality 
The case study method is often viewed as less rigorous than other qualitative approaches 
(Yin, 2003). Another criticism is that case studies are only generalizable to the theoretical 
propositions rather than populations or universes (Yin 2003). However, the goal of a case 
study to expand and generalize theories rather than to determine statistical relationships (Yin 
2003), which then diminishes the impact of these types of concerns. These cases studies were 
never intended to provide conclusive results, but rather provide exploratory information that 
could lead to additional research and study in this area.  
Table 3-16 summarizes the ways in which these research tactics were incorporated into the 
research design and analysis for this inquiry.  
 
 
Table 3- 16: Tactics to Maintain Qualitative Research Design 
Tests Case Study Tactic 
Phase of 
research in which 
tactic occurs 
Relevance for this inquiry 
Construct Validity 
• Uses multiple 
sources of evidence 
• Establish chain of 
evidence 
• Have key informants 






• Interviewed multiple 
respondents at each 
organisation 
•    Followed protocols to 
establish a chain of 
evidence   
• Respondents reviewed the 






• Address rival 
explanations 






• Used in analysis 
• Used in analysis 
• Used in analysis 
• Method not used  
 
External Validity 
Use replication logic in 
multiple-case studies 
Research design 
Incorporated into selection of 
organisations interviewed 
Reliability 
• Use case study 
protocol 






• Developed consistent 
research protocols 
• Developed case study 
database  




Another way to enhance the rigour of a qualitative methodology is through triangulation, 
which combines several research methods. Triangulation „strengthens a study by combining 
several methods – using quantitative and qualitative data … [and] can be obtained in an 
interview by combining both interviewing and observations‟ (Patton 2002).  
Stake (1995) stated that the protocols used to ensure accuracy and alternative explanations 
are called triangulation. The need for triangulation arises from the ethical need to confirm the 
validity of the processes (Yin 2003). Furthermore, the realism paradigm of case study 
interviews provides the opportunity to triangulate the data by comparing it to data about the 
real world – beyond the view of just the interviewer and respondent (Perry 1998).  
Types of triangulation include a review of public records (Yin 2003) as well as drawing on 
„key informants‟ such as consultants, government advisors, and industry association 
representatives (Patton 2002; Perry 1998), or conducting multiple interviews in each 
organisation (Perry 1998). All of these methods were used to triangulate the results in this 
inquiry. The individual case studies were enhanced by conducting multiple interviews with 
representatives from each selected organisation. Key informants, including economists and 
utility industry advisors as well as peers from other electric utility organisations and trade 
associations, were also interviewed to provide additional perspective and understanding. The 
research study was further strengthened by the literature review, which included a review of 
public records, annual reports and news media reports of the outside events regarding 
deregulation at each selected utility.  
The final way in which the data was supported was through the respondents, who were given 
an opportunity to review the individual case studies in order to support and refine the 
summaries. This approach is recommended by both Yin (2003) and Miles and Huberman 
(1994) as a strategy to strength the validity of the findings while minimizing researcher bias. 
 
3.7  Ethical considerations 
 
A researcher must be concerned about ethical issues in a case study, because often a 
researcher is a member of the organisation, industry or field of expertise researched. This was 
true for this study, as the researcher has worked as a consultant in the electric utility industry 
for more than 15 years. Given the fact that the researcher has conducted numerous qualitative 
 116 
and quantitative studies within the electric utility industry, she was able to impart her own 
standard of professional ethics as well as conform to the four principals of ethical standards 
often cited for conducting qualitative research (Miles & Huberman 1994). 
 
Voluntary participation. This principal requires that people are not coerced into participation. 
All interviews were conducted on a voluntary basis and several potential respondents 
declined the invitation to participate due to their concerns about the sensitivity of the subject 
matter.  
 
Informed consent. Prior to participation, all respondents must be fully informed about the 
procedures and risks involved in this research (Patton 2002). All the respondents received an 
informed consent form, explaining the research and related materials in detail upfront, 
including purpose and nature of the in-depth interviews and scope of the investigation.  
 
Avoidance of harm. Ethical standards require that researchers not put participants at risk. No 
one was harmed in these interviews. 
 
Confidentiality. It is also imperative that the researcher protect the privacy of research 
participants and, as such, care and diligence were used. Anonymity was agreed upon for all 
participating companies and organisations (Patton 2002). The respondents were assured that 
the research results would not be used for any purpose other than academic knowledge and 
advancement (Neuman 2000). Confidentiality, an especially important aspect of this study, 
was achieved by the use of disguised case studies, as recommended by Yin (2003). The need 
to disguise the case studies followed the parameters cited in Yin (2003), both because of the 
controversial nature of the topic and the utilities investigated and the fact that many of the 
respondents were currently still working within the deregulated organisation or in the field. 
Given the close and closed nature of the electric utility industry, these case studies could only 
be written as disguised cases in order to protect the respondents while also ensuring that the 
information provided was valid and the respondents were allowed to speak freely. This issue 
will be addressed more fully in Chapter 4. 
 
The guidelines for conducting institutional and professional research are clearly stated for 
students attending the University of Southern Queensland (USQ and all respondents signed 
this statement prior to beginning in-person or telephone interviews.  
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3.8 Limitations 
All research studies have limitations, but this is especially true for exploratory, qualitative 
inquiries such as this one (Patton 2002; Yin 2003). The limitations specific to this 
investigation include the following: 
 
Potential researcher bias. Research results based on subjective methods, such as in-depth 
interviews and case studies, are limited by the skills and ability of the interviewer. There is a 
definite potential for bias if the interviewer has a „hidden agenda‟ or foregone conclusion. 
Despite the concerns raised by Zikmund (2000) regarding research bias, this study minimized 
the potential bias by asking a combination of open- and close-ended questions, asking 
questions in several ways, and allowing the respondents to review and correct the case study 
write-ups prior to the final analysis. The researcher also conformed to the standards of 
interviewing principals described in the research procedures for doctoral dissertations for the 
University of Southern Queensland (McPhail 2002).  
 
Sampling bias. This research study was based on only three case studies, supplemented by 
eight additional interviews. The sampling techniques used a combination of a stratified, 
purposeful and snowball methodologies, recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) as a 
way to identify three electric utility cases that would contribute to understanding of the 
research framework discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
Respondent Bias. There is also a potential for respondent bias, given the controversial nature 
of this topic. Internal politics could be viewed as a study limitation (Patton 2002). As a way 
to minimize this potential bias, the respondents were promised confidentiality, several 
respondents from each organisation were interviewed, and their insights were then matched 
against other primary and secondary data sources. These efforts help to identify where the 
respondents may simply have had an „axe to grind‟ about a particular experience which 
coloured their perceptions. 
 
In summary, qualitative research does have its limitations (Patton 2002; Yin 2003; Zikmund 
2000), which include the inability to make generalisable findings, and the need to rely more 
on subjective rather than objective methods of data collection. However, qualitative research 
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studies, such as this inquiry, do fulfil an important purpose because they provide an 
opportunity to explore and identify areas that warrant more in-depth study and investigation.  
 
3.9 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 begins by making the case for selecting the realism paradigm, using qualitative 
methods, specifically case studies and in-depth interviews, to address the research issue. The 
case study sample and expert respondents were selected based on the judgment of the 
researcher and the relevance of the selected case to meet the study objectives. The interview 
protocols for both the case studies and the expert interviews were based on a mixture of open- 
and close-ended questions based on the systematic approach advocated by both Yin (2003) 
and Miles and Huberman (1994). This chapter described the merits of using both single and 
multiple case approaches and described the rationale for selecting the firms for these case 
studies. The data collection procedures used in this investigation were designed for 
replication by future research. This chapter also addressed the ways in which this study 
conformed to analytical standards in order to meet tests for both validity and reliability. The 
final sections addressed the ways in which this research adhered to the ethical conduct 
required in qualitative research investigations while acknowledging the limitations of using 
this approach for exploratory case studies in the realism paradigm. These frameworks are 
well established and have been successfully deployed to guide change research in the past. 
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CHAPTER 4 – DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1  Introduction   
Chapter 4 discusses the research results from the case study and in-depth interviews. The 
findings are organised by each research issue, originally introduced in Chapter 2. The first set 
of findings is based on results from the three case studies, supplemented by the results from 
the key informants.  
 
4.2  Summary of Selected Cases  
This section provides a summary of the three case studies selected for this research inquiry. 
These three case studies represent three different deregulation experiences for investor-owned 
electric utilities in the U.S. The case studies were selected for the following reasons: 
 These case studies represented a geographic diversity which illustrated the different 
approaches to deregulation in three separate U.S. states. This geographic diversity 
provided a good contrast for deregulation experiences, given that deregulation 
differed in these regions. 
 These case studies represented a size diversity. The utilities were selected because 
they also varied considerably in the number of employees. The West Coast utility was 
more than three times larger than the Midwest Utility while the East Coast utility 
provided some perspective of a mid-size utility becoming part of a substantially larger 
organisation through mergers and acquisitions. 
 The three case studies also represented three different responses to electric utility 
deregulation. Deregulation crippled the West Coast utility; it emboldened the East 
Coast utility to become even bigger and it completely restructured the Midwest 
Utility. These outcomes, while not necessarily typical of investor-owned utilities in 
the U.S., do provide sufficient contrasts from which to draw conclusions. 
 
While these three case studies were all investor-owned utilities experiencing deregulation, the 
selection of these case studies illustrated the distinct and unique responses to this 
transformational change within the electric utility industry.  
 
4.2.1 Background of Cases Selected   
Case 1: Yankee Electric (YE) was selected for this research project for a number of reasons. 
It was among the first electric utilities to divest its generation assets and become strictly an 
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electricity delivery business. Its merger with United Kingdom Power Corporation 
7
 (UKPC) 
was viewed as an opportunity for the owner of a high-voltage transmission network in the 
UK to enter the emerging U.S. electric market. The merger enabled Yankee Electric to 
combine forces with a company that has a broad understanding of operating in a competitive 
electric market. This case is referred to as the East Coast Utility in this analysis. 
 
Case 2: Great Lakes Electric (GLE) was selected because it represented an electric utility that 
started, but did not complete, deregulation. GLE, however, used deregulation as a catalyst to 
reorganise and restructure the company, divest itself of non-core businesses and completely 
transform its utility organisation‟s culture. This case is referred to as Midwest Utility. 
 
Case 3: The Western Electric and Gas Company
8
 (WEGC) was selected for this research 
project for a number of reasons. It is one of the oldest and largest combination electric and 
natural gas companies in the United States. This company has approximately 20,000 
employees and serves more than 12 million customers in a 70,000 square-mile service 
territory. It is regulated by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), which is 
directly responsible for overseeing its transition from a monopoly to a competitive energy 
provider. Its experience and response to electric deregulation was consistent with other 
organisations facing deregulation at the same time in California. The firm was also selected 
based on the researcher‟s professional knowledge of the organisation and its structure, and 
contacts with employees at both the senior and middle management. This is referred to as the 
West Coast Utility in these write-ups.  
 
In each section the perspectives of the respondents in the utilities will be analysed in detail. 
The summary of their responses will include the contrasting or complimentary statements by 
the experts. The detailed analysis of the experts‟ statements can be found in Appendix E. Not 
every respondent felt qualified to comment on all areas, but the combination of these 
interviews did provide additional insight into the seven research issues posed in this 
investigation. 
 
                                                 
7
 The actual name of the organisation has been changed in order to protect the identities of the respondents interviewed in 
this case study. 
8
 The name and certain salient facts about this company have been disguised to protect respondent confidentiality 
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4.3   Case Analysis of R1: Evolution of the U.S. electric utility industry 
This section summarises the responses to Research Issue 1(R1): What is the evolution of the 
US electric utility industry, focusing particularly on the external forces leading to 
deregulation? This analysis is based on the responses to the following question in the 
interview protocol: 
 
Q7.  What are your impressions, so far, of deregulation of the U.S. electric utility industry? Why?  
 
The purpose of this question was to provide a context for the respondents‟ experiences 
against the backdrop of the tumultuous events surrounding their companies‟ responses to 
electric utility deregulation. Please refer to Appendix D for a summary of deregulation 
activities for each utility case study. This section focuses on a summary of deregulation as it 
affected these respondents directly, and indirectly, for each case study and concludes with a 
cross-case analysis.  
 
 
4.3.1  East Coast Utility 
Deregulation caused a corporate shift for most of the major functions, both internally and 
externally. It propelled this company to seek out ways to be more competitive, which was 
accomplished through a series of friendly mergers and acquisitions. These activities were 
accelerated by deregulation, as the promise of open markets led to a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions in this industry. The respondents were all affected by deregulation, as they 
experienced change, both internally and externally. The merger with the British firm was 
followed closely by a friendly merger with another local electric utility referred to as 
Northeastern Utilities (NU)
9
. NU was a public utility holding company based in New 
England, with a focus on transmission and distribution utilities in Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island. This merger was viewed a way for both Yankee Electric and Northeastern Utility to 
consolidate operations in New England. The merger created a more efficient transmission and 
distribution company
10
. In April 2000, the acquisition was completed for approximately $642 
million and resulted in the one of the largest electric utility systems in the Northeast (Kerber 
1999).  
                                                 
9
 The actual name of this company has been disguised to protect the respondents‟ identity. 
10
  Mergers and Acquisitions of Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, EIA Administration, Chapter 3, 1999  
www.eia.gov.  
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United Kingdom Power Company also agreed to purchase Iroquois Electric Company
11
 (IEC) 
through the formation of a new UKPC holding company. IEC is an investor-owned energy 
services company that provides electricity to more than 1.5 million customers across 24,000 
square miles in New York and delivers natural gas to more than 540,000 customers over 
4,500 square miles. It had 7,600 employees.  
The combination created the ninth-largest electric utility in the U.S. with an electric customer 
base of approximately 3.3 million. With the acquisition, UKPC will own and operate the 
most extensive transmission network (by square miles) and be the second largest distribution 
business (by power delivered) in the Northeastern market. 
From Table 4-1 it is clear that the respondents‟ overall impressions of deregulation were 
unfavourable, creating turmoil and friction among various departments as the organisation 
tried to adapt to a competitive marketplace. However, the changes within Yankee Electric 
also did not develop as expected, which created additional frustration for these employees. 
                                                 
11
  The original name of this company has been disguised to protect the respondents interviewed for this case 
study. 
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Table 4-1: Selected Responses from East Coast Respondents Regarding R1 
 
4.3.2  Midwest Utility 
From comments in Table 4-2 it can be seen that the regulators in this Midwestern state 
wanted to be at the forefront of the drive for electric utility deregulation in the United States. 
At first they adopted a „me-too‟ attitude towards electric utility deregulation, but pursued it in 
a rather cautious manner. There was a push, led by both the legislatures and the leaders of the 
large IOUs for deregulation, which led to a compromise. The utilities had to shed their non-
utility operations and focus instead on increased generation capacity. This state does not have 
enough generation to keep up with demand, so the commission focused on developing new 
infrastructure, specifically generation plants, in a way that was fair to the other utilities, 












East Coast Utility 
A lot of staff …didn’t want change in their lives or want to experience 
constant change. … Some workers were fourth generation…but there 
were a lot of generations working for the company. (Former Utility Middle 
Manager: ET)  
We underwent massive change for about 10 years. It really began in the  
mid-1990s with retail choice in New England. … (This) was the first utility 
in America to offer choice. …It was ahead of California – pioneering with a 
mind-set that changed. It was also the first to divest its power plants and 
first to experience major changes (former Utility Executive: CA).  
Deregulation worked for large business and commercial customers, 
but not at all for residential companies (Utility Middle Management: LH).   
 
Deregulation happened and (we) divested some facilities. All energy 
groups became spun off the suppliers. We had to set up firewalls between 
commercial groups and our staff. Then (the staff) transferred to all the 
energy companies. …There were lots of change in the commercial and 
wholesale company (operations). … We could not talk to each other 
(former Utility Middle Management: ET). 
The retail competition didn’t happen as fast as we expected nor did it 
happen as we intended. We were not going to be able to keep both 
generation and transmission capabilities and meet the market pressures. 
…This was new to the utilities (former Utility Executive). 
Not going to keep both generation and transmission and meet the market 
pressures. This was new to the utilities (former Utility Executive: EC).  
Relationship in government and regulatory structure make a break creates 
tremendous scepticism. Privately there were some concerns (Utility Middle 
Management: ET).    
 (the utilities will ) spin off the generators and a lot of  (this was) making the 
legislation palatable to regulators and government was the deal in ‘good 
faith’ with people (Former Utility Executive: CA).  
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Midwest Case Study 
The first major change was the ‘trade-off’, which allowed utilities to get 
out from under the ‘asset cap rule’. The utilities were pushing them to 
get rid of the asset cap and that was a key to growth opportunities. ... 
They made a deal and the state got rid of the asset cap rule which let 
the utilities get into unregulated business (Utility Executive: JA). 
The Commission was under pressure from the utilities in (the state) to 
deregulate. …There was a ‘pro-business climate’ in (the state). The 
climate was conservative. ... Utility executives are the guys who know 
how to run a business and thought they were smarter than the regulators 
about the utility business (Former Regulatory Staff, Senior Management: 
GE).  
Overall impression that (the state) has always made wise decisions 
regarding the utility industry. There is certain Midwest cautiousness and 
...  (the utilities) always took a ‘go slow’ and reasoned approach (former 
Utility, Middle Manager: JB). 
In 1993 there was a massive revitalization and re-engineering, and the 
utility adopted the California regulatory model work as progress and we 
had to learn and get leaner and meaner quickly. … The mission has 
changed completely from before and after deregulation. …There was 
fighting over deregulation and the roles and responsibilities and effects 
of the deregulation (Utility Executive: JA).  
The utility made a deal and the state got rid of the asset cap rule, which 
let the utilities get into unregulated business. We were frugal but we 
were keeping the lights on and the rates down. The regulators thought 
competition would bring added infrastructure. ... (The process) was not 
the most cost effective strategy (to pursue) (Utility Executive: JA). 
 
4.3.3 West Coast Utility  
Deregulation was the catalyst for organisational change, which is the focus of this 
investigation. The respondents described the changes caused by deregulation as completely 
demoralizing to the entire organisation. Deregulation affected every department and 
employee, led to widespread layoffs, and a complete restructuring of the entire organisation. 
These effects and the organisation‟s responses to this widespread change were the focus of 
the investigation. These changes included a complete re-evaluation of the mission, focus, and 
structure of the utility. Deregulation also led to massive restructuring and reordering of the 










Table 4-3: Selected Comments from West Coast Utility Respondents 
Regarding RI 
West Coast Utility 
Deregulation created ‘constant change with no permanent infrastructure’ 
(Executive: KJ). 
Deregulation led to the creation of a ‘new team’. The utility had to start 
getting people in the professional energy world to identify new power 
supply resources…The moment had arrived (Middle Management: VR). 
(The utility) had to design a completely new cross-functional organisational 
structure (Middle Management: KD). 
The energy-efficiency division had to have to change the whole business. 
…We were living with the idea that they want to replace us. ....It was tough 
on our staff and (we) spent seven years. ... There was a growing period of 
uncertainty (Middle Management: MB). 
 
 
4.3.4 Cross-Case Analysis of R1 
All of the respondents viewed the attempts at deregulation of their electric companies as 
unfavourable and it triggered the following organisation-wide events, as summarized in Table 
4-4. 
 






4.3.5 Summary of findings for R1 
Deregulation was a cataclysmic event that changed these utilities forever, regardless of 
whether it was successfully completed. All the utility respondents reported that their 
organisations fundamentally changed as a result of this event.  
 
However, the experts‟ view is that deregulation was caused by pressures outside the control 
of the electric utility industry that had been building up based on rising prices and constrained 
supply. The change was from the outside, dictated by organisations and events other than the 
utilities. These outside influences included state energy commissions, national and state 








Number Favourable  1  
Number Unfavourable 4 4 5 
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governments, and large industrial customers. However, the outcomes of deregulation have 
largely been a failure (see Appendix E, Tables E-3 and E-4.)  
 
The next section summarizes how these respondents‟ jobs and responsibilities were affected 
by this event within their organisations.  
 
 
4.4 Case Analysis of R2:Deregulation’s impact on managerial 
decision making processes 
The previous section focused on the macro view of the deregulation as it affected the three 
utility case studies. The remainder of the research issues review deregulation   from a micro 
view, focusing on the changes that occurred internally within these three case studies 
designed to address the following R2: How were the managers’ decision-making processes 
affected by deregulation? 
 











Specifically, these questions explore the respondents‟ roles and overall experience and 
determined how these roles changed as a result of utility deregulation. 
4.4.1 East Coast   
Current Roles – The respondents from the East Coast case study represented both middle 
management and executive level management, providing a blend of perspectives for the 
events that occurred within this organisation. These employees also had a diverse group of 
skill sets which included marketing, market research, law and regulatory experience, business 
Q1. What is your current role?   
Q2. If not currently employed by the utility, what was your most recent role at 
this utility?  
Q3. How was/has your role been influenced or affected deregulation of the 
electric    utility industry?  
Q4. Which areas, in particular, are you most directly involved in regarding 
the electric utility industry?  
Q5. How did you get involved in this role?   
Q6. How long have you been involved in the utility industry, either directly or 
indirectly?   
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development, and information technology (IT). They worked in various departments during 
the time period covered in this investigation, and were able to determine how deregulation 
affected the company‟s internal focus. Moreover, one respondent was a regulatory lawyer, 
and worked very closely with the company‟s CEO as Yankee Electric restructured, merged, 
acquired and divested itself of various business groups.  
 
The senior executives provided an interesting perspective because they worked at the highest 
level of the company during this turbulent period. They were involved in executing the new 
strategies put into motion following the reorganisation and overall restructuring. One 
respondent started an in-house consulting firm designed to help other utilities navigate 
through deregulation, but this business was eventually shut down. Another respondent 
worked as a president of one of the operating companies following the acquisition by the 
British parent company.  
 
 
Three respondents indicated that their jobs had changed since the deregulation and 
reorganisation of the company. These respondents‟ current roles reflect how much the 
industry has changed and evolved since deregulation. Three of the four respondents are no 
longer with the utility, having left either voluntarily or involuntarily, due to the new 
management and new organisational focus of the company. Three respondents changed jobs 
as a result of deregulation, as the company‟s focus switched to generate additional revenue, 
sell assets and divest itself of unprofitable businesses. All are still involved in the energy 
industry. Two are consultants and one works for a non-profit energy partnership in New 
England providing support to energy-efficiency projects. Their comments are summarized in 
Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-5:  
How East Coast Respondents’ Responsibilities Changed After Deregulation 
East Coast Utility 
I was involved in all the reorganisations. I also worked as the Executive VP of 
(another utility) and restructuring came in and had to deal with that in 2000 
(Utility Executive: CA). 
I was trying to generate additional revenue (Utility Middle Manager: LH).  
I was an analyst and involved in load research and then moved into the Vice 
President of Information Technologies for five years (Utility Executive: JA).  
My focus was on the regulatory side. The function did not change in terms of 
day-to-day responsibilities. ... I was in the evaluation group for seven years … 
The whole DSM function was preserved in that particular capacity and my job 
was unchanged (Utility Middle Manager: ET). 
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The decision-making process for the East Coast utility was still driven by the regulators, even 
though the company was in the midst of deregulation.  
 
Overall Experience- These respondents were all veterans in the electric utility, working an 
average of 15½ years in this industry.  
 
 
4.4.2 Midwest Utility 
Current Roles – The five respondents interviewed for the Midwest case study currently 
work in various positions throughout the state of Wisconsin. One is a state employee, three 
work in senior leadership positions at non-profit organisations focusing on energy-efficiency 
initiatives, and one is still in a senior management position at Great Lakes Electric.  
 
Two were in executive management during the restructuring in Wisconsin, one worked for 
the regulatory staff and worked closely with all CEOs at the state‟s investor-owned utilities. 
One was a regulatory advocate against industry deregulation, and thus provided another 
perspective. The others were utility employees during this time period.  
 
All the respondents have changed jobs since the deregulation, or restructuring in the state. 
Only one respondent remains with the utility, having moved into a senior position focusing 
on renewable energy efficiency. The others have work for a variety of organisations in the 
state, all closely related to the electric utility industry. 
 
Overall Experience – Three are current or former utility employees and two were directly 
involved in the utility deregulation activities in the state commission or as an advocate 
against deregulation. Their job responsibilities continue to focus on energy efficiency and 
energy advocacy. One respondent worked on the  Citizens Utility Board as an attorney, 
advising against deregulation, and others worked on a retail access task force working closely 
with the senior management of all the Investor-Owned Utilities in the state. The average 




4.4.3 West Coast  
Current Roles – Four of the five West Coast case study respondents are still working with the 
electric utility; the fifth one has left her role as is now a consultant in the electric utility 
industry. Two the five respondents are in middle management and three are in executive 
positions (see Table 4-6). 
 
Table 4-6: How WEEG Respondents’ Responsibilities Changed After 
Deregulation 
West Coast Utility 
In a sense, deregulation followed me. I was focused on the generation 
efficiency and R&D … but that department was taken over in California by 
(state agencies) … so that went away (Senior Executive: KJ).  
There is a whole different focus on the functional part of the organisation. It 
was not just dealing with the technical function (anymore) but rather I had to 
manage a group of people and deal with leadership and development issues 
(Senior Executive: VR). 
Deregulation led to the creation of a ‘new team’. The utility had to start getting 
people in the professional energy world to identify new power supply 
resources. … The moment had arrived (Middle Management: KD). 
The utility had to move into supply-side procurement and develop a more fine-
grained approach. … All of this came together to develop a more 
comprehensive energy plan that also relied on energy conservation, direct 
response programs, and renewable (Middle Management: KD).  
There was a shake-up in my group, and I got promoted and had an opportunity 
to move over to do low-income evaluation for that program with me. … 
Everyone else would stay put. It was a parallel move for me (Middle 
Management: MO). 
Some of the change was directed from the PUC – but the level at which the 
mandates were coming ... there is not much reason to do long-range planning 
because there is no reason to expect to be around. … Just keep on doing the 
current job. Management did consult with us on policies to implement 
programs ... but in the last few years, the regulators have been making it up as 
they go (Middle Management: MB). 
 
 
Overall Experience – These employees have worked for the company for a significant period 
of time, ranging from six to 22 years, with an average of 13 years spent working for the 
electric utility. These respondents have developed a significant level of understanding of the 
company and its operational culture, both before and after the deregulation and restructuring 
in the late 1990s.  
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4.4.4 Cross-Case analysis of R2 
The Cross-Case analysis examined how the managers‟ decision-making process had been 
changed based on the following: a) Experience in the industry, b) Role change analysis and c) 
Change in company focus. 
 
As Table 4-7 shows, the 14 respondents were equally split between middle management and 
executive level positions within the organisations. Only one respondent was promoted during 
this period, but still remained in middle management. The others reported moving job 
functions and responsibilities, but still remained within the same management level after 
deregulation.  
 









All of these respondents have a long tenure within the industry, working between six and 30 
years. The average number of years for each case study is summarized in the Figure 4-1 with 































2 2 3 7 
 Executive 2 3 2 7 
Total 4 5 5 14 
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Figure 4-1:  
Comparison of Length of Time in the Electric Utility Industry Across Groups 
 























Tables 4-8 and 4-9 illustrate the ways in these respondents‟ roles have changed since 
occurred since deregulation. As Table 4-8 shows, only two respondents indicated that 
deregulation had no effect on their jobs, as they remain in the same function prior to 
deregulation. Five have left the utility, while seven have moved into new areas. However, all 
remain in the electric utility industry.  
 
Table 4-8: Comparison of Role Changes Among Utility Respondents By Utility 
Case Study 
 
Role Change Analysis 
Total 
Left the utility 
Moved into  
new area 
No effect at 
all 
East Coast 1 3 0 4 
West Coast 0 3 2 5 
Midwest 4 1 0 5 
Total 5 7 2 14 
 
 
Examining the effect another way, by company level, it shows that the middle managers had 








Table 4-9: Comparison of Role Changes Among Utility Respondents By 
Management Level 
Level in the Company 
 
Role Change Analysis 






 Middle Management 4 3 0 7 
 Executive 1 4 2 7 




4.4.5 Summary of R2   
The Cross-Case analysis illustrated that deregulation had an effect on these respondents‟ roles 
and responsibilities. All respondents said that deregulation resulted in a shift in the 
company‟s overall focus; as a result, the respondents became more concerned with 
competitive issues. Ultimately, roles of the respondents were changed dramatically by 
electric utility restructuring, in that they had to either change their job, or change their 
employer as a direct result.  
 
These findings were further supported in the expert interviews. They believed that the utility 
managers were paralysed by the constant changes and stresses associated with deregulation, 
which adversely affected their ability to make decisions. The utilities had to deal with a 
smaller workforce, ill-prepared employees and an incentive scheme that no longer reflected 
the market conditions. The result is that they were unable to make decisions fast enough to 
keep up with constant market changes and upheaval. Deregulation affected managers‟ 
decisions about their reactions to the new deregulated environment. As the following 
comments illustrate, the utility industry struggled to react but it did not have the appropriate 
skills sets or knowledge to do so successfully. In only rare cases were the managers able to 
embrace and adjust for this change rather than fight it. 
 
 
4.5. Case Analysis of R3:Deregulation and the strategic focus of 
the utilities 
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The next set of questions attempted to define the level of organisational change experienced 
by these utilities and probe more directly into how these changes affected the utilities‟ 
strategic focus to address the Research Issue 3 (R3): How did deregulation affect the 
strategic focus of these electric utilities?   The relevant questions in the interview protocol 




4.5.1 East Coast  
All the respondents described the level of organisational change as corporate transformation, 
as defined in the discussion guide. These respondents reported organisational-wide change, 
identifying changes in the organisational strategy by focusing on a competitive, rather than a 
regulated market; changes in the organisation‟s structure by selling off the generation assets 
and laying off employees; changes in the utility‟s processes, by creating new incentive 
models, creating firewalls between departments, and focusing on customer service issues; and 
changes in the corporate culture by becoming more business-oriented, rigid and more diverse. 
The comments in Table 4-10 summarize these findings from the respondents. 
  
Q8. During the past five years, how would describe the level of change that has  
 occurred within your organisation? 
1. Fine Tuning: Ongoing, incremental change in your organisation’s strategy, structure, 
people, and processes.  
2. Incremental Adjustment: Distinct, but minor modifications, to the organisation’s 
strategy, structure, and/or processes.  
3. Modular Transformation: Major re-alignment of a department or division within your 
organisation.  
4. Corporate Transformation: Organisational-wide change, characterized by major shifts in 
the organisation’s strategy, structure, systems, processes, etc. 
Q8b. Why do you say that? 
Q9. What specific strategies has your organisation undertaken to adapt to  
 competitive changes?  
Q10. Is your view, have these strategies been effective? Why/why not?  
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Table 4-10:  Types of Strategies Undertaken to Adapt to This Change: East 
Coast Utility 
Area of Focus Executive Middle Management 
Organisation’s 
Strategy 
The first reorganisation was done 
… pre-emptively in anticipation of 
retail competition (CA). 
Corporate shift for a host of major 




We had to figure out how we were 






All energy groups became spin-offs of 
the energy suppliers (ET). 
We began to separate out the 
personnel, the generation staff 
from the rest of the company (EC). 
We literally restaffed the entire 
organisation, starting with the CEO 
(CA). 
Systems 
 We had to (change) the sales 




 Cultural things, the employees (from 
the different) companies were culturally 
divergent. One utility copies everything 
that we were doing. … The IE people 
didn’t think as creatively and not the 
type of person that YE hires; The HR 
polices much more flexibility at YE 
were much more flexible, could work at 
home and have casual dress and all 




The respondents were mixed in their assessment as to whether the strategies implemented by 





Table 4-11: Summary of Responses by Organisational Level: East Coast Utility 
Level of the Company 
Have these strategies been effective? Total 
 Yes No 
Middle Management  0 2 2  
Executive 1 1 2 




4.5.2  Midwest Utility 
Four respondents described this organisational change as a corporate transformation, 
characterized by major shifts in the organisation‟s strategy, structure, systems, processes, 
etc.‟ One respondent described it as „modular transformation‟, defined as a major realignment 
of a department or division. In all cases, however, the respondents indicated that this 
organisational change was widespread and confusing. A Senior Executive (EC) said: 
Modular Transformation occurred in 1998-1999. Then all the utilities pooled their resources 
together and developed a Transmission Company, an independent company. 
 
Table 4-12 summarises these responses, based on management level, and illustrates the effect 
that this organisational change had throughout the utility. All four of the executive 
respondents believed these strategies had been effective; however, one utility middle manager 
did not believe they were effective. 
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Table 4-12: Types of Strategies Undertaken to Adapt to This Change: Midwest 
Utility 
 
Area of Focus Executive Middle Management 
Organisation’s 
Strategy 
The board decided to have a shift in 
leadership from within and brought in a new 
CEO (JA). 
Eventually led to the divestiture 
of the transmission company … 
and the sale of the nuclear 
power plants (JM). 
Decided to launch a build-out strategy for 
distribution. The goal was to refocus the 
company and make it stronger with a 
stronger emphasis on customer service and 




The commission also ordered the utilities to 
separate the transmission from the 
generation... and then spin off all the 
transmission assets. … This would be led by 
the new management team (JA). 
 
The new management inherited a strategic 
plan that includes building two new natural 
gas plants and coal generation plants (JA). 
 
The (regulators) were making sure that the 
transmission system was robust and kept at 
an arm’s length (JA). 
Had budget reductions, 10-15% cuts in 
management ranks (JA). 
(For) each transmission employee who had 
to be moved (the company) had to add five 
more employees to interface with the ones 
we lost to the transmission company (JA). 
Systems 
We had a whole new company with HR/ and 
other support functions (JA). 
 
Processes/Culture 
This was a fundamentally culture change and 




4.5.3  West Coast Utility 
The respondents described their experiences with deregulation as being in constant change 
with no permanent infrastructure. All of these respondents viewed this change as „constant, 
unending change always in overhaul, great turmoil, starting in the mid 1990s‟.  
 
Four respondents indicated that the type of organisational change implemented was corporate 
transformation, while one respondent described it as a combination of both incremental in the 
beginning, leading to corporate transformation. As a result of deregulation, the organisation 
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had to reformulate its entire organisational structure, create new jobs, and realign others. A 
Senior Executive (VR) noted: 
In the last five years, the circumstances of deregulation and bankruptcy forced the company. 
... We were always incrementally adjusting to meet new challenges. But now, that we are out 
of bankruptcy and past the energy crisis, the intent of the organisation has been broadened to 
focus on corporate transformation. … We need to have the organisation ready for the next 
tidal wave.  
 
 
Table 4-13 summarises the types of strategies used at this utility. 
 
 
Table 4-13: Types of Strategies Undertaken to Adapt to This Change: West 
Coast Utility  
 
 
None of the respondents believed that these strategies had been effective.  
 
 
4.5.4 Cross-Case Analysis of R3 
The following two figures summarise the responses given to describe organisational change 
at these utilities and the ways in which these organisations experienced change. The 
responses are summarized in the Figures 4-2 and 4-3. 
 
 
   
Executive Middle Management 
Organisation’s 
Strategy 
The energy-efficiency division 
had to change programs, 
change whole business (KJ). 
 
 
The departments have all gotten 





The traditional role was 
restructured to meet new needs 
(MB). 
(Deregulation) shook up the group and 
the department (KD). 
The company changed 
structure; brought in new execs 
to improve cost structure (VR). 
Systems 
 We were incredibly busy trying to angle 
to keep our jobs and do our jobs even 
though they might be going away (MO). 
Processes/Culture 
We had to live with idea of being 
replaced. It was tough on staff 
for many years. We had seven 
years of uncertainty (MB). 
It has been in constant upheaval and 
was nerve wracking. At different times 
we were all afraid for our jobs and (the) 
managers were not doing (our work) 
because of the restructuring (KD). 
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Most respondents identified that these electric utilities experienced change at all levels, but 




Figure 4-3:Cross-Case Comparison of the Types of Organisational Change 
Experienced  





























































East Coast Midwest West Coast 
Corporate 
Reorganisation 
   
Corporate Layoffs    
Mergers    
Acquisitions    
Divestures    
 
 
4.5.5 Summary of R3  
Overall, these respondents agreed that deregulation forced the utilities to make corporate-
wide transformational change that affected every aspect of their organisation. The effects of 
these strategies implemented by the utilities will be explored more fully in the next research 
issue (R4). 
 
The key informants provided two distinct explanations of the ways in which the electric 
utility industry responded strategically to change by taking either a reactive or proactive 
response.  
 
4.6 Case Analysis of R4: Managing change in the utilities 
The next set of questions was designed to identify more fully the ways in which utilities 
implemented organisational change in order to answer the R4: What were the specific 
mechanisms these utilities used to manage change?  The respondents answered a series of 
questions based on Tichy‟s (1982) questionnaire format (see Chapter 2). Each response will 
be analysed individually as a way to fully describe the way these organisations implemented 
change in the following areas:  
What were the specific mechanisms these 
utilities used to manage change? 
Q11, Q12, Q13, Q14, Q15, Q16, Q17 
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East Coast Utility: The respondents described the management process as a mix between 
„Directive‟ and „Coercive‟ change. The strategy came down from the very top and that was 
coercive. It was constantly refined in strategic positioning. 
 
 
 Table 4-15: Ways in Which the Company Implemented Change: East Coast 
Utility 
 
Level in the Company 
How has company implemented change? Total 
 Consultative Directive Coercive 
Middle Management  0 2 0 2 
Executive 1 0 2 3 
Total 1 2 2 5 
 
 
Here, the respondents were much more divided on their descriptions of the management 
processes used within Yankee Electric. The respondents described the management process 










Q11: How would you best describe the way that change has been implemented 
by management? (Describe each term before proceeding: Rotate responses.)  
1. Collaborative: Employees participate in important decision-making regarding what   
 changes are made and how they are implemented. 
2. Consultative: Employees are consulted regarding the implementation of change, and  
have a limited involvement in goal setting or decision-making regarding their areas of 
expertise. 
3. Directive: Management is responsible for decision-making and bringing about  
 organisational change. 
4. Coercive: Managers force/impose changes on key groups within the organisation.  
 (Tichy, 1983) 
Q12. Why do you say that? 
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Table 4-16: Selected Comments from East Coast Utility Regarding R4 
 
However, this approach evolved into a more collaborative one over time, as described by 
these respondents. Eventually, a former utility employee said the utility became quite 
sophisticated in its communication and changed its implementation approach. Another former 
utility senior management agreed, adding that subsequent mergers with „seemed reasonable 
and were collaborative because we were moving in the same direction‟.  
 
Midwest Utility: The utility was ordered to separate the transmission from the generation 
operations and then spin off the transmission company into a separate entity. The new 
structure required the utilities to „rip out the middle‟ of the company, which led to a massive 
corporate restructuring and reorganisation. But it was done without any clear communication 
or direction from senior management. The atmosphere, which was already described as 
„antagonistic‟, became even more so during this period. There were massive layoffs, and all 
employees had to reapply for their jobs. As one former utility manager said, „People had no 
clue and lived in constant fear‟.  
 
Since it was forced by the senior managers, all the respondents viewed this change as 
coercive. The layoffs were handled in an especially cruel manner, in which employees from a 





During the merger, the upper management at both (Yankee Electric) and 
(UKPC), there was some effort to be communicated with the staff informational 
meetings and memos before any change (was implemented). There were 
telephone trees and calls from management so we could hear it from the 
company before we heard it on the media. … They made an effort to be a 
source of the information and stay focused (Utility Executive: CA). 
 
Became more and more directive over time; merger seemed reasonable and 
collaborative and were moving in the same direction; however the acquisition of 
IE moved them into a whole new direction. ... The company became more and 
more directive over time (Middle Manager: ET).  
 
The company learned and improved its practices over time (Utility Executive: 
CA). 
The employees formed teams to implement the strategies and that was done in 
a very collaborative manner. … They tried to get the maximum value for their 
(generation) assets (Utility Executive: EC).  
 We were implementing things that had never been done before. … We had 
teamwork both up and down and there were times when the tension was high, 
when there were physical challenges to meet (Utility Executive: CA).  
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Table 4- 17: How Respondents View Company Implemented Change: Midwest 
Utility 
Level in Company 
 
How has company implemented change? Total 
Coercive  
Middle Management 3 3 
 Executive 2 2 




West Coast Utility: Two employees believed that the change was implemented by 
management in a „coercive‟ manner; managers forced or imposed change on key groups 
within the organisation. Another employee explained that the change at the top of the 
company was decided in collaborative, decision-making style. However, when a decision was 
made, then it was implemented through a coercive style. He observed that the company 
implied the change was a „common vision‟ but it really was a decision directed from the top 
and forced on the lower levels of the company. 
 
One employee admitted that the collaborative approach may not have been effective, given 
the sheer size of this organisation. She admitted that collaborative change style was not 
effective in her own department. Another respondent describe the change an „Incremental 
Adjustment: Distinct, but minor modifications, to the organisation‟s strategy, structure, 
and/or processes‟ as shown in Table 4-18. 
 
 
Table 4- 18: How Respondents View Company Implemented Change: West 








Level in Company 
How has company implemented change? 
Total 
Consultative Coercive 
Middle Management 0 2 2 
Executive 1 1 2 
Total 1 3 4 
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Cross-Case analysis of how companies implemented change: As Table 4-19 displays, the 
majority of the respondents viewed that this organisational change was implemented in a 
coercive manner, especially at the outset of industry deregulation. This sentiment was shared 
by the majority of respondents across all case studies, and unanimously among the 
respondents in the Midwest Utility. 
 
 





How has company implemented change? Total 
 Consultative Directive Coercive 
East Coast 1 2 2 5 
West Coast 1 0 3 4 
Midwest 0 0 5 5 
Total 2 2 10 14 
 
 
4.6.2  Case analysis of mission and strategy 
The respondents also answered a series of scaled questions indicated their level of agreement 
or disagreement with each item. The respondents in each case study evaluated the company‟s 
mission and strategy, organisational structure and human resources management at the 
company on a five-point scale where a „1‟ rating meant they „Strongly Disagreed‟ with the 
statement, while a „5‟ meant they „Strongly Agreed‟ with the statement. For convenience, the 
average ratings are reported for each group of scores by management level for the individual 











Q13: Mission and Strategy: 
 
My organisation …                  1=Strongly Disagree   5=Strongly Agree 
          
Defines its mission clearly to its 
employees. 
1    2   3   4   5 
Deploys appropriate resources to 
accomplish its mission. 
1    2   3   4   5 
Assesses its own strengths and 
weaknesses using objective 
performance measures. 
1    2   3   4   5 
Effectively assesses environmental 
threats and opportunities. 
1    2   3   4   5 
Adapts its mission and strategy to 
changes in the competitive landscape. 
1    2   3   4   5 
Fosters an organisational culture 
aligned with its mission and strategy. 
1    2   3   4   5 
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East Coast Utility: The changes within Yankee Electric were profound. These employees 
were forced to look at their jobs in a new way and some had to re-interview for positions that 
they had held for years. The company also continued to reorganize as it tried to synthesize the 
various companies acquired in the mergers into a cohesive company. 
 
The respondents believed that the company did a good job of organizing the tasks and 
responsibilities into specific and defined roles, which resulted in an average rating; the utility 
scored much lower on the other aspects related to conveying the corporation‟s mission and 
strategy as shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Summary of Ratings for Mission and Strategy – Q13: East Coast 
Utility 




































































Midwest Utility: Overall, these respondents believed that the company did not define its 
mission and deploy appropriate resources to accomplish its mission, with an average rating of 
2.8. The respondents reported lower ratings on the other aspects related to conveying the 
corporation‟s mission and strategy.  
 
One former utility manager explained that there were conflicting objectives in place, and the 




There have been at least three examples of organisational change within the utility in the past 
10 years. The new leadership and management style „turned the company upside down‟ and 
led to major readjustments and realignment, including a staff freeze and a cut of 10 to 15 
percent of all utility management.  
 
Four of the five respondents viewed these strategies as ineffective. The focus changed from 
serving the community to selling more power. It focused more on a business approach. A 
current utility employee described this shift as „a 180-degree difference from the 
collaborative and collegial atmosphere‟ that had been in place prior to the restructuring, 
where the CEO was approachable. „Now‟, said the employee, „the new CEO has a “top-
down, my way or the highway” approach that doesn‟t fit well and there is discontent‟ within 
the organisation. Some employees could not adjust and left. In his view, this new style is a 
„step backwards‟ from the way the utility operated prior to the reorganisation and industry 
restructuring as shown as Figure 4-5. 
 
Figure 4-5: Summary of Ratings for Mission and Strategy – Q13: Midwest 
Utility 





































































Overall, the West Coast utility respondents believed that the company did deploy appropriate 
resources to accomplish its mission, with an average rating of 4.0. But the respondents 
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reported lower ratings on the other aspects related to conveying the corporation‟s mission and 
strategy (see Figure 4-6). 
 
Figure 4-6: Summary of Ratings for Mission and Strategy – Q13:West Coast 
Utility 









































































Cross-Case analysis of mission and strategy: As Table 4-20 illustrates, the respondents 
gave relatively low mean scores for their organisations on the ways in which its mission and 
strategy is communicated to these respondents. Overall, the East Coast respondents rated 
their organisations higher in all these areas while respondents from the Midwest and West 
Coast utilities gave lower ratings. Although these are qualitative results, the respondents 
strongly agreed with the statement regarding defining a specific mission, but disagreed 
strongly that the organisation provided the tools to assess, adapt and foster a culture that 
supports that organisational mission.  
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Table 4-20: Cross Case Analysis of Mission and Strategy Results 
Mission and Strategy East Coast Midwest 
West 
Coast 
Defines its mission clearly to its employees. 4.80 3.75 2.80 
Deploys appropriate resources to accomplish its 
mission. 
3.60 3.00 2.20 
Assesses its own strengths and weaknesses using 
objective performance measures. 
3.60 2.00 2.60 
Effectively assesses environmental threats and 
opportunities. 
3.80 2.50 2.80 
Adapts its mission and strategy to changes in the 
competitive landscape. 
4.20 2.50 2.60 
Fosters an organisational culture aligned with its 
mission and strategy. 
3.60 2.25 2.40 
 
 
Figure 4-7 summarizes the average scores in each area provided by these respondents, further 
illustrating that these organisations are better at defining the mission than creating an 
organisational culture that supports that mission and strategy. Figure 4-8 compares these 
scores based on respondents‟ organisational level. The executives and managers had the most 
difference of opinion about whether the organisation clearly defined its mission and 
objectives, effectively assessed environmental threats and fostered an organisational culture 
aligned with the corporate mission and strategy.   
 
Figure 4-7: Cross-Case Summary of Ratings for Mission and Strategy – 
Average Ratings 



























































Figure 4-8: Cross-Case Summary of Ratings for Mission and Strategy – 
Company Level 


































































4.6.3 Case analysis of organisational structure 
Question 14 asked the respondents to describe the organisational structure that occurred, 




Q14. Organisational Structure 
My organisation….                                            1=Strongly Disagree  5=Strongly Agree 
 
Clearly organizes tasks/responsibilities into 
specific and defined roles. 
1    2   3   4   5 
Integrates these defined roles into departments, 
divisions, or regions. 
1    2   3   4   5 
Aligns these roles to meet specific corporate 
strategies and goals. 
1    2   3   4   5 
Distributes power across organisational roles. 1    2   3   4   5 
Balances power across groups of roles e.g. 
sales vs. marketing) 




4.6.3.1  East Coast Utility 
Change Affecting Organisational Structure –These respondents described a series of changes 
that occurred within Yankee Electric including: corporate reorganisation and restructuring, 
changing the incentive structure for the sales force and realigning the functions of different 
departments. The respondents gave the highest ratings to Yankee Electric‟s „defining its 
mission clearly‟ and the lowest ratings to actually deploying the appropriate resources and an 
organisational culture to meet its mission.  
 
Internal Power Struggles – Yankee Electric created two separate business units. The 
wholesale side consisted of the generation and distribution functions and the retail 
distribution company. The rationale was to focus on those parts of the business in a way that 
had never been done before. However, these changes caused internal friction between 
competing departments. 
 
British Culture Clash – Being acquired by a British firm created additional tensions on both 
sides. The American employees perceived a tremendous difference between British and 
American business practices. There was friction after the merger but the American firm lost 
control of the website and control of the internal communications system, and accounting 
system and there were „new‟ rules. In fact, the British firm was much more rules-oriented 
than the Americans. The change implementation process evolved over time according to one 
former utility employee. In the beginning, the respondent (Middle Management: ET) said: 
(Some) of the reorganisations were poorly handled. …. (With) several of the reorganisations 
and mergers I felt it was very heavy-handed. … They were gradually improving over time … 
(and) they got practice with every merger,”  
 
The cultural differences were so severe that the British firm had to „build a dictionary of 
British vs. American English with new symbols‟ so the employees on both sides of the 
Atlantic could communicate effectively with each other. The headquarters were also located 
in Britain, which led to additional internal frustration. The respondents believed that their 






Table 4-21: Selected Comments Regarding Organisational Structure: East 
Coast Utility 
 
The location of the headquarters in a separate company  led to internal frustration among 
these former utility employees, as they saw their power base eroded.  
 
Cultural Issues with Northeastern Utilities – The merger with NU was seen more as a pairing 
of two very similar cultures. In fact, the former utility executives viewed the merger with NU 
as joining forces with a younger sibling.  
 
Cultural Issues with Iroquois Electric Association – The acquisition of Iroquois Electric 
Association (IEA) was anything but smooth. The acquisition moved the company into a 
whole new direction – the company became more and more directive over time. IEA had a 
different internal culture that was much more rigid and controlling compared to the old 
Yankee Electric. The cultural differences were most apparent in the utilities‟ relationship 
with their regulators,  a critical group with which to cultivate relationships during the era of 
deregulation. IEA did not work well with regulators and that created additional problems and 
internal friction. In retrospect, these former employees believed that the merger with IEA was 
ill-conceived (see Table 4-22).  
East Coast 
Right after acquisition, UKPC did a good job trying to integrate the two 
cultures and met with them. National Grid flew 50 or 60 employees out and 
met with people. (They) had seminars and compared notes. ... It was like a 
comparative government class. (They) also wined and dined us and had 
social functions and even flew over the union staff (Utility Executive: CA).   
In IT, after the acquisition, we lost control of the website and control of the 
internal communications system, and accounting system and there were 
‘new’ rules (Utility Executive: EC). 
UKPC is a large, multi-national company with uniformity and rules … and 
they have investments throughout the world so the rules have to be well-
defined. They sent us a 50-page memo on check authorization and I was 
writing $5 million checks every month for one of the plants and with UKPC 
we would have to go through all sorts of authorizations. … This caused 
some internal friction (Utility Executive: CA). 
There are different uses of the Internet and web services … different 
cultures (Middle Manager: LH ).  
The British firm had to build a dictionary of British vs. American English 
with new symbols, so the employees on both sides of the Atlantic could 
communicate effectively with each other (Middle Manager: ET).  
UKPC is the heart and brain (of the company now) but it is on a different 
continent. Some functions are not duplicated so that gives us a fair amount 
of organisational autonomy, but clearly it is a different culture (Middle 
Manager: ET).  
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The acquisition … moved the company into a whole new direction. 
The company became more and more directive over time. … IEA 
and Yankee Electric were culturally divergent. … IEA people didn’t 
think as creatively, and they were not the type of people that YE 
hires. … The HR polices had much more flexibility at YE; 
employees could work at home, and had casual dress. … That all 
went away (Utility Executive: CA).   
IEA was different culturally and it was hard to deal with (Middle 
Manager: LH).  
We had a very different relationship with regulatory policies issues; 
IEA did not work well with regulators. … It was not a win-win 
situation. … IEA had a much more of a tendency to fight to the 
death whereas Yankee Electric was more ready to negotiate 
(Middle Manager).  
IEA had a different culture. … There was some issue over 
succession politics and hiring practices. … Yankee Electric was 
able to hire more qualified employees, with technical skills or 
broader areas of expertise, compared to the more traditional utility 
hiring practices that focused on nepotism or hiring employees who 
would not ‘rock the boat’ . ... IEA also had a good old boy network 
which is part of the traditional utility. … It was not a progressive 
company (Middle Manager).  
Yankee Electric (is) much more corporate than it used to be. … The 
regional flavour is no more; no one talks to each other anymore. 
…Yankee Electric was a special place to work; (it) had great 
employees and clear mission statement for everyone, 
understandable from top to bottom (Middle Manager).   
The head of transmission doesn’t even report to the head in the 
U.S. …Yankee Electric is now a cash cow for the UK and we are 
constantly being squeezed to get revenue higher (Executive).  
The organisational structure did not make as much sense and were 
going down a different path (Executive).  
  
The merger with NU was seen more as a pairing of two very similar cultures. In fact, the 
former utility executives viewed the merger with NU as joining forces with a younger sibling.   
 
The results in Figure 4-9 demonstrate that executive and managers agree that roles are 
aligned to meet specific corporate goals and strategies, whereas there is a marked difference 
of opinion on balance of power, distributing power across roles and integrating roles into 
departments or divisions.  
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Figure 4-9: Average Ratings – Organisational Structure: East Coast 
 
 
4.6.3.2 Midwest Utility 
The respondents indicated that this utility was most effective at balancing power among the 
groups, with an average score of 3.6. But the respondents gave much lower scores to the 
other aspects that evaluated the effectiveness of its organisational structure. The organisation 
was further hampered by its inability to change its structure, based on the legislation put in 
place that did not allow the organisation to „evolve‟. There was very little flexibility.  
 
The change in focus was most noticeable in the emphasis on meeting financial objectives. It 
was very task-oriented, rigid and focused on „Wall Street not Main Street‟.  There was little 
communication between and among departments. One former employee described the 
organisation as being arranged in silos. There was also a „pecking order‟ in how departments 
ranked with senior management and that affected the organisational structure (see Figure 4-
10). The greatest differences of opinion between executives and managers involved the way 
in which company roles were clearly organized, integrated and aligned to meet specific 
company needs. These utility respondents also disagreed about whether power was balanced 




     Figure 4-10: Average Ratings – Organisational Structure: Midwest Utility 























































4.6.4.3  West Coast Utility 
The respondents indicated that this utility was most effective at integrating roles into 
organisational structure to best meet its goals, with an average rating of 3.6. However, these 
respondents gave much lower scores to the other aspects that evaluated the effectiveness of 
its organisational structure.  
 
The greatest differences of opinion between executives and managers were on the ways in 
















  Figure 4-11: Average Ratings – Organisational Structure: West Coast 























































Failure to Communicate – The employees also pointed out that the utility‟s change strategies 
were not always effectively conveyed to lower-level employees. One respondent (Middle 
Management: MO) said: 
There is a need to improve communications which would improve overall satisfaction and 
contribute to the good of the company. … We just had a change in the VP and it clear they do 
not how to translate the management directives into (relevant information) for the employees.  
 
Internal Power Struggles – The change forced upon the utility also created internal power 
struggles at all levels within the company. This company tended not to forgive its employees 
for any previous missteps. The fact that an entire department was put in the „dog house‟ for a 
manager‟s mistakes illustrates the risk-adverse corporate culture embedded throughout this 
organisation. According to one respondent (Middle Management: MO): 
The changes going in now are negatively affecting the organisation. There have been 
organisational change power struggles. … The departments were separated in the past and we 
were stepchildren forgotten. … Nobody knew us and that is not such a bad thing until two 
years ago when we had a problem which became a PR disaster. … The department never 
recovered and we were in the dog house. The company holds grudges against people. 
 
No time for planning – The utility did not develop any orderly processes for implementing 
change in the organisation. It was so busy reacting to the regulatory changes that the 
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Table 4-23: Selected Comments Regarding Organisational Structure: West 
Coast Utility 
West Coast 
There has been no time for short-term or even long-
term planning. We are trying to do that now, but we 
don’t know what we should do. What should are 
assumptions be (Middle Management: KD)?  
We need to advocate for a longer planning horizon 
(Middle Management: MO).  
 
 
4.6.4.4 Cross – Case analysis of organisational structure 
Table 4-24 compares the responses to Q14 across all three electric utilities. As this table 
shows, the issues regarding distributing power across organisational roles received the lowest 
scores while the utilities did better in clearly organising tasks and responsibilities. The scores 
were divided regarding the utility‟s ability to align roles, with the East Coast respondents 
rating this attribute the highest while the West Coast respondents gave it a much lower mark. 
 
Table 4-24: Cross-Case Analysis of Q14: Organisational Structure 
 
The average ratings for each area are displayed in the Figure 4-12. Overall, West Coast utility 
respondents tended to award much lower scores in these categories, while the East Coast and 














Clearly organizes tasks/responsibilities into specific and defined roles. 4.40 3.43 3.25 
Integrates these defined roles into departments, divisions or regions. 3.40 3.07 3.00 
Aligns these roles to meet specific corporate strategies and goals. 4.00 3.14 2.75 
Distributes power across organisational roles. 2.80 2.86 2.00 
Balances power across groups of roles (e.g. sales vs. marketing). 3.00 2.50 2.00 
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Figure 4-12: Cross-Case Comparison of Organisational Structure Ratings 
















































4.6.4 Analysis Human Resources Management – Q15 
The respondents next answered a series of questions regarding the ways in which Human 












.6.3.1     East Coast Utility 
Yankee Electric received the highest ratings for „specifying performance criteria‟ and „has a 
well-defined reward/incentive program‟. However, it received lower rankings for „staffing 
appropriately to meet current and future needs‟ and „manages succession politics effectively‟. 
Table 4-25 summarizes the comments from these utility respondents. 
 
 
Q15.  Human Resources Management 
My organisation….                                         1=Strongly Disagree  5=Strongly Agree 
 
Staffs appropriately to meet current and future 
needs. 
1    2   3   4   5 
Specifies performance criteria for various 
roles/jobs. 
 
1    2   3   4   5 
Measures employee performance in objective 
ways. 
 
1    2   3   4   5 
Manages succession politics effectively. 1    2   3   4   5 
Has a well-defined reward/incentive program. 1    2   3   4   5 
Hires/selects employees who reflect the 
corporate culture. 
1    2   3   4   5 
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Table 4-25: Selected Comments Regarding Q15: East Coast Utility 
East Coast Utility 
The average age of the employee was 58 years old; and we saw 
the opportunity to hire 100 positions as a way to ‘change the 
complexion’ of the company. So we deliberately set out to hire a 
more diverse workforce with a bigger focus on women and 
minorities and wanted to have a more diverse employee workforce 
in terms of culture and racial background. … We wanted to create 
more diversity within YE (Utility Executive: CA). 
We sold the product but the problem is that you are relying on 
sales from people that are still union employees and are not trained 
for sales. … So the utility had to outsource this function (Middle 
Manager: LH).  
The company couldn’t deal with less than $100 million in revenue 
(so the consulting business went away). … The utility doesn’t have 
the ability to look at things through a microscope (Executive: EC).   
 
The company had another round of reorganisations after the sale of its generating company in 
1997 and began to separate out the generation staff from the rest of the company. This led to 
the elimination of approximately 1,500 jobs out of 5,000 employees and affected all those 
employees involved in the generation company. This utility also cut another 300 to 400 
employees from its service company and began outsourcing these functions instead.  
 
The former CEO described Yankee Electric workforce as conservative, „kind of technical that 
asks how to do the job right, but not how to do the job the way the customer wants it‟. He 
said this staff did not have „an adequate set of cultural attitudes for a changing world‟. 
 
The greatest differences of opinion between the executives and managers were on hiring and 
selecting employees who reflect the corporate culture, measuring employee performance in 
objective ways, and having a well-defined employee compensation plan (see Figure 4-13). 
















Figure 4-13: Average Ratings Regarding HRM Components: East Coast Utility 




































































4.6.4.2 Midwest Utility 
The company also received relatively low ratings on human management issues. While 
employees seem to have a clear understanding of the ways in which employee performance is 
measured, most of the other issues surrounding human resources are not clear. For example, 
none of the employees believed that this utility handled succession politics effectively. Jobs 
were expendable after the restructuring, since the focus was on only being number one in 
customer satisfaction, which favourably affected the company‟s stock price. The respondents 
also identified two other problems: 
 
Engineering-oriented corporate culture – The utility had an „engineering mindset‟ that is 
closed and structured. Everything is flow-charted, but that culture does not work in view of 
the changes in the industry. Unfortunately, the utility continues to hire employees that 
reinforce this „broken‟ culture. 
 
 
Cronyism – The new CEO also fundamentally changed the organisational culture. The 
culture, prior to the industry restructuring, recognized the importance of energy efficiency 
and renewable energy. The new CEO does not have the same appreciation, which creates a 
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tension. As one employee, whose responsibility is to develop renewable energy projects as 
required by the state commission, said, „My CEO doesn‟t believe in the job I do‟. 
 
The new CEO also brought in his „cronies‟ from his previous company as his top advisors. 
As several respondents observed, however, these employees do not have an understanding or 
appreciation of the company‟s history and mission to serve the community. The greatest 
differences of opinion between this executive and managers were on staffing appropriately to 
meet current and future needs and managing succession politics effectively (see Figure 4-14).  
 
 
Figure 4-14: Average Ratings Regarding HRM Components: Midwest Utility  


























































4.6.4.3   West Coast Utility 
The company also received relatively low ratings regarding human management issues. The 
issues facing this utility included dealing with an aging workforce, institutional nepotism and 
attracting new employees who have the sufficient skill set to be effective in the new market.  
 
Aging workforce – The first major issue was an aging workforce. According to the company 
estimates, nearly 50 percent of all employees will be eligible for retirement in the next three 
to five years. While this creates a tremendous opportunity to fundamentally reshape the 
utility‟s corporate culture, it also indicates that this is a deeply entrenched culture, highly 
resistant to change. As employees retire or leave the company, their core knowledge and 
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expertise is also lost. This is of particular concern if there is not an orderly transfer of 
knowledge between new and veteran employees.  One respondent (Executive: VR) said: 
There is no document foundation for corporate knowledge. … The knowledge is in all 
people‟s heads. ... There is no formal archive in place, no process in place to capture or retain 
the knowledge over time.  
 
Nepotism – This utility also has a history of nepotism in its hiring practices. This was 
something that was even encouraged as a way to maintain control and keep its culture intact. 
This nepotism has served to reinforce the old corporate culture and made the organisation 
more resistant to change. Table 4-26 summarizes the comments from the West Coast Utility.  
 
Table 4- 26: Selected Comments Regarding Q15: West Coast Utility 
 
 
Need for new skill sets – Corporate restructuring and deregulation also created the need at 
WECG for a new kind of employee, who is relationship-oriented rather than technically-
oriented. These new employees also had to be much more business-focused with an ability to 
think strategically and develop long-term objectives. 
 
Corporate restructuring and deregulation also created the need at the West Coast Utility for a 
new kind of employee. However, since deregulation, the employees have noticed that the 
utility is making a more concerted effort to hire new employees and also expand the skill sets 










The company loves to have relatives working within the company. … In 
many cases, it is real common to come up through the ranks. … The 
company thinks (it) is a good thing that most people go to work here right 
after school (Middle Management: MO). 
The culture has not changed. … This is a union shop and there wasn’t any 
competition because we offered both gas and electric service. … Most 
people were lifers (Middle Management: MO). 
During the five-year period (of deregulation), people held onto their value 
system and that made it stronger. … The core culture and values didn’t 
change (Middle Management: KD). 
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Table 4- 27: Selected Comments Regarding HRM Practices: West Coast Utility 
 
 
Figure 4-15 compares the average ratings for HRM components. Note that the West Coast 
middle managers had a much higher rating for „hiring and selecting‟ employees to reflect the 
corporate culture. But overall, these scores were also low across the board, especially 
regarding succession politics. The biggest disagreement of opinions between executives and 
managers were hiring employees who reflected the corporate culture and measuring 






















West Coast UtilityWest 
Coast Utility 
In dealing with human resources as a power company, the focus was 
on hiring people with power plant experience. … Now the focus is on 
relationships. We need to get people who understand how brands 
transition in the marketplace ... and we have to get people that think 
differently about the business we are now in (Middle Management: KD 
). 
They need … training (to become) good business administrators. …We 
have (employees) with engineering and technical backgrounds and 
they don’t understand the business perspective. … They don’t know 
how to integrate the ideas we have. … We need to have the right kind 
of folks in the roles and it is important to have people who know how to 
plan and can set strategic planning objectives (Executive: VR). 
The company does a good job and has a program of shifting people 
around (6-9 month rotations) to learn different things. …. People are 
also coming from other places to work here now… That is different 
than in the past (Middle Management: MO). 
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Figure 4-15: Analysis of HRM-Q15- West Coast Utility 


































































4.6.4.4  Cross Case Analysis of HRM: Q15 
Table 4-28 summarizes the average ratings for the HRM components from the utility 
respondents. The respondents agreed most with the fact that these electric utilities hired and 
selected employees to reflect the corporate culture, as shown by an average rating of 3.89. 
The respondents most strongly disagreed with the issue of managing succession politics 
effectively (see Figure 4-16), but agreed that employees were hired or selected based on their 
support of the corporate culture. 
  
Table 4-28: Comparison of HRM Scores Across All Utility Respondents 
All Cases East Coast Midwest West Coast 
Staffs appropriately to meet current and future 
needs. 
3.40 3.20 2.25 
Specifies performance criteria for various 
roles/jobs. 
4.20 3.40 2.75 
Measures employee performance in objective 
ways. 
3.60 3.20 3.00 
Manages succession politics effectively. 3.80 2.80 1.25 
Has a well-defined reward/incentive program. 4.00 3.40 2.75 
Hires/selects employees who reflect the 
corporate culture. 







 Figure 4-16: Cross-Case Analysis of HRM: Q15 























































4.6.5 Case Analysis of Q16 and Q17 
The last two questions in this section probed more fully the challenges that these 
organisations faced in managing change, especially moving forward. These open-ended 
questions were designed to provide additional context regarding the ways in which these 
organisations must change as a result of industry deregulation. 
 
4.6.5.1  East Coast Utility 
These respondents indicated that change would have to involve all aspects of the 
organisation, including the creation of a new structure with a different strategy and focus.  
  
The respondents also described the ways in which their organisation had to adjust to change, 
including restaffing and a broader focus on long-range planning. Deregulation forced this 
utility to completely change its organisational strategy, leading to divestiture of its major 
assets. This also forced the company to develop a new internal corporate infrastructure in 
order to compete effectively in this new market (see Table 4-29). 
Q16. In your view, what are the biggest challenges that your organisation faces in terms 
of managing change effectively during the next five years?  Why? 
 
Q17.  In your view, what areas should your organisation focus on to effectively meet 
these challenges (specifically in terms of mission/strategy; organisational 
structure; human resources; and political/market forces). 
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Table 4-29: Summary of Comments for Q16-Q17: East Coast Utility 
 
 
4.6.5.2  Midwest Utility 
Table 4-30 summarizes the ways in which this utility needs to change in order to adapt to the 




 Executive Middle Management 
Organisation’s 
Strategy 
The regulators were making the 
decisions. (One state) had problems 
with the merger (with IE) because it 
was xenophobic and the state didn’t 
want foreign firms owning its utility. It 
was worried about control and it didn’t 
even want their utilities owned by a 
firm from another state (CA). 
 
Deregulation happened and divested 
some facilities. There were lots of 
changes. The commercial and 
wholesale companies could not talk 
to each other. We have to create and 
maintain an ‘arms-length’ 
relationship (ET). 
The utility established two separate 
business units: the wholesale, which 
was the generation and distribution, 
and then the retail distribution 
company. The rationale was that we 
wanted to get focused on those parts 
of the business in a way that they had 
never been before (EC). 
First sold off the power plant and 
then bought (companies) ... and 
started doing higher level stuff (LH). 
Structure 
Customer service work and business 
development became a competitive 
business (EC). 
 
We had a (new) huge focus on 
customer information and customer 
education. We had big problems in 
billing and tracking the business. It 
was a huge effort creating something 




We had (to change) the whole 
incentive compensation format (CA). 
 
We really focused on customer service 
in way we never had before and we 
tried to develop a value-added 
services (EC). 
(We) had to set up firewalls between 
commercial groups and our staff 
(ET). 
Processes/Culture 
Wanted to create more diversity within 
YE. We literally restaffed the entire 
organisation, starting with the CEO. 
We had developed a system of 
cascading staffing positions in which 
we examined the specifications for all 
jobs from top to bottom (CA). 
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Table 4- 30: Summary of Comments for Q16-Q17: Midwest Utility 
 
 





The mission has changed completely from 
before and after deregulation (SS). 
Found conflicting 
objectives, and the 
mission is interpreted 
in different ways 
(GE). 
Focus is how we can get as much value as 
possible (JA). 
 
Has to evolve quicker 
and focus on large 
term view. In the last 
round of layouts 
heading in the 
opposite direction. ... 
Spent a lot of time 
moving retroactively 
… Headlong rush into 
the opposite direction. 
(JM). 
Utility changed to 
focus on short-term 
measures like stock 
price and making sure 
it was hitting bottom-
line (revenue) goals 
(GE). 
Structure 
On the distribution side, there is an aging 
infrastructure with expectations and 
demand needs to closely manage assets 
and (the utility needs to) figure out how to 
evolve the distribution business (JA). 
 
The transmission 
assets, the big wires, 
operate more 
effectively now by the 
ATC and are 
managed more 
efficiently and in a 
more timely manner 
... than when the 
utilities were doing it 
in tandem. However it 
had to create a whole 
new company with 
HR/ and other support 
functions (GE). 
Systems 
The company objective is to be number 









Also completely changed the feel of the 
corporate headquarters. … The company 
has a real history in the community and the 
second floor was a community centre … 
but (the company) now wants to build it as 
a showpiece. … The local community is 




4.6.5.3  West Coast Utility 
As Table 4-31 shows, the respondents believe that this utility will need to change its current 
business operations by expanding the knowledge base of its employees and focusing more on 
customer needs. They also indicated that with all these changes in place, the company needs 
to also find ways to improve overall employee morale. 
 














4.6.5.4  Cross-Case Analysis 
Mission and Strategy Analysis: Overall, the organisational change experienced by these 
utilities was more negative than positive. The content analysis identified that none of the 
respondents from the Midwest or West Coast case studies had any positive comments 
regarding the changes in the mission and strategy of their organisations;  there were some 
mixed comments from the East Coast respondents. Overall, these respondents view other the 
change was implemented in a coercive, top-down manner that was not fully communicated to 
the employees. 
 
 Executive Middle Management 
Organisation’s 
Strategy 
Need to think differently about 
the business they are in; don't 
know how to do that (KJ). 
Focus on good relationship with 
the customers (MB). 
 
Need to focus on 




Have to have more teamwork 
(VR). 
Company is not proactive; still in 
regulatory upheaval. ... Needs to 
foster a better relationship with 
the regulators (KD). 
Systems 
Need to create a knowledgeable 
workforce that can think long-
term (KJ). 
Wants to do this stuff but they 
need to learn how to plan and 
respond to be decisions (MO). 
 
 Whole life has changed. ... 
People come from other places 
to work here now (MO). 
 
Process/Culture 
  Need to boost employee morale; 
morale has been low because of 
past treatment by company (KD). 
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Organisational Structure Analysis: All respondents also viewed the changes in the 
organisational structure as negative. The rounds of restructuring, layoffs, mergers and 
acquisitions experienced by these respondents only served to reinforce their negative attitudes 
as expressed in the interviews. 
 
Human Resources Analysis: The respondents also had far more negative than positive 
comments regarding changes in the way these organisations addressed human resource needs. 
These comments reflected the cultural clashes that occurred during the acquisitions and 
mergers experienced by the employees in the East Coast utility; the ways in which the West 
Coast utility employees were treated during these periods of deregulation; and the manner in 
which these policies were conveyed to the Midwest utility employees (see Figure 4-17). 
 
Figure 4-17: Cross- Case Comparison of Organisational Strategy, Structure, 
and HRM Ratings 








































The key finding from experts is that the electric utility industry did not manage change 
effectively. The utility industry was fundamentally transformed by deregulation and was ill-
prepared to manage this change, internally and externally. 
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4.7: Case Analysis of R5: Utilities as learning 
organisations 
R5: What are the managers’ perspectives of electric utilities as ‘learning   
 organisations’?    
 
The next set of questions explored the respondents‟ perceptions regarding the feasibility of 
electric utilities‟ becoming  learning organisations. As this analysis shows, this was a new 
concept for these respondents, and therefore required them to think about the ways electric 
utilities could or should evolve to become learning organisations.  
 
4.7.1 East Coast Utility 
Awareness of Learning Organisations: None of the respondents were aware of the term 
„learning organisation‟ until it was defined. Once made aware of the term, these respondents 
believed that the concept would work in private markets, but doubted its effectiveness in the 
electric utility industry. This was due, in large part, to the role that regulators still play in 
defining the operational structure of investor-owned electric utilities (see Table 4-32). 
  
In addition, another critical barrier for these utilities to overcome in developing into learning 
organisations is their inability to attract and retain the right kind of staff. In order to become a 
learning organisation, a utility needs to hire new employees and give them room to learn, 
grow in their jobs and make mistakes.  
Q24. Have you ever heard of the term ‘learning organisation’? (If not, define: A 
learning organisation fosters continuous problem-solving by providing a 
flat structure, open communications and a culture that promotes 
adaptability and creativity.) 
 
Q25.  Do you think those organisations can really exist? 
 
Q26.  Do you think those types of organisations could exist in the electric utility 
 industry? Why/why not? 
 
Q27.  What would have to change/occur in your organisation to become a 
‘learning organisation’?  
 




Table 4-32: Selected Comments Regarding Viability of Electric Utilities 
Becoming Learning Organisations: East Coast Utility 
East Coast Utility 
Executive Middle Management 
Belief in the team orientation 
and empowerment (is) real 
important (and) not what YE 
did (EC).  
I think the old YE utility was close 
(to the ideal learning organisation) 
(LH). 
Yes, you can learn changes 
from new stuff but you have to 
bring in new people (EC). 
(For) a utility, evolving as a learning 
organisation depends entirely on 
the regulators (ET).  
Need to be constantly learning 
and adapting (CA).  
 
Utility energy efficiency and 
government programs (have) been 
(running) in Vermont (and have 
been) integrating renewables (ET).  
Some different assets and 
regulation are an absolute 
necessity in electric utilities 
(EC). 
Don't know, maybe with some help. 
Infrastructure may not be in place. 
Limited opportunities for growth 
(LH). 
The biggest barriers are the 
freedom to make changes and the 
need to learn and adapt and give 
them room to grow. Have to 
educate government to do that 
(ET). 
 
4.7.2 Midwest Utility  
None of the respondents had heard the term „learning organisation‟. All of them doubted if 
this structure would be appropriate for the electric utility industry. One respondent believed 
that learning organisations could exist in other industries. 
 
Barriers to becoming a Learning Organisation: The respondents viewed utilities as „least 
likely‟ to become learning organisations (see Table 4-33), citing the following barriers: 
  
The organisational structure is too big and slow to change. As a current utility 
manager said, „It is a Leviathan organisation and it is hard to get more agile and respond 
to changes‟. 
 
The utility does not have a strategic focus. These respondents believed that learning 
organisations have to be strategic and take the long-term view. However, the focus in this 
organisation is to maximize profits for the next quarter, which is a deterrent to long-term 
strategic planning. One respondent said that the utility was evolving into a learning 
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organisation prior to the merger. After the merger, the company took a „headlong rush in 
the opposite direction‟. 
 
The operating environment precludes this organisational structure. Utilities have to 
be stable and reliable, and this is why they were regulated initially. A learning 
organisational structure does not allow for a stable and reliable operating structure. 
 
The utility continues to use outdated theories, behaviours and infrastructure. This is 
reinforced by the view that the organisation is „stuck‟ in an engineering mind-set, and 
continually reinforces that behaviour. In addition, the utility is still using operating and 
distribution equipment from the 1940s and 50s, which makes it even harder to adapt to an 
ever-changing market.  
 
Utilities are resistant to change. The respondents observed that these organisations are 
not focused on changing the structure to benefit the employees, but rather view 
reorganisation and restructuring as a cost-cutting approach. Therefore, the only change 
they experience is the negative effects associated with layoffs and cutbacks, without any 
progress made towards opening communications and creating a flatter organisational 
structure. 
 
Change is driven externally, not internally. As the respondents illustrated, outside 
pressures led to the reorganisation and restructuring, which is the focus of this case study. 
The change was driven by national and legislation priorities rather than an internal drive 
to improve the company. These organisations are hesitant to implement change 
proactively. 
 
The utility has lost focus on the customer. Removing the transmission function from 
the utility created a „hollow core‟ and further distanced the utility from its customers. It is 
now focused on selling power in the open markets, and making profits in the financial 
side of the house. 
 
Table 4-33: Selected Comments About Viability of Electric Utilities As Learning 
Organisations: Midwest Utility     
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4.7.3 West Coast Utility 
Awareness of Learning Organisations: None of the respondents were aware of the term 
„learning organisation‟. Once it was explained, these respondents believed that there were 
organisations that could be learning organisations in the private sector, but it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for electric utilities to adopt this type of organisational structure. 
Only one respondent believed that electric organisations may, one day, achieve this type of 
structure.  
Table 4-33: Selected Comments About Viability of Electric Utilities As Learning 
Organisations: Midwest Utility     
 
Barriers to becoming a Learning Organisation: The respondents cited several major 
barriers that would prevent investor-owned electric utilities from becoming a learning 
organisation (see Table 4-34) which included: 
• Having to change the current business model for electric utilities, which relies on a limited 
and partially-regulated structure. 
• Developing a workforce that is capable of multi-tasking and able to work in a more chaotic 
environment. 







Executive Middle Management 
Learning organisation is strategic.  We 
were evolving into a learning 
organisation before the merger... but 
not now ... not in my lifetime! (SS)   
(Utilities are more concerned with) 
entrepreneurial aspects now … 
and creating new business 
opportunities (GE). 
Not sure if utilities can become 
learning organisations (JA). 
 
I am completely intimidated by 
what it would take. ... Leadership, 
and that is damn hard to do (JB). 
Utilities are the least likely to become 
learning organisations (JA). 
 
Need to bring in young people 
from outside the field to effect 
change (JM). 
No, because the utility culture is so 
entrenched (GE). 
Utilities have an enormous 
responsibility for stability and 
reliability. And they are trying to 
survive in an industry filled with 
upheaval and change. ... They still 
have a responsibility for reliability 
and stability, and that conflicts with 
the learning organisation structure 
(JM). 
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Table 4-34: Selected Comments About Barriers to Becoming a Learning 
Organisation: West Coast Utility 
 
West Coast Utility 
Executive Middle Management 
Company would have to be completely 
transformed. Don't have Jack Welsh 
types in this industry (VR). 
Also have to change the control 
and change is always going to 
happen. They have to come up 
with the process (MB). 
(Learning organisations) are great 
models for utilities (but it’s) not going to 
be an easy transition (KJ).  
 
Depends on the degree to which it 
makes sense or is even feasible (KJ). 
 
 
Recommendations for becoming a Learning Organisation: In order to become a learning 
organisation, respondents said, this utility would have to incorporate the following elements 
into its operations: 
• Permission from the public utilities commission to operate in this manner 
• Recruit corporate leaders who are committed to making corporate transformation 
• Adapt the elements of this model that makes the most sense for utilities, suggesting that some 
parts of this model may not be appropriate for the still-regulated parts of the utility company. 
 
The model of a learning organisation was one the utility executives felt best described the 
types of resources that would be needed in utilities of the future. One respondent (Executive) 
said: 
The learning organisation is a great model for electric utilities …but it is not going to be an 
easy transition. … We need to have a creative/innovative/brainstorming utility that has the 
ability to have its people constantly learning. 
 
Table 4-35: Selected Comments Regarding Barriers to Becoming a Learning 




Executive Middle Management 
Have to be able to live through chaos 
(KJ). 
The regulated utility model is 
distinctly limited and this 
change would be driven by 
the PUC (KD). 
How to manage the business model 
and adjust it otherwise going to lose 
the value of what (the utility) is doing 
(KJ). 
 
(We) need a new worker that is able to 
handle multi-tasking.  Utility future is 
like Efficiency Vermont (KJ). 
 




4.7.4 Cross-Case analysis 
This section summarises an analysis of the barriers to becoming a learning organisation, as 
identified by the respondents. The most commonly mentioned barriers cited by these 
respondents are the utility‟s culture and structure (see Table 4-36). Other barriers frequently 
mentioned by these respondents include difficulty in developing a strategic focus and 
improperly trained employees. These barriers are also illustrated in Figure 4-18.  
 
Table 4-36: Cross-Case Analysis of Barriers to Becoming a Learning 
Organisation 
 
Barriers to Utilities Becoming  
Learning Organisations 
Frequency of Mentions 
Cultural Barriers 12 
Utility Structure 11 
Strategic Focus 10 
Employees not trained 11 




Figure 4-18: Cross-Case Analysis of Types of Barriers Mentioned to  
Becoming a Learning Organisation 















These barriers are also summarised by each utility (see Figure 4-19). According to the East 
Coast respondents, the biggest barrier to becoming a learning organisation was the 
organisational culture. Midwest respondents most frequently mentioned the lack of properly 
trained employees and the West Coast respondents identified the utility structure as the major 
 174 
barrier. Each barrier plays a vital role in developing an effective learning organisation, 
especially as it relates to vision, commitment and resources. 
 
Figure 4-19: Cross-Case Analysis of Barriers to Becoming a Learning 
Organisation 








































4.7.5 Summary of R5  
This research issue addressed the feasibility of these electric utilities becoming learning 
organisations. As this analysis illustrates, these respondents were initially unaware of the 
term „learning organisation‟. Once informed about this topic, respondents were sceptical 
about the feasibility of these organisations evolving into flexible learning organisations. 
Moreover, these respondents also mentioned a variety of barriers – including organisational 
culture, structure and employee training levels – that could prevent these organisations from 
becoming learning organisations. 
 
The experts believe that electric utilities can evolve into learning organisations if they have 
the appropriate vision, commitment and resources to do so (see Tables E16-18 in Appendix 
E). However, it appears that most electric utilities are not able to make this transition because 






4.8 Case Analysis of R6: Perceptions of an ideal utility 
This section summarizes the individual and Cross-Case analysis of the three utility cases 
regarding their perceptions of an „ideal electric utility‟ as defined in R6:  What are the 







Another goal was to ask these utility executives and experts to describe the “ideal electric 
utility” in the future in terms of its: 
 Vision 




Q18. Scenario 1: Ideal utility organisation 
If you could design the ideal ‘electric utility of the future’ describe its: 
Vision (specifically): 
 Its mission 
 Leadership qualities required to achieve that vision   
Commitment 
 Its organisational culture 
 Its long-term outlook   
Resources 
 Infrastructures that need to be in place to accomplish these goals 
 Types of training, support mechanisms, etc. 
Q19. Is there anything else that needs to be included in this ‘ideal electric utility  
 organisation’? 
Q20. Do you think this is possible for utilities to evolve into this type of 
organisation? What would you call this type of ‘new electric utility 
organisation’? 
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4.8.1 East Coast Utility 
Vision: Yankee Electric had one of the most visionary chief executives in the utility 
community. This vision was the catalyst that drove both the acquisition by UKPC and also 
the mergers with NU and IEA.  
While working at a smaller utility, this CEO developed a management style that included 
involving workers in the company and developing a sense of shared pride (see Table 4-37). 
 
Table 4-37: Selected Comments Regarding Vision: East Coast Utility 
Vision 
Executive Middle Management 
The CEO was always asking ‘What do 
we do next’? (CA) 
Try to have a company that makes 
sense with geographic boundaries 
and have an infrastructure that could 
address problems but preserve the 
focus on customer satisfaction (ET). 
It takes more adaptability and had a 
clear vision (EC). 
  
Foster a better, more collaborative 
relationship with the (regulators) (CA). 
 
Vision: set a clear goal despite the 
change. … Need to have a cohesive 
vision and need to have established 




Ideally, the vision-oriented model for the electric utility is a partnership between the 
municipality and the employee, such as SAIC. A former utility employee noted that „this is a 
big private company with vested interest in employee ownership as part of the structure. It 
has managed some private sector goals, part collaborative with the environment‟. 
 
Commitment: This former utility executive also pointed out that the employees were deeply 
committed to making these transitions successful. An „ideal organisation‟ is one that is 
forgiving of errors and is a good corporate citizen, focusing on customers and the larger 
community. This would also require changing the internal culture to focus less on 





Table 4-38: Selected Comments Regarding Commitment East Coast Utility 
  Executive Middle Management 
Commitment 
Forgiving of errors (EC). Continue to do a good job in the 
community (LH). 
It involved reversing the course 
180 degrees. … The company is 
no longer engineering-minded 
(EC). 
Be a good corporate citizen (ET) 
More customer-focused. Need to 




Resources: Table 4-39 summarizes the comments these respondents had regarding the  
kind and type of resources required to be an „ideal‟ organisation. These attributes include an 
increased focus on team-building with a more flexible corporate structure that both empowers 
and encourages employees. 
 
Table 4-39: Selected Comments Regarding Resources East Coast Utility 
 
These respondents were also asked to provide examples of companies that they viewed as 
having the attributes of „ideal‟ organisations. These responses are summarized in Table 4-40. 
 








Executive Middle Management 
Resources  
Hired and realigned staff to (meet) 
changing needs (EC). 
Employees become owners or 
shareholders in the utilities, like other 
employee-owned business such as SAIC 
(ET). 
There was a belief in the team 
orientation and empowerment. …It 
was really important to everything 
YE did (CA). 
The ideal (utility) makes the best of its 
big efficiencies with a high-calibre staff. 
... (In a) large geographic territory, this 
makes more sense than one person 
trying to do everything (LH). 
Executive Middle Management 
Bell Labs: some different assets 
and regulation is an absolute 
necessity in electric utilities. It is a 
higher stakes game and less 
forgiving of errors (EC). 
Cooperative energy programs designed to serve 
customers makes sense from supply and delivery 
point of view. Need to have freedom for activity (LH). 
Efficiency Vermont (ET). 
SAIC (ET). 
Pacificorp: vertically-integrated, environmentally-
focused utility looking at sustainability policy (LH). 
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4.8.2 Midwest Utility 
These respondents believed that that it would be difficult in today‟s environment for an 
electric utility to achieve the ideal. Several believed that industry restructuring, caused by the 
attempted deregulation and subsequent merger and organisational restructuring, thwarted any 
chance for this utility to become an ideal. Rather, it had the opposite effect by destroying the 
culture, vision, and sense of purpose that these utility employees felt before reorganisation. 
The respondents indicated that one municipal utility, Madison Gas & Electric, had come 
close to becoming an ideal utility organisation. But this is not a model that would be easy for 
investor-owned utilities to adopt.  
 
Vision: The vision for this type of organisation would be wide and deep. It would need to 
have a global perspective. More importantly, it needs to be spread among the senior 
management team, rather than rest with just the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The ideal 
utility would have a visionary leader „who‟s heart is in the right place‟, one who has a 
commitment to the community and public service, rather than just the corporate bottom line. 
Its focus is that employees, customers, and the community are all equally important to the 
overall corporate mission (see Table 4-41). 
 
Table 4-41: Selected Comments Regarding Vision: Midwest Utility 






Executive Middle Management 
(It is important to) have a good vision. 
MG&E does a nice job. It keeps to the 
knitting of what is important. It has the 
right attitude. Employees are 
important customers (SS). 
Need to focus on changing needs of the 
market (GE). 
Able to adapt to change quickly (JA). 
Madison Gas & Electric is the model. 
Runs a tight ship. ... Had vision but 
also knows how to have fun at the 
company. ... Got the Board to help 






Commitment: The ideal utility would also have to back up this vision with employees who 
are allowed „to push the envelope‟ and be accepted. These employees will also have 
permission to fail. The ideal future utility employees may be outsiders who are „thought 






Table 4-42: Selected Comments Regarding Commitment: Midwest Utility 
Commitment 
Executive Middle Management 
Need to have people capable of 
making good judgments (JA). 
 
Need to understand market and also 
understand larger role (GE). 
Support to reinforce the culture (JB). 
Need permission through the 
organisation to fail (and) have 
freedom to take risks (SS). 
Need to bring in outsiders and listen to 
them... and people who pushed the 
envelope were accepted. (JM) 
 
 
Resources: The focus of the utility resources will be on the „greater good‟, an approach that 
is used by Madison Gas & Electric (MG&E). The ideal utility knows and understands its 
market niche, and plays to that niche by establishing a strong and visible community 
presence. The ideal utility will also be committed to developing infrastructure to support 
renewable and energy-efficiency projects, rather than focusing on just building additional 
generation plants (see Table 4-43). 
 
Table 4-43: Selected Comments Regarding Resources: Midwest Utility 
Resources 
Executive Middle Management 
Had a lawyer who understands FERC 
and needs to make changes. Pursued 
the transmission market but known as 
consistent in his position (SS). 
Message at MG&E is to focus on the 
‘greater good’ work with a local ad 
agency to develop and cultivate their 
brand and it reflects their outlook and 
focus (JB). 
John Rowe type of mission. Heart is 
in the right place. ... Understand the 
nature of regulatory deal (SS). 
Needs to get a different (look). … I’m 
not seeing them) do it (JM).  
Need to bring in young people from 
outside the field to effect change (JM). 
Need to hire people that reflect that 
view (and) spread the vision among the 
senior management (GE). 




These respondents were also asked to provide examples of companies that they viewed as 





Table 4-44:  Examples of Ideal Organisations- Midwest Utility 
Executive Middle-Management 
Our utility before deregulation (SS) Madison Gas & Electric (JB) 
New England Electric System (before 
deregulation) (JA) 
 
Madison Gas & Electric (SS)  
 
 
4.8.3 West Coast Utility 
Vision: The West Coast respondents described the characteristics of an ideal organisation‟s 
vision as an increased focus on the external stakeholders, who include customers, suppliers 
and regulators. This organisation would also put a higher degree of emphasis on internal and 
external communication. (See Table 4-45). 
 
 
Table 4-45: Selected Comments Regarding Vision: West Coast Utility 
Vision 
Executive Middle Management 
(The vision) needs to be more 
customer-focused even though (the 
utility) has made giant strides (in the 
past few years). Need to focus more 
on energy efficiency (KJ). 
If the utility can please the regulators 
better, it fosters a more collaborative 
relationship (MB).  
Also have to reach out to non-utility 
suppliers and customers (VR). 
Vision elements: high integrative 
leadership. … Need better 
communication and organisation (MO). 
Communication is the blood of an 
organisation and (this company) 
needs to put an emphasis on it (VR). 
  
Needs to be driven by well-defined 





Commitment: These respondents believed that this ideal organisation would require a new 
type of employee that is able to work well in a non-regulated organisation. These employees 
would have to also be able to help move the company forward, more proactively rather than 






Table 4-46: Selected Comments Regarding Commitment: West Coast Utility 
Commitment 
Executive Middle Management 
 (Company) has moved in that 
direction but (still needs more) 
people who don’t take monopoly 
status for granted and understand 
that change creates permanent 
consternation in the market (KD). 
Need to focus resources on being 
a better corporation (MO). 
 (Need a) commitment to tap into 




Resources: These respondents also indicated the types of resources that would be needed in 
an „ideal organisation‟. These organisations would require employees with new types of skill 
sets; these employees would be less focused on an engineering mentality and more on one 
that fosters innovation, communication and the ability to follow as well as lead (see Table 4-
47). 
 
Table 4-47: Selected Comments Regarding Resources: West Coast Utility 
Resources 
Executive Middle Management 
Resources (are) not just a new 
leadership model but also have a 
followership model, a model that 
teachers and leaders sometimes 
need to follow. … There needs to be 
an ‘OK-ness’ with that. Following 
sometimes actually makes a good 
leader (KJ). 
Need to support people learning other 
skills (KD). 
(A company should) not have a culture 
of nepotism. (It’s important to) attract 
others (MO). 
Needs to foster innovation and have a 
knowledge-based culture. Need to 
nurture knowledge (KJ).  
Have to have the right kind of folks in 
the roles. ... It is important. ... Need to 
learn how to set strategic objectives. 
(KD).  
(Utilities need to be) training good 
business administrators. (Utilities now 
hire) engineers or those with a 
technical background who aren't 
oriented to a business perspective. 
They don't understand it (VR). 
Need to have more customer-
focus…Set stretch goals and address 
key issues (MB). 
 
Executive respondents from the West Coast Utility also identified two organisations that 





4.8.4 Cross-Case analysis of R6 
This section provides a Cross-Case analysis of R6, which explored the following question: 
What are the managers’ perspectives of an ideal electric utility in terms of vision, 
commitment, and resources? These responses are summarized in the following tables (See 
Tables 4-48 to 4-50).  
 
Vision: The attributes mentioned most frequently by respondents from all three utilities 
customer focus, proactive leadership from the top executives, and setting clear goals. Other 
factors mentioned by respondents from at least two utilities were the ability to develop an 
organisation that that is more flexible and collaborative.  
 
Table 4-48: Cross-Case Analysis of Attributes of ‘Vision’ for an Ideal Utility 
 
 
Commitment: Respondents across all three electric utilities all believed that the ideal 
organisation would engender commitment by becoming more tolerant and by being a good 
corporate citizen. Other ways to reinforce this corporate commitment is to overcome the 






Vision East Coast Midwest West Coast 
# of Times 
Mentioned* 
Customer Focus 2 1 1 4 
Proactive leadership at the top 1 1 1 3 
Set clear goals 1 1 1 3 
Flexible/adaptable 1 1  2 
More collaborative 1  1 2 
focus on energy efficiency/renewable  1  1 
Understand the market  1  1 
Bring in/listen to outsiders  1  1 
Better communication   1 1 
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Resources:  These respondents had more comments regarding the ways in which the 
resources of an ideal organisation would be cultivated and deployed. Respondents from all 
three electric utilities identified that these ideal organisations would require a new type of 
skill set from employees and a higher calibre of staff. These respondents also indicated that 
these employees would be working in an organisational structure that encourages teamwork 
and empowers employees. 
 
 
Table 4-50: Cross-Case Analysis of Attributes of ‘Resources’ for an Ideal Utility 
 
 
Examples of ideal organisations: These respondents expressed a bit of wistfulness in 
mentioning that one „ideal‟ organisation was their utility prior to deregulation. One particular 
organisation, Efficiency Vermont, was mentioned by two separate utilities while Madison 
Gas & Electric was mentioned by two Midwest Utility respondents. It is also interesting to 
note that these respondents identified other non-utilities – including Bell Labs, Science 
Commitment East Coast Midwest West Coast 
# of Times 
Mentioned  
Tolerant of risks 1 1 1 3 
Good corporate citizen 1 1 1 3 
Less focus on engineering culture 1  1 2 




Midwest West Coast 
# of Times 
Mentioned 
Realign staff to better meet needs 1 1 1 3 
Higher calibre of staff 1 1 1 3 
Employee-
empowerment/teamwork 1  1 2 
Organisational structure aligned 
to meet needs 1 1  2 
Employees as owners 1  1 2 
Develop new skill sets  1 1 2 
Foster innovation   1 1 
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Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and General Electric – as „ideal‟ 
organisations. 
 
Table 4-51: Cross-Case Analysis of ‘Ideal Organisations’ 
 
4.8.5 Summary of RI6 
This research issue focused on having the respondents describe how vision, commitment and 
resources would be deployed in an „ideal‟ electric utility. The major findings were that these 
organisations would have visionary leadership, with an emphasis on reaching out to 
customers, vendors and regulators. The commitment would be demonstrated by creating a 
culture that was less rigid and engineering-oriented, and more risk tolerant and welcoming to 
outsiders. The resources used in this organisation would attract new employees with a higher 
skill sets focused more on business rather than technical skills. The culture would be more 
open and one that empowers teamwork and is more flexible to adapt to changing markets.  
 
The experts could identify organisations that exemplified the nature of a learning organisation 
that encompassed the characteristics of a visionary leader, a culture that supported and even 
embraced change, and the appropriate resources to support the organisation‟s overall strategy. 
Their examples included Bell Labs, Enron and municipal utilities that operate in a different 
regulatory climate, such as Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), Colorado Springs 
and the investor-owned utility, New England Electric System (NEES) prior to deregulation. 
 
 
Examples of ‘Ideal 
Organisations’ 
East Coast Midwest 
West 
Coast 
# of Times 
Mentioned 
Efficiency Vermont 1  1 2 
My utility prior to deregulation 1 1  2 
Madison Gas & Electric  2  2 
Bell Labs 1   1 
SAIC 1   1 
PacifiCorp 1   1 
Rural Electric Cooperatives 1   1 
General Electric   1 1 
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4.9 Case Analysis of R7 Ideal versus Current organisation 
This section summarizes the responses from the individual electric utilities and a Cross-Case 
analysis regarding the gap between what is achievable, compared to the ideal electric utility 
organisation.  
R7 
What is the gap between the current 
utility and ideal utility of the future? 
Q21, Q22, Q23 
 
 
4.9.1 East Coast Utility Gap Analysis 
These respondents believed that the new corporate structure and identity – created through 
merger, acquisitions, and corporate-wide restructuring – has created the likely utility of the 
future. Its characteristics include: 
Vision: A vision focused on achieving the appropriate organisational efficiencies to 
maximize profits and identify other market opportunities.  
Commitment: There will be a focus on short-term commitment rather than a longer-term 
commitment to employees. The era of nepotism and the „old boys‟ network has been replaced 
with a more business-like focus on employees who manage effectively. 
Resources: The employee skill sets will be business-oriented, rather than technical, and 
support the overall corporate goals. There will also be a more diverse workforce, including 
more minorities and women in positions previously held by men. 
 
Table 4-52 compares the characteristics of an ideal electric utility with those features 
mentioned by these respondents. The purpose of this exercise is to identify the likely gaps 
between the ideal and the current electric utility, as described in the models developed by  
both Daft (2001) and Tichy (1982). 
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Table 4-52: Comparison of ‘Ideal’ vs. Current Organisations- East Coast Utility 
Characteristics of an Ideal Utility ‘Likely’ Utility Gaps 
Vision   
Customer Focus   
Proactive leadership at the top   
Set clear goals   
Flexible/adaptable   
More collaborative   
Focus on energy efficiency/renewables   
Understand the market   
Bring in/listen to outsiders    
Better communication   
    
Commitment   
Tolerant of risks    
Good corporate citizen   
Less focus on engineering culture   
Less emphasis on nepotism   
   
Resources   
Realign staff to better meet needs   
Higher calibre of staff   
Employee-empowerment/teamwork   
Organisational structure aligned to meet needs   
Employees as owners   
Develop new skill sets   
Foster innovation   
 
4.9.2 Midwest Utility Gap Analysis 
None of the respondents believe that investor-owned utilities will evolve into the ideal. 
Rather, they believe that these electric utilities will continue to focus on the short-term profit 
orientation dominated by Wall Street.  
 
Vision: The investor-owned utilities will continue to be hamstrung between the demands of 
short-term profitability that is favoured by Wall Street and the requirements to make large 
and long-term investments in power plants. Therefore, these respondents believe that the 
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„likely‟ utilities will follow in the GLE model that focuses on a CEO-dominated culture, 
reinforced by senior management that is focused strictly on the short-term benefits. They do 
not believe there will be very many visionary CEOs at these utilities. 
 
Commitment: The utilities will make commitments only as required. There will no longer be 
the commitment of a lifetime job at a utility, as these organisations will be in constant change 
and turmoil. Rather, they will do what they have to but are no longer interested in „playing 
nice‟ with the Commission.  
 
Resources: The utilities will be focused on selling more electricity and therefore cultivate 
financial, rather than engineering, resources. The focus will no longer be on customers, but 
rather maximizing profits through efficiencies in generation, and additional mergers and 
acquisitions to improve their market power. These employees will not have an understanding 
of the public service side of the electric utility industry, nor an appreciation for its history in 




Table 4-53: Comparison of ‘Ideal’ vs. Current Organisations: Midwest Utility 
 
 
The overwhelming view of the Midwest utility respondents was negative, in that the likely 






Characteristics of an Ideal Utility ‘Likely’ Utility Gaps 
Vision   
Customer Focus   
Proactive leadership at the top   
Set clear goals   
Flexible/adaptable   
More collaborative   
Focus on energy efficiency/renewables   
Understand the market   
Bring in/listen to outsiders   
Better communication   
    
Commitment   
Tolerant of risks   
Good corporate citizen    
Less focus on engineering culture   
Less emphasis on nepotism   
   
Resources   
Realign staff to better meet needs   
Higher calibre of staff   
Employee-empowerment/teamwork   
Organisational structure aligned to meet needs   
Employees as owners   
Develop new skill sets   
Foster innovation   
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4.9.3 West Coast Utility Gap Analysis 
The West Coast utility respondents also described the „likely‟ utility of the future. Their 
responses are summarized next.  
 
Vision: The respondents described the „likely‟ electric utility‟s vision in terms of both 
articulating a mission and also developing the leadership qualities necessary to achieve that 
vision.  These elements included an increased focus on business issues and accountability, 
and customer satisfaction.  
 
Commitment: These employees also described the likely level of commitment expected in 
these organisations. This level of commitment by senior management will include better 
responses to crises and the ability to communicate effectively with employees. Senior 
managers will also actively look for ways to incorporate feedback and suggestions from 
customers and employees. 
 
Resources: The respondents indicated that they believe electric utilities in the future will 
likely move to hiring staff with broader skill sets, which will enable them to communicate 
with critical stakeholders. 
 
The gap between the ideal electric utility organisation and the „likely‟ electric utility is that 
not going to embody the characteristics of a learning organisation in foreseeable future, as 
indicated by the comparison in Table 4-54.  
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Table 4-54: Comparison of ‘Ideal’ vs. Current Organisations- West Coast Utility 
Characteristics of an Ideal Utility ‘Likely’ Utility Gaps 
Vision   
Customer Focus   
Proactive leadership at the top   
Set clear goals   
Flexible/adaptable   
More collaborative   
focus on energy efficiency/renewables   
Understand the market   
Bring in/listen to outsiders   
Better communication   
    
Commitment   
Tolerant of risks   
Good corporate citizen   
Less focus on engineering culture   
Less emphasis on nepotism   
   
Resources   
Realign staff to better meet needs   
Higher calibre of staff   
Employee-empowerment/teamwork   
Organisational structure aligned to meet needs   
Employees as owners   
Develop new skill sets   
Foster innovation   
 
 
4.9.4 Cross-Case gap analysis 
As Figure 4-20 illustrates, these utility respondents all that gaps will exist regarding the likely 
utility of the future regarding the following characteristics: proactive leadership, set clear 
goals, flexible/adaptable, and collaborative, and listening to outsiders. The only area of vision 
that these respondents all agreed on is that the leadership will „understand the market‟ but this 
was not necessarily viewed as a positive attribute. The experts believe that the major gap in 
vision is the „disconnect‟ between the utilities that are still clinging to the regulated utility 
model and those that want to focus more directly on other products and services.  
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Figure 4-20: Cross-Case Analysis of Vision Characteristics 

































































































































Figure 4-21 illustrates that all these respondents indicated that the likely utility will still 
remain risk-adverse, but will have less of an emphasis on nepotism. All the respondents 
indicated that these utilities will have less of an engineering focus in the future. The experts 
identified the major gaps in these organisations are that they still have a change-resistant 













Figure 4-21: Cross-Case Analysis of Commitment Characteristics 








































Figure 4-22 illustrates that all these respondents indicated that the gaps that will remain 
regarding resources regarding fostering innovation, but there was less agreement on the other 
characteristics. All respondents agreed that the likely utility of the future will realign its staff 
to meet future needs and two of the three cases indicated that these new employees will 
develop new skill sets and be of a higher calibre. The major gap in resources, as cited by the 
experts, is the result of utilities continuing to recruit the wrong type of employees. Rather 
than finding employees capable of creating vision and creating a new type of culture, these 
utilities still recruit followers not leaders, and therefore will never have the skill sets required 
to become learning organisations. 
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Figure 4-22: Cross-Case Analysis of Resource Characteristics 














































































































4.9.5   Summary of R7: Gap Analysis 
This gap analysis required a comparison of responses from the two scenarios: what was the 
ideal versus what would be the likely reality. As this analysis indicated, these respondents all 
believed that the utilities would cultivate few of the characteristics of an ideal organisation, 
only agreeing that the likely utility of the future would encompass the following 
characteristics: 
 Vision – Understand the Market  
 Commitment – Less focus on engineering culture 
 Resources – Realign Staff 
 
Unfortunately, the same conclusion was reached by the expert interviews. These respondents 
are also pessimistic that electric utilities could become learning organisations because of the 
entrenched and insular culture, dominated by technical rather than customer-oriented 
employees. The regulated nature of these organisations also creates added complexity, since 
utilities must conform to an externally imposed structure as well. Specifically, the experts 
described the ways in which the gap between the „likely‟ and „ideal‟ electric utility 
organisation will expand.  
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Vision: In summary, these experts believe that the electric utilities need to articulate a clear 
direction and purpose to their stakeholders, including employees, that outline ways in which 
these organisations are going to focus on customers, rather than electrons.  
 
Commitment: The experts believed that the ideal electric utility organisation would 
demonstrate commitment to its employees by providing long-term investments in the skills 
and resources necessary to do their jobs effectively.  
 
Resources: Lastly, it is important to create a culture that encourages risk-taking and 
entrepreneurial behaviour, rather than punishing it. It is also one that focuses on customers 
rather than selling electrons, and creating a more customer-oriented, rather than technically-
oriented, organisation.  
 
Below are some comments from utility respondent MB: 
Depends on how much they will let us do versus forcing us to strip it off. … We are not going 
to win from deregulation. ... As long as we have wires we will be a monopoly and always be 
regulated. ... We are fighting to get us back and regulated as much as possible.   
 
 
Summary of R7:  Both the respondents and the experts doubted if electric utilities could ever 
become learning organisations because of the entrenched and insular culture, dominated by 
technical- rather than customer-oriented employees. The regulated nature of these 
organisations also creates added complexity, since utilities must conform to an externally 
imposed structure as well.  
 
4.10 Summary of Chapter 4 
This chapter summarized the findings from the three case studies across all seven research 
issues. Where appropriate, the findings from the expert interviews were included to provide 
additional insight. The major finding from this research investigation was that deregulation 
had a profoundly negative effect on these three electric utility organisations. Rather than 
moving these electric utilities towards a more evolved and less rigid organisational structure, 
the opposite occurred. Therefore, it seems unlikely that these organisations could ever 
become learning organisations as defined by Senge (1990) and others.  
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These findings were corroborated in the expert interviews, which provided additional insight 
regarding the legal and political pressures that led to industry deregulation. The experts also 
believed that deregulation had a negative effect on the industry because utility employees 
were often paralysed by the constant changes and stresses associated with deregulation. This 
had a negative effect on their strategic decision-making skills because they were forced to do 
more with less. The experts identified two distinct explanations of the ways in which the 
electric utility industry responded strategically to change: proactively or reactively.   
 
Organisational change was implemented in a coercive manner that was poorly communicated 
to the employees. The utility respondents indicated that their „new‟ organisations had 
difficulty in effectively managing this organisational change, especially handling succession 
politics, distributing organisational power and effectively developing an appropriate mission 
and strategy. The negative outcomes of these poorly-executed strategies included rounds of 
restructuring, layoffs, mergers and acquisitions. It was also reflected in the way in which 
these organisations addressed human resource needs. These include reports of cultural clashes 
among different divisions of newly acquired companies, harsh treatment of employees and 
faulty communication. The industry experts also agreed with this assessment. The utility 
industry, which had been fundamentally transformed by deregulation, was not at all prepared 
to manage this change, either internally or externally. 
  
Not surprisingly, the utility respondents also doubted that their organisations could ever 
become a „learning organisation‟. They cited barriers that included an entrenched 
organisational culture, the lack of properly trained employees and a rigid organisational 
structure. Each barrier hinders the development of an effective learning organisation, 
especially as it relates to vision, commitment and resources. 
 
An ideal organisation, according to the electric utility respondents, would have visionary 
leadership, with an emphasis on reaching out to customers, vendors and regulators. The 
commitment would be demonstrated by creating a culture that was less rigid and engineering-
oriented and more risk-tolerant and welcoming to outsiders. The resources used in this 
organisation would attract new employees with a higher skill sets focused more on business 
rather than technical skills. The culture would be more open and one that empowers 
teamwork and is more flexible to adapt to changing markets.  
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These experts were slightly more optimistic. They thought that electric utilities might be able 
to evolve into learning organisations if they have the appropriate vision, commitment and 
resources in place to do so. However, they agree that this change would only occur if there is 
a visionary leader, a culture that supported change and the appropriate resources to support 
the organisation‟s overall strategy. But, as their interviews suggest, they doubt that electric 
utilities will ever be able to bridge the gaps from their current organisations to that of a more 
„ideal‟ one.  
 





CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The research problem is as follows: How did deregulation change the strategic focus and 
internal operating culture of U.S. investor-owned electric utilities?  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and integrate the research findings from the three 
utility case studies and the in-depth expert interviews as a way to address this research issue 
and offer an assessment and critique of established frameworks for understanding change in 
light of this research.  The theoretical framework for this study is based on the blending of 
components from five major theories about competition and organisational change which 
were presented and discussed in Chapter 2. These frameworks are well established and have 
been successfully deployed to guide change research in the past. The theoretical framework 
viewed the changes caused by external change, specifically electric utility deregulation, 
through the lens of three separate electric utilities and selected industry experts. The findings 
are examined from two perspectives: 
• Context (external and internal environment) 
• Process (how change was implemented) 
 
The external context is environmental, political, legal and economic factors that led to 
electric utility deregulation (Daft, 2001; Pettigrew & Whipp 1998; Senge 1990, Tichy 1982). 
Internal context describes the specific ways in which these three electric utilities attempted to 
alter their organisational cultures, structures, policies, resources and capabilities to match the 
new external environment (Daft, 2001; Pettigrew & Whipp 1998; Senge 1990; Tichy 1982). 
Process focused on the ways in which organisational change was implemented in the electric 
utility industry (Daft 2001; Pettigrew & Whipp 1998; Senge 1990). A finding of this research 
was that established frameworks considered in Chapter 2, though useful, have limitations. 
They provide only a partial understanding of the changes explored in this study.  
Seven research issues were developed specifically to examine the nature of both external and 
internal contexts. This final chapter interprets the findings discussed in Chapter 4 and relates 
them to relevant literature cited in Chapter 2. Based on these research results, the conclusions 
are first developed for each of the seven research issues and then for the research problem 
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under study. Next, the implications for and contributions to strategic management and 
organisational change theories, the study methodology and management practices are 
discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion regarding future research needs and areas 
to consider. 
 
5.2 Devolution of the U.S. electric industry 
 
Deregulation was a cataclysmic event that changed these utilities forever, regardless of 
whether it was successfully completed. It was an event that precipitated a period of radical 
change, as described in Tushman and Romanelli‟s (1994) model of punctuated equilibrium. 
However, this theory assumes that organisations move between calm and radical change 
states. Yet in this study, the respondents described change that was a much more radical, as 
described by Daft (2001); this was a transformational change that fundamentally altered their 
specific organisations. Transformational change is defined as the emergence of a „new 
organisation‟ built out of the ashes from the chaotic death of the old state (Battram 1998). 
This more closely describes the effects that industry deregulation had on the utilities 
examined in the three case studies of this investigation.  
 
The experts‟ view is that deregulation was caused by pressures that had been building up due 
to rising prices and constrained supply; these pressures were outside the control of the electric 
utility industry. The change was from the outside, dictated by organisations and events other 
than the utilities, specifically the commissions, the national and state governments and large 
industrial customers.  
 
As this inquiry demonstrated for these three case studies, the outcomes of deregulation did 
not lead to the development of a more open organisation exhibiting those characteristics of a 
„learning organisation‟ with an adaptive culture as shown in Table 5-1 column 2. But rather, 
the outcomes of deregulation have largely been a failure. These organisations became even 
more rigid, bureaucratic and close-minded in the wake of industry deregulation (see column 
3).  
R1: What is the evolution of the US electric utility industry, focusing 




Table 5-1: Comparing Successful vs. Failed Utility Organisations Post-
Deregulation 
(Source: Adapted from Daft, 2001 citing, Kotter & Heskett 1992) 
 
Deregulation in the U.S. electric industry was caused by several external forces specifically 
related to political/legal, economic and technological factors (see Appendix A: EEI Historical 
Overview). In the Pettigrew et al. (1998) model, these forces would be viewed as strategic 
change in terms of external context. In Daft‟s (2001) model, deregulation could be viewed as 
the transformational change that fundamentally altered these three electric utility 
organisations through these external forces. All the utility case study respondents viewed the 
attempts at deregulation of their electric companies as unfavourable and their organisations 
were fundamentally changed as a result of this event. The expert analysis helped to explain 
that these changes were dictated by the commissions, the national and state governments, and 
large industrial customers. But groups concluded that the electric utility deregulation has 
largely been a failure.  
 
The basic premise of the theoretical framework was that organisational change, especially the 
types of transformational change that occurred in the electric utility industry, would result in 
a positive outcome for both the organisations affected and the industry as a whole. But from 
the vantage points of the industry respondents, who lived through this event, and those 
experts who viewed it on a more macro level, electric utility deregulation did not lead to 
positive change. Rather, it resembled more closely the paradox described by Emmons (2000) 









Managers care deeply about 
customers, stockholders, and 
employees. They strongly value 
people and processes that can 
create useful change, such as 
leadership initiatives up and down 
the management hierarchy. 
Managers care mainly about 
themselves and their immediate 
work group or product associated 
with that workgroup. They value 
the orderly and risk-reducing 
management process much more 
highly than leadership initiatives. 
Common Behaviour 
Managers pay close attention to all 
constituencies, especially 
customers and initiate change 
when needed, even if entails some 
risk. 
Managers tend to be isolated, 
political and bureaucratic. They 
do not change their strategies 
quickly to adjust or take 
advantage of changes in their 
business environments.  
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learning organisation envisioned by Senge (1990). Furthermore, the findings were 
paradoxical because in two of the case studies, these utilities had fostered an organisational 
culture that would have facilitated the development of a learning organisation. But these 
corporate structures were destroyed by the deregulation process and all utilities instead 
became the rigid and hierarchical organisations as described in Table 5-1. These case study 
findings more closely support Emmons‟s (2000) theories regarding the inherent problems of 
deregulating monopolies than Senge‟s (1990). These findings suggest that while the 
organisational change models used to guide this framework (Daft 2001; Pettigrew & Whipp, 
1998) may be informative in some ways, they do not adequately consider the negative 
outcomes of change, especially in the context of industry deregulation. Another perspective, 
based on complexity theory, would suggest that organisations/industries and environments 
co-exist and that outcomes viewed to be negative cannot always be avoided.  
 
5.3 Utility managers’ decision-making process 
 
Findings from the case studies support the theories of strategic decision-making explored in 
Chapter 2 (i.e. Papadakis et al. 1998 citing Schneider & De Meyer 1991; Beach & Mitchell 
1978; Billings, Milburn & Schaalman 1980; Bryson & Bromiley 1993; Dutton, Fahey & 
Narayanan1983; Hitt & Tylder 1991; Rajagopalan et al. 1993). These theories suggested that 
strategic decision-making would be guided by: the managers‟ individual characteristics and 
group dynamics, the internal organisational context, and environmental factors. 
The Cross-Case analysis illustrated that deregulation changed these respondents‟ roles and 
responsibilities. All the respondents said that deregulation resulted in a shift in the company‟s 
overall focus, which forced these organisations to become more concerned with competitive 
issues (i.e. environmental factors).  The respondents‟ roles changed, due electric utility 
restructuring, and they had to either change jobs, or change employers directly as a result, 
thus affecting both the organisation‟s internal context as well as group dynamics.  
 
These findings were further supported in the expert interviews. They believed that the utility 
managers were paralysed by the constant changes and stresses associated with deregulation; 
R2: How were the managers’ decision-making processes affected by  
 deregulation?  
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this added stress adversely affected their ability to make decisions. The utilities had to deal 
with a smaller workforce, ill-prepared employees and an incentive scheme that no longer 
reflected the market conditions. As a result, they were unable to make decisions fast enough 
to keep up with constant market changes and upheaval.  
 
Deregulation affected the managers‟ decisions about how to react to the new competitive 
environment. These utility industry respondents struggled to react but they did not have the 
appropriate skills sets or knowledge to do so successfully. In only rare cases, were the 
managers able to embrace and adjust for this change, rather than fight it.  
 
Industry deregulation also adversely affected the utilities‟ strategic decision-making process 
because their managers perceived this as a crisis rather than an opportunity. Decisions will be 
made differently if the decision is perceived as a crisis rather than an opportunity (Milburn, 
Schuler & Watman 1983; Papadakis, Lioukas & Chambers 1998 citing Jackson & Dutton 
1988). As postulated in the literature review, the three utility organisations did react 
differently but all three regarded deregulation as a crisis rather than an opportunity. For 
example, the East Coast utility sought ways to be acquired in a friendly merger rather than in 
a hostile takeover. The West Coast case study described the utility managers‟ responses to 
one crisis after another. The Midwest case study respondents viewed their reaction as a 
response to an externally-mandated requirement rather than an opportunity to reshape their 
organisation. The three case studies described these differences as being driven by the various 
regional, political and internal utility cultures. Another perspective may be that the specific 
differences might be explained by variations among these firms, the individual cultural 
differences and the interactions between a firm and its external agents, which can create 
positive and negative feedback loops. 
 
But none of these utility managers viewed these decisions with any comprehensiveness, as 
theorized by Papadakis et al. (1998). Rather, these managers chose to make short-term 
decisions based on surviving this crisis rather than making decisions that were comprehensive 
and offered long-term solutions. So these findings support the premise that decision-makers 
react differently if they perceive a crisis rather than an opportunity, and are driven by both 
internal and external forces (Papadakis et al. 1998; Frederickson 1984). 
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However, these propositions do not fully explain the diverse reactions of the three case 
studies. While the three utilities did have unique differences driving the decision to 
deregulate, their response was similar – resist rather than embrace change. This further 
supports Whittington (1993) who noted that resistance to change is not „stupid‟ but rather 
based on a very shrewd appreciation of the personal consequences. These managers decided 
to resist change because they understood the negative consequences of losing both power and 
status. This suggests that when managers are not properly equipped to deal with 
overwhelming transformational change, they will remain highly resistant. These findings 
further illustrate the negative consequences of transformational change, which can lead 
organisations to adopt an „ostrich approach‟ to change. The study also pointed out that 
transformational change will not succeed if managers are not confident that they will be able 
to retain their power and status after transformational change. Thus organisational change, as 
described in the three case studies, is more likely to fail than succeed. Although some 
research has been done in this area, it is worth additional consideration to expand on the 
theories exploring resistance to change when it is driven by external forces, such as 
deregulation. 
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5.4 Strategic focus of electric utilities 
 
Overall, this study‟s respondents agreed that deregulation forced the utilities to make 
corporate-wide transformational change that affected every aspect of their organisations. The 
effects of these strategies implemented by the utilities will be explored more fully in the next 
research issue. The key informants provided two distinct explanations of the ways in which 
the electric utility industry responded strategically to change – taking a reactive or proactive 
response.  
 
Miles and Snow (1978) provided a useful format for studying the successful implementation 
of different strategies in the three utility case studies (East Coast Utility, West Coast Utility 
and a Midwestern Utility). It theorizes that defenders, analysers, and prospectors are likely to 
perform equally well and all will outperform reactors. This is because reactors are 
inconsistent, which may lead to inappropriate reactions to change and uncertainty, and thus 
they perform poorly (Conant et al. 1990; McKee et al. 1989; Miles & Snow 1978; Smith & 
Grimm 1987; Zahra & Pearce 1990). Specifically, this study investigated the typologies these 
utility case studies adopted under Miles and Snow‟s (1978) theories: defender, analyser, 
prospector or reactor strategies. 
 
Findings from the case studies and the expert interviews found that all three utility case 
studies relied on the reactor strategy, which led to inconsistent and inappropriate reactions to 
change and overall poor performance. Therefore, these findings support the theories 
advanced by Miles and Snow (1978) and others. As the case studies illustrated, deregulation 
caused these utilities to develop a reactive approach in the wake of the corporate 
transformational change they faced. These findings supported the contention that the 
„Reactor‟ strategy, first formulated by Miles and Snow (1978) is a specific business strategy 
rather than one that is developed because „the management has failed to develop strategy, 
structure, and context in a consistent fashion‟ (Miles & Snow 1978, p. 12). All the case study 
respondents described a range of strategies that were „Reactive‟ and often inconsistent. These 
strategies included selling off some divisions and assets and laying off employees through 
restructuring while also acquiring new companies and additional employees. While this may 
R3: How did deregulation affect the strategic focus of these electric utilities?    
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not necessarily be inconsistent for competitive industries, this reaction was definitely 
inconsistent with the usual practices in the electric utility industry. These respondents 
described contradictory approaches taken by upper management to cope with 
transformational change.  
 
Consistent with the findings from R2, these utilities did not view this transformational change 
as a way to develop a proactive response, or an emergent strategic approach as described by 
Mintzberg (1994). Rather than view these changes as an opportunity to incorporate a more 
flexible approach that involved managing strategically from the top, using some sort of 
„cerebral control‟ (Mintzberg 1994), the utilities instead chose to rely on short-term reactive 
approaches. Thus, these utilities did not embrace the notion of emergent change but rather 
behaved exactly as hypothesized by Miles and Snow (1994).  
 
The case study findings were also consistent with  Kim and Mc Intosh‟s (1999) theory that 
some organisations, like utilities, will continue to do „business as usual‟ (Kim & Mc Intosh 
1999 citing Smith & Grimm 1987; Zajac & Shortell 1989). As this theory contends, 
organisations like electric utilities do not have the appropriate resources to implement a 
focused strategy that is more closely aligned with a post-deregulated market (Boeker 1996; 
Kim & Mc Intosh 1999 citing Bettis & Prahald 1995) and thus take a reactive rather than a 
proactive stance. As Kim and Mc Intosh (1999) correctly theorized, utilities would remain 
„Reactors‟.  While deregulation did change the organisational structure, the results were 
consistent with Kim and Mc Intosh‟s (1999) predicted outcomes. Therefore, this finding 
supports the theory that a reactor is a viable business strategy and may help to explain the 
strategic responses used by electric utilities after deregulation. Moreover, it points out the 
need to develop a broader understanding of the challenges that face regulated organisations as 
they wrestle with deregulation.  
 
Change theorists concede that while organisations may want to adopt an approach of 
emergent change, as advocated by Mintzberg (1994), this may be impossible if they 
previously operated in a rigid bureaucratic structure, which accurately describes the three 
case studies in this inquiry. While emergent change theorizes that these utility managers may 
be able to instil order out of chaos, this was not the case for these three utilities. Rather, these 
findings support Stacey (2007), who identified that this as unrealistic or inappropriate in 
certain circumstances, such as the transformational change experienced by these three 
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utilities. Furthermore, these findings illustrate shortcomings because managers‟ reactions are 
not well understood in changing environments (Sastry 1997). Therefore, more research needs 
to be conducted, focusing specifically on managers in organisations experiencing 
transformational change, to explore why they are not likely to adopt an emergent change 
approach.  
 
5.5 Specific mechanisms to manage change 
 
 
This research issue examined change from four different perspectives: the ways in which 
change was implemented; and how change affected an organisation‟s mission and strategy, 
organisational structure and human resources management (HRM). 
  
5.5.1 Ways in which change was implemented    
The electric utility case studies revealed that organisational change was implemented in a 
coercive manner, using a top-down approach. This finding disputes the basic premise guiding 
organisational change theory that „any change, whether planned or unplanned is an action that 
attempts to improve an organisation‟ (MacPhail 2001). Moreover, the change models 
developed by Pettigrew (1998) and Senge (1990) proposed that organisations would benefit 
from change. As the case studies showed, the opposite was evident. Instead of fostering an 
open culture that promoted communication, said the utility respondents, these changes were 
often directed from the top. This suggests that most organisational change theories also need 
to address the negative outcomes of change rather than assuming all change is positive. 
 
5.5.2 Changes in mission and strategy 
 
The three electric utility organisations were most effective at articulating a mission and 
strategy but did not deploy the appropriate resources to ensure the proper execution of this 
mission and strategy (vision) throughout the organisation. Utility respondents also rated their 
organisations relatively low on: a) deploying the appropriate resources to accomplish their 
R4: What were the specific mechanisms these utilities used to manage change? 
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mission; b) assessing organisational strengths and weaknesses, and c) fostering an 
organisational culture that supports their overall mission (Tichy 1982). This finding 
reinforces Kotter‟s (1996) theory that when an organisation is implementing change, this 
change needs to be communicated clearly and consistently in order to be effective. It also 
reinforces the importance of cultivating the internal resources, systems and structure to 
support this mission and strategy (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1998). Therefore, it is not surprising 
that these organisations failed to implement a consistent mission and strategy. The finding 
further demonstrates the gap between organisational theory and operational practice with 
these three electric utilities. 
 
5.5.3 Changes in organisational structure 
The rigid organisational structure in place prior to deregulation continued even after 
deregulation, and this was ultimately one of the biggest barriers to implementing change 
mechanisms effectively in these organisations. Despite deregulation, the utility respondents 
reported that their organisations focused best at micro-managing employees, by organising 
tasks and assigning specific roles and responsibilities (Tichy 1982). This is consistent with 
the rigid and formal structure that was in place prior to industry deregulation. This finding 
supports the theory that, despite their best efforts to become more open, many organisations 
continue to remain bureaucracies even after restructuring (Clayton 2008), which would make 
it difficult for companies like electric utilities to develop into „learning organisations‟. 
 
The case study respondents also documented the failures that resulted because of these 
organisations‟ inability to distribute and balance power among various groups (Tichy 1982). 
These shortcomings included the culture clash among and between departments (East Coast 
and West Coast case studies), a greater emphasis on meeting financial rather than operational 
goals (Midwest case study), internal power struggles (East Coast and West Coast case 
studies), and the inability to allow employees to try something new and fail (West Coast case 
study). These findings are consistent with the documented difficulties that many 
organisations face after restructuring (Daft 1993 citing Hammer & Champy 1993). Emmons 
(2000) adds that too often regulated organisations do not fully understand the magnitude of 
the task required and underestimate the challenge of managing the political processes 
associated with deregulation. Therefore, these findings further illustrate the difficulties that 
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regulated organisations, like electric utilities, face as they try to operate in a deregulated 
environment.  
 
The implication for this finding is consistent with the previous results. While the literature 
postulated that organisations experiencing transformational change, such as industry 
deregulation, would move towards a more open and flexible structure, once again the electric 
utilities did not react as predicted. Rather than embracing change and seeing it as a 
mechanism to transform the organisation‟s strategic focus, instead the three electric utilities 
turned inward. The implications remain clear: The organisational change models have not yet 
captured the difficulties and challenges associated with change in the electric utility industry. 
Of the theories presented in Chapter 2, none of them accurately describes the true responses 
found in these three case studies. The researcher‟s perspective is that the more recent 
theories, such as the theory of punctuated equilibrium (Tushman & Romaneill 1994) and 
chaos and complexity theory (Stacey 2007), also do not accurately describe the nature of 
transformational change experienced by these three case studies. This suggests that there is 
not a single research theory or framework that truly describes the internal reactions to 
transformational change. Rather, researchers may have to develop their own frameworks, 
similar to the approach used in this study, which combines the key theories from several 
models into one that is suitable for this particular industry.  
 
5.5.4 Changes in human resources management  
Most utility respondents reported that their organisations were not able to recruit and attract 
workers with the skill sets necessary to successfully deal with a deregulated market (East 
Coast and West Coast case studies). As Emmons (2000) observed, HRM issues are especially 
challenging for deregulating organisations like electric utilities. This was true for the three 
electric utilities, which had to cope with a shrinking workforce during the first few years after 
deregulation (Emmons 2000) while also trying to develop and attract employees with the new 
skills needed in a deregulated marketplace. Emmons (2000) also observed that the „lifetime‟ 
contract that was once implied by electric utilities was no longer in effect after deregulation, 
and that added to the inner turmoil reported by these utility respondents. This finding 
supports the research developed by Emmons (2000) and further reinforces the specific 
challenges that face a recently deregulated organisation, like an electric utility.  
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The case studies found that, despite deregulation, the three electric utilities continued to hire 
and select employees who reinforced their current corporate cultures of an engineering 
orientation, and continued nepotism and cronyism while avoiding risk-taking. This finding 
supports the conclusions reached by Christensen et al. (2006), who proposed that 
organisations with strong cultures can be „highly resistant to change‟ because they have their 
own cultural practices in place as a way to maintain the status quo, rather than to embrace 
change. These findings also support Hirsh‟s (1989) description of the unique electric utility 
culture and helps to explain why the „utility industry managed itself differently from others‟ 
(Hirsh 1989, p. 26). This research reinforced Hirsh‟s (1989) own conclusions about the 
insular, risk-adverse culture within the electric utility industry, further illustrating how some 
organisations prefer to resist rather than embrace organisational change. Table 5-2 
summarizes key themes that emerged from the three utility case studies and demonstrates 
further support of the conclusions reached by both Hirsh (1989) and Emmons (2000).  
 
Table 5-2: Key Themes from Case Studies 




Strategy dictated by others.    
Forced development of separate business units. 




Had to change incentive structure, infrastructure to reflect new orientation. 
Added new services, created new processes. 
Viewed employees as expendable while creating new departments. 
Systems 
Viewed customer service as a way to meet competition. 
Got rid of long-term employees. 
Processes/Culture 
 
Tried to create more diversity ...  
But also cut community/long-time ties. 
 Still retained risk-adverse, engineering-oriented culture sceptical of change. 
(Source: Adapted and revised for this study) 
 
The overall conclusion from R4 is that while the literature review proposed that deregulation 
would force the electric utility industry to radically change its structure, mission, strategy and 
HRM practices, the changes did not occur as anticipated. The implications of this finding are 
that electric utilities did not institutionalize change as expected, but rather developed highly 
sophisticated reactions to mitigate, avoid or ignore ways to institutionalise change. The 
implication further suggests that the internal processes used by these types of insular 
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organisations, such as electric utility organisations, warrant further study to expand on 
Hirsh‟s (1987) conclusions and insights.  
5.6 Electric utilities as ‘learning organisations’ 
 
 
Three critical findings emerged from this research issue. First, the utility respondents were 
unfamiliar with the concept of a „learning organisation‟ and none had ever envisioned such an 
„ideal‟ organisation prior to this research inquiry. While the theory regarding a „learning 
organisation‟ has been well established in the organisational change literature, beginning with 
Senge (1990) and expanded later with Goh (1998), this theory was not well known within this 
industry. Moreover, once the respondents were informed about the nature of a learning 
organisation, in which learning is built into the key structure and processes of the 
organisation so it becomes an integral part of the employees' work lives (Argyris 1990), the 
respondents were intrigued but not convinced that this type of organisation was feasible in the 
electric utility industry. This finding is not particularly surprising, given that this is an 
emerging field of organisational theory and that the literature about the nature of adult 
learning is becoming more well known (Rosenblum & Keller 1994; Tannenbaum 1997; 
Willis, Dubin & Heckscher 1995). The finding suggests that perhaps, as learning 
organisations become a more well known type of organisational structure, this could lead to a 
greater awareness of this theory within the electric utility industry.  
 
However, the second finding suggests that even if the theory becomes well known, these 
respondents are doubtful that electric utility organisations will cultivate the processes, 
systems, culture and structure necessary to become more learning-oriented. As the findings 
from two case studies showed, two organisations had started to foster an organisational 
culture that would have facilitated the development of a learning organisation but by the end 
of their deregulation experience, all three utilities had reverted back to becoming rigid and 
hierarchical. This finding supports the work by Whittington (1993) which highlighted the 
difficulties of convincing managers to change, because this may diminish their own power 
and status. It also further supports De Geus (1988) who argued that successful organisational 
R5: What are the managers’ and industry experts’ perspectives of electric 
utilities as ‘learning organisations’? 
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change must start at the top, and will only succeed if it is led by the individuals with decision-
making authority. Furthermore, it also supports the challenges identified by Rifkin and Fulop 
(1997) that managers may respond by actually impeding the development of a learning 
organisation. The implication supports Rifkin and Fulop‟s (1997) theory that it may be 
particularly difficult for large public companies, such as electric utilities, to successfully 
develop into learning organisations. Another perspective is that such large public companies 
have different types of commitment and that might have exerted an influence. This issue is 
noted in the next section.  
 
These findings also reinforce the notion that utilities often have difficulty getting key 
employees to embrace organisational change, which is often demonstrated by a lack of 
commitment to change (see Section 5.7.2). The lack of enthusiasm by the utility respondents 
for this type of transformational change was further reinforced by the role ambiguity and 
conflict that this change created; this lack of enthusiasm has been found in other employees 
facing similar experiences (Dale & Fox 2008 citing Johnston et al 1990; Lee 2003 and 
Mathieu & Zajac 1990).    
 
The third critical finding that emerged from this research issue identified future areas for 
possible investigation. The respondents identified several critical barriers that must be 
overcome by large organisations, like theirs, in order to develop to into learning 
organisations. These barriers – which included the organisation‟s culture, the utility‟s 
operating structure and regulatory constraints – further support the challenges raised by both 
Emmons (2000) and Hirsh (1989). It also supports the propositions formulated by Kochan 
and Useem (1992) suggesting that learning organisation must foster a disruptive, even 
radical, corporate culture to be successful. This seems highly unlikely, given the difficulties 
identified by both the electric utility respondents and the industry experts.  
 
In conclusion, a key assumption from this research inquiry is that some organisations want to 
become learning organisations; this, however, is clearly not the case among three utility case 
studies. The findings from this research inquiry support earlier criticisms that outline the 
shortcomings of existing theories about establishing a learning organisation. This inquiry also 
points out a new proposition that may not yet have been sufficiently considered: Some 
organisations do not want to change.  
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5.7 Defining the ‘ideal’ electric utility 
 
5.7.1 Vision  
The case study respondents characterized the necessary leadership traits required to develop a 
vision as 1) focusing on the customer, 2) proactive leadership from the top and 3) setting 
clear goals. These findings were consistent with the types of leadership qualities and vision 
that enable an organisation to differentiate itself in the market (Hoover 2001) as well as 
inspire employees to strive for excellence. Kotter‟s (1996) characteristics of an effective 
vision were similar to the traits identified by these utility case study respondents and industry 
experts, especially regarding the need to be focused, feasible and flexible. 
However, these case study respondents did not place as much emphasis on communicating 
this vision to employees as may have been expected. While Canterucci (2003), Heskett et al. 
(1997), Kotter (1996) and Wallington (2000) all stress the need to communicate the 
organisation‟s vision to employees, only one respondent indicated that was a characteristic of 
a leader at an ideal utility. This finding suggests that while it is important for leaders to 
communicate during periods of transformational change (Pettigrew & Whipp 1998), this is 
not a practice that respondents would necessarily expect, even from an „ideal‟ utility.  
5.7.2 Commitment 
According to the utility respondents and industry experts, the key qualities that define 
commitment are higher risk tolerance and increased corporate responsibility. This differs 
from theories presented in the literature review, which view commitment as a way to build 
organisational consensus in order to achieve the overall corporate mission (Cummings & 
Worley 1997; Daft 2001; Dunphy & Stace 1988; Yukl 1994). 
 
The respondents‟ definitions of commitment focuses inwardly on developing a way in which 
to help institutionalize change; utility respondents were more outwardly focused on ways 
these electric utilities would demonstrate commitment to both their employees and the larger 
community. Furthermore, it was clear that these respondents did not view their own 
commitment as a willingness to extend extra effort on behalf of the organisation or desire to 
R6: What are the managers/industry experts’ perspectives of an ideal electric 
utility in terms of vision, commitment and resources?   
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remain with their employers, as suggested by Chen and Chen (2008) citing Mowday et al. 
(1982); O‟Reilly & Chatman 1986; and Porter et al. (1972). These findings suggest that the 
introduction of transformational change through industry deregulation fundamentally 
undermined or eliminated the sense of commitment these utility employees had for their 
organisations. Furthermore, the research indicates that industry deregulation fundamentally 
altered the implicit promise of lifetime employment, thus destroying any commitment these 
employees may have had to their employers (Emmons 2000). 
 
These findings were also consistent with behaviours of „survivors‟ after significant 
downsizing (Brockner et al. 1993 cited by Chen & Chen 2008). Knudsen et al. (2003 cited by 
Chen & Chen 2008) said that downsizing results in lower levels of organisational 
commitment among those employees who remain and the „survivors‟ are less committed to 
their organisation as their workload increases dramatically (Chen & Chen 2008). „Survivors‟ 
may resist the increased organisational demands by withdrawing or lessening their 
commitment to their organisation (Knudsen et al. 2003 cited in Chen & Chen). These 
findings were certainly supported by the electric utility deregulation „survivors‟, who were 
interviewed in these three case studies and their reactions reinforce the validity of these 
findings.  
 
The utility case study respondents also noted it was important to cultivate a new type of 
culture that was more accommodating and open-minded. As Schein (1992) and Millett (1989) 
observed, the organisational culture is determined at the top and often reflects the values and 
behaviours of the organisation‟s early leaders. This is certainly applicable to the electric 
utility industry, as documented by Hirsh (1989). In his work, he has captured the unique 
nature of these organisations, which focused on attracting low-risk engineers as a way to 
maintain the status quo. The findings from this section reinforce the validity of Hirsh‟s 
(1989) observations and reinforce the difficulty of creating this type of cultural change in 
these electric utility organisations. Moreover, it shows that the electric utility respondents 
understand the importance that culture plays in moving an organisation closer to the ideal as 




An „ideal‟ utility would also actively cultivate the resources necessary to support this new 
organisational structure by recruiting a more diverse workforce, focusing more on teamwork 
and developing a flexible corporate structure that both empowers and encourages employees. 
Galbraith (1973), Mintzberg (1989) and Van de Ven (1986) view creating the necessary 
infrastructure as vital to effectively institutionalising organisational change. This new 
structure is created by realigning the company‟s overall structure, including its policies, 
processes, and procedures (Galbraith 1996; Rowden 2001). Thus ideal utilities would develop 
complex and decentralised organisational structures operated by empowered employees who 
were rewarded by risk-taking behaviour (Galbraith  1996). However, the findings from these 
case studies suggest that the utility respondents do not ever believe, even in an „ideal‟ utility, 
that these attributes would be cultivated. This finding suggests that Galbraith‟s (1996) notion 
of   cultivating employees who adapt easily to change is highly unlikely to be identified or 
recognized as a vital need in the electric utility industry.  
 
Although respondents and industry experts from the three utility case studies were able to 
identify a variety of organisations that they viewed as „ideal‟ organisations, none identified 
any investor-owned utilities as having these characteristics. Rather, they focused on 
identifying companies that had developed reputations for being aggressive and 
entrepreneurial, such as General Electric and Enron, or utilities that operate without the 
regulatory constraints facing IOUs, such as rural electric cooperatives and municipal utilities. 
These findings support Galbraith‟s (1996) theory that the fundamental elements of an 
organisation become more complex and interrelated as an organisation moves towards a more 
flexible and decentralized structure. It appears that these organisations are unlikely to develop 
within the electric utility industry. This finding further reinforces the overall theme that has 
emerged from this research: The electric utility industry presents a unique perspective on the 










5.8 The gap between ‘current’ and ‘ideal’ utilities 
  
 
Overall, the case study respondents and industry experts did not believe that an ideal utility 
could ever exist. The identified gaps, integrating both Tichy‟s (1982) and Daft‟s (2001) 
theories, revealed that it is unlikely that three electric utility organisations would be able to 
evolve into a learning organisation as defined by Senge (1990). This finding suggests that 
learning organisations may never be an appropriate organisational model for previously 
regulated organisations, such as electric utilities.   
 
5.8.1 Gaps in vision  
The findings from the three case studies, and supported by the expert interviews, indicated 
that most utilities would not develop the full suite of characteristics that define a „visionary‟ 
organisation. They did believe that the „likely‟ utility of the future would acquire a vision by 
developing a much more comprehensive understanding of the market. This finding suggests 
that it will be difficult for the three electric utilities featured in these case studies to develop 
the full range of visionary characteristics as defined by Kotter (1996). While these electric 
utilities may be able to cultivate an ability to understand the market, it is doubtful that they 
will sufficiently develop the other components of an organisational vision that allow these 
utilities to proactively respond to these market changes. Kotter‟s (1996) theories viewed 
vision beyond just clarifying the direction for employees, but also include motivating 
employees and providing them the ability to coordinate their actions. These findings suggest 
that rigid organisations like electric utilities may have a difficult time developing fully the 
characteristics hypothesized by Kotter (1996).  
 
5.8.2 Gaps in commitment 
The gaps in commitment were defined as the changes required by the utility organisations in 
order to alter the employment terms and conditions with employees. Rather than offering a 
lifetime contract (Emmons 2000) or fostering an organisation built on nepotism and cronyism 
(Hirsh 1998), the utilities must instead focus on recruiting a more culturally diverse, 
R7: What is the gap between the current utility and ideal utility of the future? 
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balanced, and financially-oriented organisation with a short-term rather than a long-term 
orientation. It seems unlikely that the three electric utility organisations are progressing in 
this area, suggesting again the difficulties these organisations have with institutionalising 
organisational change. 
 
The findings further illustrate the difference between organisations successfully building 
commitment to embracing change compared to those opposing it. This finding suggests that it 
is highly unlikely that the electric utility organisations in this research will take the 
methodical and reasoned approach presented by Daft (2001) by managing organisational 
change through preparation, acceptance and ultimately organisation-wide commitment. 
Rather, the utility respondents said that only parts of this model – such as developing limited 
reactions to outside organisational change through better crisis management – would be 
implemented in their organisations. These findings imply that while Daft (2001) formulated a 
guide for institutionalising corporate commitment, the electric utility industry will probably 
never progress through those stages. There are gaps in the current understanding of 
organisational commitment as it relates to the unique nature of organisations‟ experiencing 
industry deregulation. These gaps prevent us from fully understanding the unique 
characteristics revealed in these three case studies. Therefore more investigation is required, 
especially in the area of commitment in the U.S. electric utility industry.  
5.8.3 Gaps in resources 
 
The case study respondents believe that the following organisational gaps will continue to 
exist: a) lack of innovation, b) inability to realign staff to meet future needs and failure to 
attract employees capable of creating vision and c) inability to create a new type of culture. 
As the case study respondents identified, the biggest stumbling block to cultivating a new 
type of organisation was the organisation‟s ongoing resistance to planned cultural change. 
Utility respondents reported that instead of embracing a new type of culture, their 
organisations became even more insular, focusing only on the dysfunctional consequences of 
organisational change (Mannion et al 2003). These findings reinforce the importance of 
developing the appropriate organisational structure to encourage institutional change 
(Pettigrew & Whipp 1998). The findings also support research by Clayton (2008) that 
indicates some organisations continue to remain bureaucracies even after restructuring. 
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These findings support the theories posed by Daft (2001) that an ideal electric utility would 
have to evolve into a more open and diverse organisation that is focused outward on the 
market rather than inward on internal policies and politics. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
electric utilities profiled in this research inquiry will develop the commitment necessary to 
evolve into the post-transformational change organisations theorised by Daft (2001). This 
further suggests that the current organisational change theories do not yet fully explain the 
unique perspective of organisations resistant to change, such as the electric utility industry. 
 
The overall implication is that there is a significant gap that separates the current utility‟s 
structure and the „ideal‟. The case study respondents and industry experts are pessimistic that 
electric utilities could become learning organisations because of the entrenched and insular 
culture, dominated by technical- rather than customer-oriented employees. The regulated 
nature of these organisations also creates added complexity, since utilities must conform to an 
externally-imposed structure as well. While no organisation is ideal, it is disheartening to 
think that the electric utility may be an industry in which there is not only little interest in 
embracing change, but rather a fundamental resistance to it. This does suggest that while 
organisational change theory may be appropriate for competitive businesses, there is not yet 
an appropriate framework to explain the nature of transformational change and its effect on 
deregulating industries. The basic premise of most organisational change literature is that 
transformational organisational change (deregulation) would propel the traditional utilities 
into ones that had flatter structures, more empowered employees, an adaptive culture and 
more open communications.  
 
Figure 5-1 shows the actual outcomes of transformational change that occurred in these three 
case studies, based on Daft (2001)‟s original model. As this figure shows, the effect of 
transformational change led to the creation of hyper-rigid organisations. This, in turn, led to 
much more chaotic organisational structures, cultural clashes from the mergers and 
acquisitions, employee disillusionment (rather than empowerment) through layoffs and 








Figure 5-1: The effect of transformational change in the electric utility market 
based on this research inquiry 
 
 
        (Source: Modified for the Study) 
 
In this way, the gaps between the hypothesized „ideal‟ and „likely‟ utility are best illustrated. 
Daft (2001) provided a valid theoretical framework to view the effects of organisational 
change but perhaps this theory is perhaps best suited for organisations that must operate in 
competitive markets. The overall implication from this finding is that organisational theories 
do not yet fully address the unique challenges of deregulated organisations facing 
transformational change. The electric utility industry is a paradox, not in the context of 
organisational chaos theory but rather in the context of contradicting established frameworks 
to understand organisational change. The contradictions between theories and actual 
experience need to be explained more fully in subsequent research inquiries and could also be 
compared to the experiences of industry restructuring in other insular industries with strong 
corporate cultures.  
 







Table 5-3: Summary of Major Findings from this Research Inquiry 
Research Issue Major Findings 
R1:  
 
What is the evolution of the 
U.S. electric utility industry, 
focusing particularly on the 
external forces leading to 
deregulation? 
  
1.  Deregulation was more transformational than chaotic 
change. 
2. Transformational change did not lead to the 
development of ‘learning organisations’. 
3. Change led to negative rather than positive outcomes. 
R2:  How were the managers' 
decision-making processes 
affected by deregulation?  
 
1. Strategic decision-making theory findings supported 
Papadakis et al. 1998 and others. 
2. Transformational change was viewed more as a crisis 
than an opportunity as theorized by Papadakis et al 
1998. 
3. Crisis mode forced managers to be more concerned 
with self-preservation rather and thus highly resistant to 
change which supports Whittington (1993). 
R3:  
 
How did deregulation affect  
the strategic focus of these 




The findings support the ‘Reactor’ theory developed by 
Miles & Snow (1994). 
2. The case study respondents described a range of 
strategies that were ‘Reactive’ and often inconsistent. 
3. The findings supported theories (Boeker 1996; Kim & 
Mc Intosh 1999 citing Bettis & Prahald 1995) stating  
that utilities would remain ‘Reactors’.  
4. Emergent strategy (Mintzberg 1994) is not an approach 




What were the specific 
mechanisms these utilities 





Changes in Mission & Strategy: While there was a 
mission and strategy articulated, the appropriate 
resources were not deployed to execute these 
objectives throughout the organisation.  
2. Reinforces Kotter’s (1996) theory that change needs to 
be communicated clearly and consistently in order to be 
effective. 
3. Also reinforces the importance of cultivating the internal 
resources, systems, and structure to support this 
mission and strategy (Pettigrew & Whipp, 1998). 
4. Changes in HRM: Utilities continued to hire ‘like-minded 
employees’. 
5. These findings support both Emmons (2000) and 
Christiansen et al. (2006) and Hirsh (1989). 
R5:  What are the 
managers’/industry experts’ 
perspectives of electric utilities 
as ‘learning organisations’? 
1.  Respondents were unfamiliar with the concept of a 
‘learning organisation’.  
2. Respondents were sceptical that a ‘learning 
organisation’ could exist in the electric utility industry. 
R6:   What are the 
managers/industry experts’ 
perspectives of an ideal  
electric utility in terms of 
vision, commitment and 
resources?   
1.  
 
These findings were consistent with the 
leadership/vision qualities described by Hoover (2001) 
and  Kotter (1996).  
2. The respondents did not place  emphasis on 
communicating this vision to employees. 
3. The respondents’ views of commitment differed  
significantly from commitment defined in the literature. 
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4. The respondents viewed commitment inwardly, which 
supported the notions of a diminished commitment level 
due to transformational change. 
5. Findings were consistent with  behaviours of ‘survivors’ 
after significant downsizing Brockner et al. (1993 cited 
by Chen & Chen 2008). 
6. The  case study respondents said it was important to 
cultivate a new type of culture that was more 
accommodating and open-minded. 
7. An ‘ideal’ utility would cultivate the resources necessary 
to support this new organisational structure by recruiting 
a more diverse workforce and through teamwork and a 
flexible corporate structure. 
R7: What is the gap between the 
current utility and ideal utility  
of the future? 
1.   The case study respondents and industry experts did 
not believe that an ‘ideal’ utility could ever exist.  
2. Most utilities would not develop the characteristics that 
define a ‘visionary’ organisation.  
3. It is unlikely that these organisations will adapt the 
strategies advocated by Daft (2001). 
4. Findings reinforce the importance of developing the 
appropriate organisational structure to support 
institutional change (Pettigrew & Whipp 1998).  
5. Findings support Clayton (2008) in that some 
organisations continue to remain bureaucracies even 
after restructuring. 
 
5.9 Implications for practice 
The findings from this research inquiry also lead to a number of key conclusions and 
implications for managers operating in environments similar to those faced by the utility 
managers in the three case studies. These major conclusions and implications transcended 
specific research issues and can be summarized as follows: 
 
5.9.1 Employees may often resist change 
Organisational change is hard, even in the best of circumstances. As the findings from this 
research inquiry illustrated, however, change may become even more difficult when 
employees actively resist attempts to implement change within an organisation. As the 
findings from R2 showed, managers were highly resistant to change when it threatened their 
power or position. Rather than embracing change as an opportunity for growth, many utility 
managers instead became ostriches, burying their heads and hoping this transformational 
change would go away without bothering them. 
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The implications from this finding are relevant for today‟s managers who must acknowledge 
that not every manager is willing to cede power during turbulent times. Moreover, it is 
unreasonable to expect managers in highly rigid cultures to readily embrace change, 
especially if it means a loss of job security, diminished power and status (Rifkin & Fulop 
1997; Emmons 2000).  
 
These findings highlight the psychological barriers on the part of many managers who are 
facing organisational change. This can be a major obstacle to implementing effective change 
management strategies. Therefore, senior management needs to be aware of these potential 
issues, recognizing and addressing the need for culture change at all levels of the 
organisation. Senior managers also need to develop strategies that are more inclusive and 
emphasize the benefits of culture change so that managers may be less threatened by these 
events. This is difficult to achieve, as illustrated in this research inquiry, since the nature of 
the electric utility management style is essentially top-down and therefore not always 
welcoming or inclusive to new ideas (Hirsh 1989).  
5.9.2 Organisations may not want to change 
These research findings illustrated not only the reluctance of employees to change, but also 
the reluctance of organisations to change. Respondents in the three case studies described 
how their organisations did not embrace, but rather sought alternatives to, industry 
deregulation, either by avoiding the issue by becoming part of a larger entity (East Coast 
Utility) or identifying ways to thwart the regulatory process demanding change (West Coast 
Utility). This research inquiry points out a hard lesson to those practitioners in organisational 
change and strategic management: Sometimes organisations are perfectly content to remain 
as they are and even transformational change may not result in successful outcomes.  
 
Practically speaking, organisations must adapt to change, regardless of how „content‟ they 
may appear to be, if they are to survive. As this investigation illustrated, organisations that 
did not actively seek out adaptation strategies were subsequently acquired through mergers 
and acquisitions as illustrated in the East Coast Case Study. Therefore, organisations will 
change – either proactively or reactively.  
 
This finding also illustrates the effectiveness that reactive change strategies can have on 
change-resistant organisations. For example, those electric utilities that did not desire change 
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were able to then find other strategies, by either being acquired or successfully delaying the 
effects of industry deregulation (West Coast Case Study) until the market conditions changed 
again. Therefore, there are successful reactive change strategies that should be investigated 
more fully in subsequent industry inquiries. 
 
5.9.3 The learning organisation is not an ideal structure for deregulated 
industries 
 
The findings from the three case studies and expert interviews revealed a fundamental flaw in 
the development of this theoretical framework. While the learning organisation may be 
viewed as an „ideal‟ organisation in many competitive industries, it is simply not viewed that 
favourably by organisations that are accustomed to rigid and bureaucratic cultures. Indeed the 
flexibility of learning organisations was viewed with scepticism and suspicion among the 
utility employees. They cannot imagine an electric utility would be able to operate in this 
type of structure, nor do they think it would be an especially appealing place to work. Rather, 
it is important for managers to recognise that employees who are used to operating (and 
perhaps even thriving) in rigid bureaucracies with clear-cut policies and lines of authority 
would likely become overwhelmed and confused with a more flexible organisational 
structure as described by Kotter (1996) and others. Furthermore, in organisations where they 
may be the „survivors‟ from industry downsizing and restructuring, these employees may feel 
even less committed to their companies (Chen and Chen 2008 et al.; O‟Reilly & Chatman 
1986 and Porter et al. 1972).  
 
5.10  Implications for methodology 
There are three methodological implications from this study: a) case study methodology, 
properly applied, can be a rigorous research method, b) exploratory studies are appropriate 
for this type of preliminary investigation and c) expert interviews enhance the overall 






5.10.1  Case study methodology is a rigorous research approach 
 
This research study shows that the case study methodology, conforming to the dictates of a 
realism paradigm, is a suitable and rigorous method for investigation (Perry, Riege & Brown 
1998; Yin 1994). The level of detail collected from the multiple respondents in three separate 
organisations provided for a rich and meaningful data analysis and interpretation. The 
accuracy and construct validity of each case study was enhanced though the triangulation. 
This included reviewing public records (Yin 2003), drawing on „key informants‟ such as 
consultants, government advisors and industry association representatives (Patton 2002; Perry 
1998), or conducting multiple interviews in each organisation (Perry 1998). The individual 
case studies were enhanced by conducting multiple interviews with representatives from each 
selected organisation. Overall, this approach helped to maintain study validity while 
minimizing researcher bias (Miles & Huberman 1994; Yin 2003). 
5.10.2   The exploratory case study is most appropriate for this type of     
introductory inquiry 
Yin (2003) argues that the goal of an exploratory case study is to „develop pertinent 
hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry‟. The three case studies demonstrated the 
value of using this approach, because it allowed the respondents to focus on how 
organisations reacted to the outside events over which they had no control and their 
responses, both internally and externally in the context of organisational change (Yin 2003). 
Given the overall findings from this inquiry, this method was clearly an appropriate approach 
for this type of research inquiry. 
 
5.10.3   The inclusion of in-depth interviews further strengthened the 
research findings 
Beyond triangulation, the in-depth interviews provided a valuable way to explore the deeper 
underlying issues that may not be easily known or recognized by the case study respondents 
(Yin 2003). However, to facilitate analysis, it was critical to ensure that the same study 
protocols were in place. This research inquiry demonstrated the value of using key 
informants, especially when trying to document and understands the content and context of 
the effects of organisational change in the electric utility industry. Therefore, this approach 
should be considered when contemplating additional exploratory case studies. 
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5.11  Implications for future research   
This research inquiry was set up as a way to test whether accepted organisational change 
models and strategic theory were the appropriate mechanisms by which to understand the 
electric utility industry. The results from this study identified several opportunities for 
additional research in the areas of strategic management and organisational change: a) the 
role of organisational change models for deregulating industries, b) the negative 
consequences of organisational change, c)  support for the „Reactor‟ strategy and d) 
alternative approaches for organisations that do not want to change.  
 
5.11.1   The role of organisational change models for deregulating     
industries 
A key finding from this research inquiry was that deregulation did not lead to the 
hypothesized changes in the electric utilities‟ structures, processes, policies and procedures. 
The finding, across several research issues, illustrated the gap that exists between 
organisational theory and operational practice among these three electric utilities. This 
suggests that the current theories and organisational models that attempt to explain 
organisational change simply are not appropriate to the electric utility industry. While many 
organisational change theories view that radical change leads to wholescale organisational 
change at every level (Allaire & Firsirotu 1984; Benjamin & Mabey 1993; Clarke 1994; 
Dawson 1994; Handy 1993; Wilson 1992), the findings from this study suggest that it was 
possible for these organisations to experience transformational change that did not lead to a 
radical restructuring of their fundamental operating structure. While there have been some 
advances made in understanding the nonlinear nature of organisational change, these models 
were still not adequate to address the transformational change documented in these case 
studies. Moreover, the theories advanced by Tushman and Romanelli (1994) provided 
insights regarding episodic change but these models did not fully explain the reactions 
described in the three case studies. This finding suggests that regulated industries, such as 
electric utilities, are not easily explained in the current organisational theories and additional 
research should be conducted to build on the insights gained from both Emmons (2000) and 
Hirsh (1989). Not enough attention has been paid to the effects of change in deregulating 
industries in the U.S., especially the electric utility industry. Therefore this area needs to be 
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investigated more fully, in both organisational change as well as strategic management 
research, specifically exploring more fully the culture of deregulated companies and 
industries.  
 
5.11.2   The negative consequences of change 
Most organisational change is viewed as a force for positive rather than negative change. By 
documenting the challenges and obstacles faced by these three utility organisations as they 
tried to cope with organisational change both internally and externally, these three case 
studies illustrated that change led to negative rather than positive outcomes.  While Mannion 
et al. (2003) and Clayton (2008) identified the barriers and obstacles to institutionalising 
change, these investigations should be expanded to focus more fully on the negative ways in 
which organisations try to thwart organisational change. This research study identifies the 
need to focus more fully on the negative outcomes of organisational change, especially in the 
context of the electric utility industry. Specifically, more research is need to expand upon the 
theories explored by Whittington (1993) about the resistance to change at the managerial 
level as well as exploring how large bureaucratic organisations resist change through crisis 
(such as industry deregulation)  as theorized by Frederickson (1984) and Papadakis et al. 
(1998).  
 
5.11.3   Support for the  Support for the Reactor12  strategy 
 
These findings supported the contention that the reactor strategy, first formulated by Miles 
and Snow (1978), is a valid business strategy (Doty et al. 1993; Pettigrew et al. 1998; Segev 
1989) for organisations to use when facing transformational change, such as documented in 
these case studies. But this theory is not well understood. While it may help to explain the 
strategic responses used by electric utilities after deregulation, this is still an area that 
warrants further investigation, especially in deregulating industries such as the electric utility 
industry.  
 
                                                 
12 While it is amusing to view electric utilities as having a „reactor‟ strategy but to be clear, none of the three 
utilities in these case studies owned nuclear power plants; all were either divested or closed during deregulation.  
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5.11.4   Alternative approaches for organisations that do not want to 
change 
 
While the key assumption from this research inquiry is that some organisations want to 
become learning organisations, this was not true for the three utilities in the case studies. 
There is still much to be learned in understanding managers‟ reactions to change, supporting 
Sastry‟s (1997) finding for organisations experiencing transformational change. Therefore, it 
may be useful to identify if this finding as valid among other utility case studies. The findings 
also suggest that this inquiry should be broadened to include not just additional electric 
utilities but other types of deregulated industries as well. Lastly, it points out that there is a 
need to develop a road map to help organisations that deliberately do not want to evolve into 
an „ideal‟ model, but would be willing to adopt change strategies that are „good enough‟ to 
meet their internal and external needs.  
5.12     Conclusion 
 
This exploratory research into the U.S. electric utility industry provided several key findings 
and conclusions. The three case studies illustrated the difficulties of adjusting to 
transformational change, both internally and externally. The industry experts provided 
additional insight regarding the barriers faced by these utilities in developing a successful 
change strategy – and the shortcomings that resulted from a lack of clear and well-
implemented strategy. Most of all, this research inquiry identified an industry segment – the 
U.S. investor-owned electric utility industry – that had not been previously examined in any 
depth, regarding the nature and effect of organisational change. The findings revealed some 
areas that warrant further investigation, most importantly focusing on the unique nature, 
culture and structure of this industry. Additional research could lead to the greater 
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Major Federal Legislation Affecting the Electric Power Industry  
 
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933  
(Public Law 73-17)  
Under this law, the Federal Government provided electric power to States, counties, municipalities, and 
nonprofit cooperatives. It was the steady continuation of Federal initiatives to provide navigation, flood 
control, strategic materials for national defense, electric power, relief of unemployment, and improvement 
of living conditions in rural areas. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was also authorized to generate, 
transmit, and sell electric power. With regard to the sale of electric power, the TVA is authorized to enter 
into contracts of up to 20 years for sales to governmental and private entities, to construct transmission 
lines to areas not otherwise supplied with electricity, to establish rules and regulations for power sales and 
distribution, and to acquire existing electric facilities used in serving certain areas.  
 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA)  
(Public Law 74-333)  
PUHCA was enacted to remedy utility industry abuses facilitated by the holding company structure. 
PUHCA gave the Securities and Exchange Commission the authority to oversee utility holding companies 
pursuant to the extensive set of regulations provided by the Act.  
 
Federal Power Act of 1935 (Title II of PUHCA)  
(Aug. 26, 1935, Ch. 687, Title II, 49 Stat. 838)  
This Act was passed to provide for a Federal mechanism for interstate electricity regulation.  
 
Rural Electrification Act of 1936  
(Public Law 74-605)  
This Act established the Rural Electrification Administration (REA) to provide loans and assistance to 
organizations providing electricity to rural areas and towns with populations under 2,500. REA 
cooperatives are generally associations or corporations formed under State law. The predecessor to this Act 
was the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of 1935, which performed the same function.  
 
Bonneville Project Act of 1937  
(Public Law 75-329)  
This Act created the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), which pioneered the Federal power 
marketing administrations. The BPA was accountable for the transmission and marketing of power 
produced at Federal dams in the Northwest. In 1953, the BPA first guaranteed the bonds of and a market 
for small energy facilities built and financed by public utility districts.  
 
Reclamation Project Act of 1939  
(Public Law 76-260)  
This Act requires that rates for electric power generated at Federal hydroelectric projects be sufficient to 
recover an appropriate share of annual operation and maintenance costs and an appropriate share of 
construction costs, to include interest charged at a rate of not less than 3 percent.  
Flood Control Act of 1944  
(Public Law 78-534)  




1950. SEPA would sell power produced by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Southeast. It 
also laid the groundwork for the Alaska Power Administration (APA)
b
 in 1967 to operate and 
market power from two hydroelectric plants in Alaska: the Eklutna Project and the Snettisham 
Project. Although the Southwestern Power Administration‟s (SWPA)c authority after World War II came 
from the Flood Control Act of 1944, it was established using the Executive Branch‟s emergency war 
powers authority to satisfy the growing demands from weapons development and domestic needs. This Act 
also demands that rates for electric power be enough to recover the cost of „producing and transmitting 
such electric energy‟.d 
 
First Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1949  
(Public Law 81-71)  
The Act authorized the Tennessee Valley Authority to construct thermal-electric power plants for 
commercial electricity sale.  
 
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 (ESECA)  
(Public Law 93-319)  
This Act allowed the Federal Government to prohibit electric utilities from burning natural gas or 
petroleum products.  
 
DOE Organization Act of 1977  
(Public Law 95-91)  
In addition to forming the Department of Energy (including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), 
this Act provided authority for the establishment of the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) 
e
 and 
transferred power marketing responsibilities and transmission assets previously managed by the Bureau of 
Reclamation to WAPA. WAPA‟s authority was extended through the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984. 
This Act also transferred the other four power marketing administrations (PMAs) – the Southeastern Power 
Administration, the Southwestern Power Administration, the Alaska Power Administration and the 
Bonneville Power Administration – from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Energy.  
 
National Energy Act of 1978  
(Public Law 95-617 - 95-621)  
This Act was signed into law in November 1978 and includes five different statutes: the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), the Energy Tax Act (Public Law 95-618), the National Energy 
Conservation Policy Act (Public Law 95-619), the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act (Public Law 
95-620) and the Natural Gas Policy Act (Public Law 95-621). Passed in the wake of the oil-producing 
nations‟ ban on oil exports to the United States and retail oil price increases, its general purpose was to 
ensure sustained economic growth while also permitting the economy time to make an orderly transition 





Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)  
(Public Law 95-617)  
PURPA was passed in response to the unstable energy climate of the late 1970s. PURPA sought to promote 
conservation of electric energy. Additionally, PURPA created a new class of non-utility generators. 
Utilities are now required to buy power from these small power producers as well as qualified co-
 243 
generators. Further, PURPA gave FERC the authority to order wheeling under the FPA.  
 
Energy Tax Act of 1978 (ETA)  
(Public Law 95-618)  
This Act, like PURPA, was passed in response to the unstable energy climate of the 1970s. The ETA 
encouraged conversion of boilers to coal and investment in co-generation equipment and solar and wind 
technologies by allowing a tax credit on top of the investment tax credit. It was later expanded to include 
other renewable technologies. However, the incentives generally were curtailed as a result of tax reform 
legislation in the mid-1980s.  
 
National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978  
(Public Law 95-619)  
This Act required utilities to develop residential energy conservation plans to encourage slower growth of 
electricity demand.  
 
Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978  
(Public Law 95-620)  
This Act succeeded the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, and extended Federal 
prohibition on the use of natural gas and petroleum in new electric power plants.  
 
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980  
(Public Law 96-501)  
This Act created the Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Council to coordinate the 
conservation and resource acquisition planning of the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA). The Act 
also provides for BPA to purchase and exchange electric power with Northwest utilities at the „average 
system cost‟. Approval of the methodology for determining „average system cost‟ is required. This Act also 
gave BPA the authority to plan for and acquire additional power to meet its growing load requirements.  
 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981  
(Public Law 97-34)  
This Act introduced a new methodology for determining allowable tax depreciation deductions. The new 
methodology, the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), set forth rules enabling taxpayers to claim 
generous depreciation deductions based on the system‟s permitted depreciable life, method and salvage 
value assumptions. The generation, transmission and distribution plants of regulated electric utilities were 
categorized as public utility property. Public utility property under ACRS was assigned relatively long 




Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986 (ECPA)  
(Public Law 99-495)  
This Act was the first significant amendment to the hydro licensing provisions of the FPA since 1935. „The 
amendments have made four principal changes to Part I of the FPA. First, the municipal preference on 
relicensing has been eliminated. Second, the importance of environmental considerations in the licensing 
process has been greatly increased and the role of the State and Federal fish and wildlife agencies are 
expanded. Third, PURPA benefits for hydroelectric projects at new dams and diversions were eliminated 
unless the projects satisfy stringent environmental conditions. Finally, FERC‟s enforcement powers have 
been increased substantially‟.f  
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Tax Reform Act of 1986  
(Public Law 99-514)  
Under this Act, ACRS was replaced with the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS). Under 
MACRS, the disparity in treatment of property between regulated and non-regulated taxpayers was 
eliminated. The investment credit was also repealed. The investment credit of the Federal income tax law 
was a dollar-to-dollar offset against the taxes payable by the taxpayer. The investment credit was available 
for regulated and non-regulated taxpayers and was intended to encourage capital investment by the 
Nation‟s businesses. The credit continues to be of importance to regulated utilities, however, because it is 
generally amortized for rate-making and financial reporting purposes over the regulatory life of the related 
property that gave rise to the credit.  
 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA)  
(Public Law 101-549)  
These Amendments established a new emissions-reduction program. The goal of the legislation was to 
reduce annual sulfur dioxide emissions by 10 million tons and annual nitrogen oxide emissions by 2 million 
tons from 1980 levels for all man-made sources. Generators of electricity will be responsible for large 
portions of the sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide reductions. The program instituted under the Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990 employs a unique, market-based approach to sulfur dioxide emission reductions, 
while relying on more traditional methods for nitrogen oxide reductions.  
 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT)  
(Public Law 102-486)  
This Act created a new category of electricity producer, the exempt wholesale generator, which narrowed 
PUHCA‟s restrictions on the development of nonutility electricity generation. The law also authorized 
FERC to open up the national electricity transmission system to wholesale suppliers.  
    
 
     a
 SEPA markets power in West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee and Kentucky. SEPA is unique from the other marketing authorities 
because it does not own any transmission lines.  
   
b
 The APA and the TVA are the only two Federal marketing organizations that operate their own plants.  
   
c
 SWPA markets power in Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma and Texas.  
   
d
 Energy Information Administration, Financial Statistics of Major U.S. Publicly Owned Electric Utilities 
1994, DOE/EIA-0437(94)/2 (Washington, DC, December 1995), p. 458.  
   
e
 The territory served by WAPA includes 15 Central and Western States of Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah and Wyoming. The WAPA's authority was lengthened through the Hoover Power Plant Act of 1984 
to constrain customer utilities to address certain conservation activities and to retain a part of customers' 
power allocations if they did not follow.  
   
f
 D. J. Muchow and W. A. Mogel, Energy Law and Transactions (Matthew Bender, April 1996), p. 53-
20.  
 
   Note: Although it is not a law, the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), which 
provides that the sale of electricity is sourced for apportionment purposes to the ultimate destination State, 
has been adopted in some form by 44 States from a total of 47 States that impose a corporate income tax. 
Public laws before 1935 were sourced differently than those after 1935. For more information on the power 
marketing administrations, refer to Energy Information Administration, Financial Statistics of Major U.S. 
Publicly Owned Electric Utilities 1994, DOE/EIA-0437(94)/2 (Washington, DC, December 1995).  
    
   Source: This inset is based on information compiled by the Office of Coal, Nuclear, Electric and 
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Alternate Fuels from various documents. These documents include Congressional Quarterly as well as 
others published by the following organizations: the Congressional Research Service, Government 
Institutes, Inc., the Council on Environmental Quality, the General Accounting Office, and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission. Also refer to D. J. Muchow and W. A. Mogel, Energy Law and 
Transactions (Matthew Bender, April 1996).  
 
Source:  Energy Information Administration, Assumptions to the Annual Energy Outlook, DOE/EIA-
0554 (Washington D.C., January 2000).   
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APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM
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Dissertation Topic: 
 Developing a Framework for Change:  
An Examination of the US Electric Industry 
Abstract 
 
This research is designed to achieve the following objectives: 
 
 Identify current changes regarding change management in the electric utility industry in 
the United States; 
 Contribute to the understanding of organisational development theory as it applies to 
regulated businesses, and 
 Provide electric utilities with an effective change management plan to help them as 
they navigate between regulation and competition. 
 
This dissertation will focus on gathering in-depth information in a case study format from 
selected electric utilities and industry experts throughout the United States. The data 
gathered for this study will focus on the following issues: 
 Electric utilities and their response to deregulation, both internally and externally; 
 The estimated effect that deregulation has had on electric utilities, both internally 
and externally;  and 
 What are the ‘key lessons learned’ for utilities to develop more effective change 
management strategies going forward? 
If requested, all information uncovered during this research will be disguised to protect 
confidentiality. In exchange, your organisation will receive an Executive Summary of the 
Research Results and specific conclusions and recommendations to assist your 
organisation in developing effective change management strategies. If you agree to 
participate, please sign and date the release at the bottom of this page: 
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1.0 Expert Interviews Analysis 
To provide additional value and richness to this inquiry, the researcher also conducted a 
series of interviews with experts who had extensive knowledge in either the utility industry 
and/or organisational change. The following table lists the experts and their areas of 
expertise.  
 






E1. S. Coakely   
E2. R. Daft   
E3. W. Emmons   
E4. M. Harrigan   
E5. R. Hirsh   
E6. T. Royal   
E7. P. Van Doren   
  
The interview protocol was similar to the protocol developed for case analysis. However, it 
did allow for a more free-flowing dialogue because, unlike the case studies where the 
respondents were focusing on „telling a story‟ about the deregulation experiences, the experts 
were allowed to provide a broader perspective on these issues. The interviewer also allowed 
these experts to focus more specifically on the areas of the protocol best suited to their unique 




















Table E-2: Research Issues Categorized by Protocol Interview Questions for 
Industry Experts 
 
The next section summarizes the key findings for each research interview based on the 
interviews from these key informants. Not every respondent felt qualified to comment on all 
areas, but the combination of these interviews did provide additional insight into the seven 
research issues posed in this investigation. 
2.0 Expert Analysis of R1 
This analysis is based on the responses to the following question in the interview protocol: 
R1): Research Issue 1: What is the evolution of the US electric utility industry, focusing 




Expert Research Issues 
R1 
What is the evolution of the U.S. electric utility 
industry, focusing particularly on the external 
forces leading to deregulation?  
Q6, Q7, Q8a, Q8b 
 
R2 
How were the managers’ decision-making 
processes affected by deregulation?  
Q1-Q5, Q9, Q10, Q11 
  
R3 
How did deregulation affect the strategic focus 
of these electric utilities?    
Q16, Q17 
R4 
What were the specific mechanisms these 
utilities used to manage change?    
Q13,(Q12, Q14, Q15 for 
specialists only) 
R5 
What are the managers’ perspectives of electric 
utilities as ‘learning organisations’?   
 Q20, Q22, Q23, Q24 
R6 
What are the managers’ perspectives of an 
ideal electric utility in terms of vision, 
commitment and resources?  
 Q18-Q19 
R7 
What is the gap between the current utility and 
ideal utility of the future? 
Q21, Q25 
Questions addressed in R1: 
 
Q6. How long have you been involved in the utility industry, either directly or indirectly?   
Q7. What are your impressions, so far, of deregulation of the Utilities industry? Why? 
Section 2: View of Organisational Change in the Utilities Industry 
Q8. a. What has been the worst aspect of Utilities deregulation?   







These experts provided the following insights regarding deregulation and its effect on the 
electric utility industry.  
 
Although the trend towards electric deregulation had been building for the past 20 years, it 
began in 1995 under pressure from regulators in California and the Northeast. The motivation 
for deregulation was to open up markets, but the electric utilities were radically unprepared 
for the outcomes caused electric utility deregulation. 
 
The goal of electric utility deregulation was to create a competitive market that would 
ultimately benefit both customer and overall society.  
  
Table E-3: Selected Comments Regarding Motives of Deregulation 
Utilities were competitive until 1930... but that changed and there has been a trend towards 
contemporary privatization in the last 20 years. … The essential issue is giving customers 
reliability (E3). 
The restructuring effort began in 1995 based on the correct observance that there could be a 
competitive market in generation that is attached to the transmission … and is a huge public 
good in the externalities. The fight is around the underlying standard market design … a fight 
over wealth implications of private provision of a public good (E7).  
Worst aspect has been the some of the common features in different states … that treated 
residential customers differently. The California political concerns and the legislative flaws of 
incorporating so many different views of so many disparate parties … created an environment 
vs. utilities and focus on getting more money for the environment and energy efficiency. … 
Everyone got something and it was horrible legislation and the market that was created had not 
worked out the flaws. ... This is the focus of Power Loss (E5).  
There is no incentive for states such as Virginia or Southeastern states for deregulation. These 
states have a history and culture of letting the big companies do their thing and created and 
maintained that culture (E5). 
 
However, deregulation ultimately failed because of both the internal and external structure of 
this market. 
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Table E-4: Selected Comments Regarding Outcomes of Electric Utility 
Deregulation 
The motivations for deregulation or reform in certain industries, such as the electric and 
water segments, were fundamentally different and it was so overwhelming that it failed in 
its execution (E3). 
Only one or two utilities have successfully negotiated deregulation. All the utilities in 
California are still in some type of regulatory format (E4). 
All of the utilities are not without a clue. …Southern utilities are good at keeping a stable 
environment. They couldn’t control the restructured world so they changed it (E1). 
Deregulation supposedly created the Energy Policy Act in 1992 but that did not mandate 
national standards and set different approaches for each state. They proceeded with the 
illusion of consumer protection but it inhibited real competition. ...The legislation created 
an environment of going back and motive companies before competition (begins) (E5).   
  
Summary of R1: Deregulation was caused by pressures outside the control of the electric 
utility industry that had been building up based on rising prices and constrained supply. The 
change was from the outside, dictated by organisations and events other than the utilities, 
specifically the commissions, the national and state governments and the large industrial 
customers. However, the outcomes of deregulation have largely been a failure. 
3.0 Expert Analysis of R2 
This section summarises the responses to R2: How were the managers' decision-making 
processes affected by deregulation?  
 
The utility managers were paralysed by the constant changes and stresses associated with 
deregulation, which adversely affected their ability to make decisions. The utilities had to 
deal with a smaller workforce, ill-prepared employees and an incentive scheme that no longer 
R2      
How were the managers’ decision-
making processes affected by 
deregulation?  
Q9-11 
Questions Addressing R2 
Q9.     In your experience, have any Utilities companies successfully negotiated the transition from a   
          regulated to deregulated organisation. If so, which organisation?  What specifically did they do  
          that seemed to make that transition successful? 
Q10.  If not, why do you think that these companies have not yet successfully negotiated the  
         transition from a regulated to a deregulated organisation?   
Q11. Are there examples of companies in other industries that have successfully negotiated the  
        transition from regulated to deregulated organisations?  If so, which companies?  Why do you      
        say that? 
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reflected the market conditions. The result is that they were unable to make decisions fast 
enough to keep up with constant market changes and upheaval.  
  
Deregulation affected these managers‟ decisions regarding how to react to the new 
deregulated environment. As the following comments illustrate, the utility industry struggled 
to react but the managers did not have the appropriate skills sets or knowledge to do so 
successfully. In only rare cases, such as those mentioned below, were the managers able to 
embrace and adjust for this change rather than fight it. 
 
Table E-5: Selected Comments Regarding How Electric Utilities Changed 
Utilities went into paralysed mode (making it) difficult for some management staff (E4). 
Implementation failed because of the lack of human resources. Due to a reduced 
workforce, the employees did not have the expertise to meet the needs and these skills 
may have to be acquired through mergers and acquisitions, and the salary levels have to 
be adjusted. …The vertical disaggregation of the industry also created problems as to 
who’s is in charge and what are the incentives or rewards (E3). 
The managers in some states have been innovative and are using government incentives, 
tax credits, Renewable Portfolio Standards, mandates and other things ... but there is still 




Summary of R2: Overall, these key informants believed that most utilities did not adjust 
well to deregulation, which adversely affected their decision-making capabilities. 
4.0  Expert Analysis of R3 
This section summarizes the key informants‟ impressions regarding R3:  How did 
deregulation affect the strategic focus of these electric utilities? Their impressions were 
captured in the responses to the following questions:  
 
R3 
How did deregulation affect the 






Electric industry deregulation caught the electric utility industry „off balance‟ and, as 
indicated by these expert comments, it was ill-prepared to adjust strategically to the demands 
of a competitive market. Despite these challenges, the responses consolidate around the two 
separate responses to organisational change used by electric utilities. So, in that way, the 
research issue was addressed, just not as originally envisioned. 
 
The utility industry took two very different approaches to deregulation and the organisational 
change that accompanied it: reactive and proactive. Most utilities, according to these experts, 
viewed this change as a negative experience and they responded reactively to the changes 
imposed on them externally, whether from the regulatory environment or their customers. 
 





In the early 1970s, they wanted to build a nuclear plant but the PSC didn’t like the idea ... Ultimately 
the managers figured that if you can’t beat them, join them ... and (it began to) pick up (and some 
utility managers saw) the financial benefits of energy efficiency and building plants (so they began)  
doing energy efficiency for a while helped to drive the price and dividend up 15 percent (E5).  
The utility employees fought restructuring as long as they could but it was inevitable. ... They got the 
best deal they could. They argued to not sell the assets but (the result would be) they could either 
lose control or not be as successful (E4). 
Questions Addressing R3: 
Q16. How would you describe the current status of the utility industry? Are they bureaucratic, 
resistant to change, risk adverse, etc? 
 
Q17. Which theories of organisational change seem most relevant or appropriate to describing the 
transition these companies are still facing? Is it ...  
1. Fine-Tuning: Ongoing, incremental change in your organisation’s strategy, structure, 
people, and processes. 
2. Incremental Adjustment: Distinct, but minor modifications, to your organisation’s 
strategy, structure, and/or processes. 
3. Modular Transformation: Major re-alignment of a department or division within your 
organisation. 
4. Corporate Transformation: Organisation-wide change, characterized by major shifts in 
the organisation’s strategy and structure. 
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A few utilities, however, took a more proactive approach by either embracing deregulation or 
using it to consolidate and strengthen their market position through mergers and acquisitions, 
or by successfully thwarting the plans of regulators by „changing the rules‟. 
 
Table E-7: Selected Comments Regarding R3- Proactive Responses 
NEES, a vertically-integrated utility, anticipated in the early 1990s that the state government 
would eventually adopt legislation substantially reforming the state’s industry, so the 
company took a proactive approach (E3). 
Since the mid to late 1990s, (we) have seen more and more consolidation and merger mania 
to enhance the synergies and economies of scale … and to compete with the new 
competitors. … It has been transformational in states and on small scale utilities. The multi-
state behemoths, that have both regulated and deregulated subsidiaries, have been 
transformed in a certain way. … (It was) externally imposed change (E5). 
The Southern utilities resisted deregulation more effectively than others. Southern utilities got 
off the hook (E4). 
 
 
Summary of R3: The key informants provided two distinct explanations of the ways in 
which the electric utility industry responded strategically to change by taking either a reactive 
or proactive response.  
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5.0 Expert Analysis of R4 
This section summarizes the responses from the key informants for R4: What were the 




Questions 12, 14, and 15 were omitted from these discussions because they were too 
technical for the key informants who did not have an understanding of these organisational 
theories. However, the responses to Q13 were especially insightful, regarding the ways in 
which utilities attempted to manage change.  
 
Table E-8: Selected Comments Regarding R4 
The utilities (were) caught utilities off balance; they were ill-prepared. The (senior 
management’s) lack of foresight regarding the ways in which the respondents would react 
– the technology challenges associated with vertical integration (E3). 
The utilities were never the same (E4). 
We have been understaffed and are still in fire-fighting mode (E1). 
Internally, ‘utilities are risk-adverse and they have defined procedures for doing things their 
own way. Only rarely are utilities cooperative. They want to be left alone (E1). 
The utility had to change from resource acquisition to market transformation and that was a 
change in the perspective of the utility (E1). 
The utility did not effectively communicate what was going on and did not involve other 
stakeholders. It had an inward focus and was not aware. ... It  underestimated the 
importance of outside constituencies (E2),  
 
 
Summary of R4: The key finding from these experts is that the electric utility industry did 
not manage change effectively. The utility industry was fundamentally transformed by 





What were the specific mechanisms 
these utilities used to manage 
change? 
Q13 (Q12, Q14,Q15 were 
omitted) 
Q13: What kind of transformation strategies did Utilities develop, if any, to cope with this  
         large-scale organisational change? 
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6.0 Expert Analysis of R5 
This section summarizes the responses to the key informants‟ impressions regarding R5: 




Some key informants were familiar with the term „learning organisation‟ but all were 
sceptical that the electric utilities could evolve into these types of organisations. The nature of 
a learning organisation is one that focuses on creating innovative change (Daft 2001) by 
cultivating idea champions. Respondent E2 said: 
The idea champion fights to overcome the natural resistance to change to make things happen. 
They provide the time and energy to make things happen. Idea champions come in two types:  
1) technical, the person devoted to pursuing a technical innovation or 2) the management 
champion, the supporter and shield to promote an ideal within the organisation. 
 
A few experts were able to cite examples of electric utilities that had these idea champions or 




What are the managers’ perspectives 
of electric utilities as ‘learning 
organisations’?  
Q20, Q22, Q23, Q24 
Questions Addressing R5: 
Q20:  Do you think this is possible for companies to evolve into this type of organisation? What would 
you call this type of ‘new utility’? 
Q22:  Which companies do you think, if any, will evolve into an ‘ideal’  utility of the future?  Why? 
Q23:  Which companies, if any, do you think will evolve into a ‘likely’  utility of the future?  Why? 
Q24:  Which companies do you think will either stay ‘stuck’ or disappear because they cannot evolve 
and change? Why? 
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Table E-9: Examples of Electric Utilities as Learning Organisations – R5  
Notion of a learning organisation – some have tried it and are trying it. Exelon and John 
Rowe are creative and out-of-the box thinkers, trying to solve the problems. … Learning 
utilities are public utilities, SMUD and co-ops. APPA does a lot of creative stuff. They are 
doing well (E4). 
NEES… and Rowe (had a) great willingness to do things that violated the culture right 
from the start. ... (They were) open-minded enough to take a position that was not 
traditional. ... It was good for management to have people in-house that took opposing 
viewpoints and that is integral to creating ‘transformation agents’. ... The (employees) are 
in the real minorities but they make positive impacts and culturally (E5). 
 
 
However, these experts also observed that the regulatory environment that still controls many 
aspects of these organisations argues against the notion that electric utilities could ever 
evolve into true learning organisations.  
 
 
Table E- 10: Challenges to Electric Utilities as Learning Organisations 
Utilities don’t think about it. (They) regulate to make change see the class in how to 
provide services and lower the bills, focusing on best reliability and best customer 
service and organizing it differently. (A) monopoly is not ready for that (deregulation). … 
(It is) possible to determine what services are provided. …Utilities can be learning 
organisations if the heart is changed. (It's) not hard to buy by reacting to the definition of 
service: who is the customer? (The utilities are) going to make sure that the power is 
there (E1). 
Utilities always had credibility but never had a vision (E4). 
 
 
Summary of R5: These experts believe that electric utilities can evolve into learning 
organisations if they have the appropriate vision, commitment and resources in place to do so. 
However, it appears that most electric utilities are not able to make this transition because 









7.0 Expert Analysis of R6 
This section summarizes the comments focusing on R6: What are the experts’ perspectives 







These experts provided the following insights regarding the ways in which electric utilities 
could develop an ideal utility centred on the basic components of vision, commitment and 
resources. 
 
Vision: In summary, these experts believe that the electric utilities need to articulate the clear 
direction and purpose to its stakeholders, including employees, outlining ways the 
organisation is going to focus on customers rather than electrons.  
R6 
What are the managers’ perspectives 
of an ideal electric utility in terms of 
vision, commitment and resources?  
 Q18-Q19 
Questions Addressing R6: 
Q18. Scenario 1: Ideal utility organisation 
             If you could design the ideal ‘utility of the future’ describe its: 
Vision (specifically): 
 Its mission 
 Leadership qualities required to achieve that vision   
 Commitment 
 Its organisational culture 
 Its long-term outlook   
Resources 
 Infrastructures that need to be in place to accomplish these goals 
 Types of training, support mechanisms, etc. 
Q19. Is there anything else that needs to be included in this ‘ideal utility organisation’? 
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Table E-11: Summary of Comments for R6-Vision 
Vision is based on who understands the target market and studied it… and understands the bid 
idea. ... Prefer the word ‘change champions’ – vision is too lofty an idea. ... Goal and tasks 
should be the focus of change; take a bottom-up approach (E6). 
Need to focus on messages that have meaning for the employees. And translate that into job 
security  (E6). 
Have to determine what the new vision will be … by conducting a vision retreat in which the 
different stakeholders are together and together they create the knowledge required to 
understand the issues (E2). 
The senior management people have to have an understanding. An insight from all the other 
utilities goes through the changes at different levels (E2). 
Have more customer focus and even though we are making significant strides, in a positive way, 
we need to work effectively with non-utility supporters to customers (E1).  
Have to focus on marketing energy resources as the end product (E4). 
The ideal utility has to understand what the free market is about and have a perspective and 
understand the complexity of the markets. Also the culture and organisation have to fit in. ... 
Have to know your market (E1) 
The cultural response is to make the electrons move and need to rethink the business and make 
money from it. …Value pricing is also novel and based on the value of the customer margin … 
Get away from the rule of thumb and have the opportunity to change their ways in theory by 
gaming the system (E5). 
 
 
Commitment: The experts believed that the ideal electric utility organisation would 
demonstrate commitment to its employees by providing long-term investments in the skills 
and resources necessary to do their jobs effectively. 
 
 
Table E-12: Summary of Comments for R6-Commitment 
When there is a company that makes a long-term commitment to its employees and a 
commitment to reinvest like Bell Labs, (that is the type of company that becomes a learning 
organisation) (E3). 
Commitment is important because it buys into the need for change (E6). 
 
 
Resources:  Lastly, it is important to create a culture that encourages risk-taking and 
entrepreneurial behaviour, rather than punishing it. It is also one that focuses on customers 








Table E-13: Summary of Comments for R6-Resources 
Some utility managers, like Exelon’s John Rowe, saw an opportunity ... but the traditional 
utility is not viewing the customer. ... (They’re) used to seeing meters not customers. Enron 
was an innovative company that went too far. It was incredibility entrepreneurial and 
created a culture of risk-taking. If managers want to be successful, they will have to take 
risks and fail ... or they will miss opportunities by not challenging and taking risks (E5).  
It is important (that the utilities are) selling electrons to make revenues but the utilities need 
to figure out how to (identify) performance indicators (focusing) on reliability factors.  … 
(They) need to define the quality of service (E1).       
Implementation is the bitch because you need resources and you have to explain the 




‘Ideal Organisations’: The experts also identified several organisations that embodied the 
qualities of „ideal organisations‟ prior to deregulation: Bell Labs, municipal utilities like 
SMUD and Colorado Springs, Enron, and the New England Electric System (NEES). 
 
Respondent E5 shared some thoughts about Enron evolving into a learning organisation: 
One did and it died, Enron. … I believe that Enron was a learning organisation. …Yes, the 
company has to beat a traditional utility... (and) create virtual utilities. … In the early 1990s, 
Enron developed useful concepts as a virtual company that was light on assets and heavy on 
intellectual capital. It was the anti-utility. 
 
Summary of R6: The experts could identify organisations that exemplified the nature of a 
learning organisation that encompassed the characteristics of a visionary leader, a culture that 
supported and even embraced change, and the appropriate resources to support the 
organisation‟s overall strategy. The experts could provide several examples of organisations 
that exemplified these characteristics, including Bell Labs, Enron and municipal utilities that 
operate in a different regulatory climate.
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8.0 Expert Analysis of R7 
 
This final section of the key informant interviews focused on a gap analysis as summarized in 








Gaps in Vision: The major gaps in vision cited by these experts is the disconnect between 
the utilities that are still clinging to the regulated utility model and those that want to focus 
more directly on other products and services. The experts believe that there is a gap between 
the vision of a deregulated electric utility and the core mission of an electric utility: to 
provide reliable electric power to all customers. Since deregulation changes the fundamental 
mission by focusing on products and services beyond the traditional electric utility‟s role, the 
experts fear that this change will continue to hamper these organisations.   
R7 
What is the gap between the current 
utility and ideal utility of the future? 
Q21, Q25 
Question Addressing R7 
Q21: Scenario 2: Likely Utility of the Future 
Moving from the ideal, what do you think is the likely Utilities of the future in terms of its: 
  Vision (specifically): 
 Its mission 
 Leadership qualities required to achieve that vision   
Commitment 
 Its organisational culture 
 Its long-term outlook    
Resources 
 Infrastructures that need to be in place to accomplish these goals 
 Types of training, support mechanisms, etc. 
 
Q25: Do you have anything else to add that I should consider in pursuing this research? 
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Gaps in Commitment: The major gaps in these organisations are that they still have a 
change-resistant culture that does not reward long-term leadership or a risk-tolerant culture.  
 
Table E-15: Summary of Gaps in Commitment 
Incentives for long-term leadership are gone. Used to have those incentives for making  
decisions that could take 10 or 15 years, like building a nuclear power plant. But that has 
gone away. Now there are no incentives for utilities to take big risks and instead have to 
focus on the regulatory determined ‘rate of return’ (E3). 
Top people think there is no need to change. ... The approach had to be long-term. … 
Often change is much slower and deeper. Success also means long-term planning, 
putting the right people in the right job. Have to create a very different mindset.  … Have 
to create a new environment (E7). 
 
 
Gaps in Resources: The major gap in resources is that these utilities continue to recruit the 
wrong type of employees. Rather than finding employees capable of creating vision and 
creating a new type of culture, these utilities still recruit followers not leaders, and therefore 
will never have the skill sets required to become learning organisations. 
 
 
Table E-16 Summary of Gaps in Resources 
Restructuring occurred in an insular culture that has sought and wanted some culture 
change. …Non-energy financial types didn’t come from the culture (E5). 
The critical gap is finding the right resources and people. The old system was based on 
the premise that the utility company only hired ‘C’ students (E5). 
That was the culture of the utility, not to have leaders, only followers. … The non-
regulatory services end up with the ‘good’ people not the regulated side (E3). 
Need to have better resources in place: Electricity executives based on surveys are 
generally not entrepreneurial, not risk-takers… The world’s best and brightest don’t go to 
work in the U.S. electric industry (E7). 
 
Summary of R7: These experts believe that electric utilities can evolve into learning 
organisations if they have the appropriate vision, commitment and resources in place to do so. 
The vision is one of reliability. This is problematic for a regulated business. The utilities 
are just kind of hanging on (E3). 
There are enormous conflicts. ...The power system engineers are not economists and 
operate in different worlds and are fighting each other. ... It is a struggle for the soul of 
the company. Between engineers and lawyers and economists, no one is answering the 
question … and the engineers, who are focusing on vertical integration, are still in 
charge… There is an intellectual disagreement that needs to be resolved before the 
company sets the MBAs loose. …This fundamental issue has not been resolved (E7). 
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However, it appears that most electric utilities are not able to make this transition because 
they lack true „idea champions‟ in pain who can translate the vision into a new culture that 
embraces change. 
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UTILITY 
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Case Study #1 – East Coast Utility 
 
This case study describes the actions and reactions that Yankee Electric
13
  took as deregulation became 
imminent. With a few years the utility had managed to: 
 
1. Divest itself of its generating assets, which were sold at a substantial premium; 
2. Win regulatory approval to be purchased by a foreign owned firm; 
3. Simultaneously acquire one of its largest competitors, thereby increasing its strong-hold in the 
Northeastern Market; and 
4. Acquire a much larger New York-based utility, effectively tripling its market power. 
 
 
1. Firm Background 
Yankee Electric was selected for this research project for a number of reasons. It was among the first electric 
utilities to divest its generation assets and become an electricity delivery business only. Its merger with United 
Kingdom Power Corporation
14
 (UKPC) was viewed as an opportunity for the owner of a high-voltage 
transmission network in the UK to enter the emerging U.S. electric market while Yankee Electric found a 
company with a broad understanding of operating in a competitive electric market. 
2. Role of Deregulation  
Deregulation caused a corporate shift for a host of major functions both internally and externally. It propelled 
this company to seek ways to be more competitive, which was accomplished through a series of friendly 
mergers and acquisitions. These activities were accelerated by deregulation, as the promise of open markets led 
to a wave of mergers and acquisitions in this industry. The respondents were all affected by deregulation, as 
they experienced change both internally and externally. The merger with the British firm was followed closely 
by a friendly merger with another local electric utility referred to as Northeastern Utilities (NU)
15
. NU was a 
public utility holding company based in New England with a focus on transmission and distribution utilities in 
Massachusetts and Rhode Island. This merger was viewed a way for both Yankee Electric and Northeastern 
Utilities to consolidate operations in New England. The merger created a more efficient transmission and 
distribution company.
16
 In April 2000, the acquisition was completed for approximately $642 million and 
resulted in the one of the largest electric utility systems in the Northeast (Kerber, 1999).  
United Kingdom Power Company also agreed to purchase and Iroquois Electric Company
17
 (IEC) through the 
formation of a new UKPC holding company. IEC is an investor-owned energy services company that provides 
electricity to more than 1.5 million customers across 24,000 square miles in New York and delivers natural gas 
to more than 540,000 customers over 4,500 square miles. It had 7,600 employees.  
The combination created the ninth-largest electric utility in the U.S. with an electric customer base of 
approximately 3.3 million. With the acquisition, UKPC will own and operate the most extensive transmission 
network (by square miles) and be the second largest distribution business (by power delivered) in the 
Northeastern market. 
3. Sources of Evidence 
Once the firm was chosen, the interview participants were selected and the focus of the interview was 
confirmed. The first part describes the process used to select the participants; the second describes the level of 
overall participant experience and the third outlines other sources of evidence used to support the facts in this 
case. 
 
3.1 Participant Selection 
                                                 
13
 The actual name of the organisation has been changed in order to protect the identities of the respondents interviewed in 
this case study. 
14 The actual name of the organisation has been changed in order to protect the identities of the respondents interviewed in 
this case study. 
15 The actual name of this company has been disguised to protect the respondents‟ identity. 
16 Mergers and Acquisitions of Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, EIA Administration,  Chapter 3, 1999  www.eia.gov.  
17 The original name of this company has been disguised to protect the respondents interviewed for this case study. 
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All respondents were either current or former employees, and wished to remain anonymous. They were 
selected based on their positions in the company and experiences with deregulation. Three respondents 
were in senior management and one was in middle management. 
 
3.2 Participant Experience 
The respondents interviewed for this case study had a long history with Yankee Electric prior to the move 
into a competitive electric market. As a result of these organisational changes, the respondents changed 
positions or left the company. However, since they were involved in Yankee Electric‟s operations both 
before and after deregulation, they can speak authoritatively to the changes this electric utility faced. 
 
3.3 Other Evidence Available 
In addition to the participant interviews, articles pertaining to deregulation in New England were reviewed 
and listed in Appendix D. The list of supporting data provides additional sources of information that were 
used to inform the case study and support the interviews conducted in October and November 2004. 
 
4. Experience with Organisational Change   
The consensus among the respondents was that Yankee Electric experienced „corporate transformation‟. The 
organisational change affected every aspect of the corporation‟s functions. At the same time the senior managers 
were trying to find a buyer for the electric utility, the senior management also began a comprehensive corporate-
wide organisational restructuring.    
 
The respondents described the management process as a mix between „Directive‟ and „Coercive‟ change. The 
strategy came down from the very top and that was coercive; it was constantly refined in strategic positioning. 
 
4.1  Strategies Initiated  
The changes within Yankee Electric were profound. These employees were forced to look at their jobs in a 
whole new way. Some had to re-interview for positions that they had held for years. The company also 
continued to reorganize as it tried to synthesize the various companies acquired in the mergers into a 
cohesive company. 
 
4.2  Change Affecting Mission and Strategy  
The respondents evaluated the company‟s mission and strategy, organisational structure and human 
resources management on a five-point scale where a „1‟ rating meant they „Strongly Disagreed‟ with the 
statement, while a „5‟ meant they „Strongly Agreed‟ with the statement. 
 
The respondents believed that the company did a good job of organizing the tasks and responsibilities into 
specific and defined roles average rating, while they scored much lower on the other aspects related to 
conveying the corporation‟s mission and strategy. See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of these findings. 
 
4.3  Change Affecting Organisational Structure  
The changes included corporate reorganisation and restructuring, changing the incentive structure for the 
sales force and realigning the functions of different departments. The respondents gave the highest marks to 
Yankee Electric‟s „defining its mission clearly‟ and the lowest marks to actually deploying the appropriate 
resources and an organisational culture to meet its mission. 
Internal Power Struggles: Yankee Electric created two separate business units. The wholesale side 
consisted of the generation and distribution functions, and the retail distribution company. The 
rationale was to focus on those parts of the business in a way that had never been done before. But 
these changes caused internal friction between competing departments. 
 
British culture clash: Being acquired by a British firm created additional tensions from both sides. 
The American employees perceived a tremendous difference between British and American business 
practices. There was friction after the merger but the American firm lost control of the website, internal 
communications system and accounting system, and there were „new‟ rules. In fact, the British firm 
was much more rules-oriented that the Americans were accustomed.  
 
The cultural differences were so severe that the British firm had to „build a dictionary of British vs. 
American English with new symbols‟, so the employees on both sides of the Atlantic could 
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communicate effectively with each other. The headquarters were also located in Britain, which led to 
additional internal frustration. The respondents believed that their company had just become a „cash 
cow‟ for the UK instead of a valued asset.  
 
Cultural Issues with Northeastern Utilities: The merger with NU was seen more as a pairing of two 
very similar cultures. In fact, the former utility executives viewed the merger with NU as joining forces 
with a younger sibling.  
 
Cultural Issues with Iroquois Electric Association: The acquisition of Iroquois Electric Association 
(IEA), however, was anything but smooth. The acquisition moved the company into a whole new 
direction; the company became more and more directive over time. IEA had a different internal culture 
that was much more rigid and controlling compared to the old YE. The cultural differences were most 
apparent in the utilities‟ relationship with their regulators, a critical group to cultivate during the era of 
deregulation. IEA did not work well with regulators and that created additional problems and internal 
friction. In retrospect, these former employees believed that the merger with IEA was ill-conceived.  
 
4.4 Human Resources  
Yankee Electric received the highest ratings for „specifying performance criteria‟ and „has a well-defined 
reward/incentive program‟. However, it received lower marks for „staffing appropriately to meet current 
and future need‟ and „manages succession politics effectively‟. The mergers and acquisitions led to 
corporate restructuring and employee cutbacks of approximately 14 percent. As part of first-round 
restructuring, YE completed an entire overhaul of all corporate jobs in which everyone had to reapply for 
their positions. Ultimately, the reorganisation led to the creation of 100 new positions and YE used this as 
opportunity to create a more diverse workforce. This hiring effort was successful and more than 50 percent 
were women or minorities.  
 
The company had another round of reorganisations after the sale of its generating company in 1997.and began to 
separate out the generation staff from the rest of the company. This led to the elimination of approximately 
1,500 jobs out of 5,000 employees and affected all those employees involved in the generation company. YE 
also cut another 300 to 400 employees from its service company and began outsourcing these functions instead. 
The former CEO described YE workforce as conservative, technical-type workers who ask how to do the job 
right, but do not know how to do the job the way the customer wants it. He said this staff did not have an 
adequate set of cultural attitudes for a changing world. 
5. Utilities as Learning Organisations  
None of the respondents were aware of the term „learning organisation‟ until it was defined. Once made aware 
of the term, these respondents believed that the concept would work in private markets, but doubted its 
effectiveness in the electric utility industry. This was due, in large part, to the role that regulators still play in 
defining the operational structure of investor-owned electric utilities. 
 
In addition, another critical barrier for these utilities to overcome in developing into learning organisations is 
their inability to attract and retain the right kind of staff. In order to become a learning organisation, a utility 
needs to hire new employees and give them room to learn, grow in their jobs and make mistakes.  
 
 
6.  Electric Utility Scenarios 
6.1  ‘Ideal’  Electric Utility Organisation of the Future 
According to these respondents, they believed that their old organisation, the one prior to deregulation and 
industry restructuring, was the ideal. The effect of organisational change, through the merger and 
acquisitions, was to replace their old culture with a new one that was much more rigid, inflexible and 
bureaucratic. Other ideal organisations cited by these respondents included Efficiency Vermont, a public-
private partnership that provides energy and efficiency services to citizens state-wide. 
 
Vision: Yankee Electric had one of the most visionary chief executives within the utility community. 
This vision was the catalyst that drove both the acquisition by UKPC and also the mergers with NU 
and IEA.  
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When he left, Yankee Electric also lost most of its vision. This loss of vision was most clearly 
illustrated in the acquisition of IEA.  
 
Commitment: The ideal electric utility of the company will be less engineering-oriented. The ideal 
electric utility would also allow its employees to make mistakes. The ideal organisation would also be 
committed to being a good corporate citizen, much as YE was. 
 
Resources: There would also be a strong sense of teamwork, all features of the original YE before 
deregulation and the subsequent mergers. The ideal electric utility will have geographic boundaries that 
can be served though an infrastructure focused on customer satisfaction. The model should be 
municipal-employee owned utility that is focused on serving customers.  
 
6.2  ‘Likely’ Electric Utility Organisation of the Future 
These respondents believed that the new corporate structure and identity, created through the merger, 
acquisitions and corporate-wide restructuring has created the „likely‟ utility of the future. Its characteristics 
include: 
 
Vision: A vision focused on achieving the appropriate organisational efficiencies to maximize profits 
and identify other market opportunities.  
 
Commitment: Short-term commitment rather than a longer-term commitment to employees. The era 
of nepotism and the „old boys‟ network has been replaced with a more business-like focus on 
employees who manage effectively. 
 
Resources: The employee skill sets will be business-oriented, rather than technically-oriented and 
support the overall corporate goals. There will also be a more diverse workforce, including more 
minorities and women in positions previously held by men. 
 
 
Sources of Evidence 
1. Interviewee participants – current titles 
1- Principal, Energy Consulting Firm, Middle Management 
2- Former Vice President, Senior Management 
3- Former Vice President for Regulatory Affairs, Senior Management 
4- Director of Evaluation, Non-profit energy organisation, Middle Management 
 
  
2. Organisation-focused secondary literature 
Deregulator Process, Governance Structures and Efficiency: The U.S. Electric Utility Sector, Year 
2003 Paper 3, Magali A., Delmas , Yesim Tokat Y., Institute for Social, Behavioral, and Economic 
Research ISBER Publications, University of California, Santa Barbara, [Online] Available: 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/isber/publications/3, [Accessed: 3 June 2007], Copyright 2003.  
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Case Study #2 – Midwest Electric Utility 
 
This case study describes the response to electric utility deregulation by an investor-owned electric utility, Great 
Lakes Electric (GLE)
18
, when this Midwestern state decided to restructure its electric utility market. This 
restructuring caused the company to: 
 
1. Divest itself of all non-utility assets; 
2. Sell its transmission operations to a state-run organisation;  
3. Expand its position in the market through several acquisitions; and 
4. Exchange its homespun culture for a more button-up corporate approach. 
 
As a result of the industry restructuring and its merger, the company was renamed Great Lakes Energies. 
 
 
1. Firm Background 
Great Lakes Electric (GLE) was selected because it represented an electric utility that started, but did not 
complete, deregulation. However, the utility used deregulation as a catalyst to reorganise and restructure the 
company, divest itself of non-core businesses and completely transform its utility organisation‟s culture.  
  
 2. Role of Deregulation  
The regulators in this Midwestern state wanted to be at the forefront of the drive for electric utility deregulation 
in the United States. At first they adopted a „me-too‟ attitude toward electric utility deregulation, but pursued it 
in a rather cautious manner. There was a push – led by the state legislatures and the leaders of the large IOUs – 
for deregulation, which led to a compromise. The utilities had to shed their non-utility operations and focus 
instead on increased generation capacity. This state does not have enough generation to keep up with demand, 
so the commission focused on developing new infrastructure, specifically generation plants, in a way that was 
fair to the other utilities, including the small municipalities and rural electric cooperatives. For a more thorough 
discussion on the effect of electric utility restructuring in this state, see Appendix D.  
 
3.  Sources of Evidence 
Once the firm was chosen, the interview participants were selected and the focus of the interview was 
confirmed. The first part describes the process used to select the participants; the second describes the level of 
overall participant experience, and the third outlines other sources of evidence used to support the facts in this 
case. 
  
3.1 Participant Selection 
All of the respondents were either current or former employees, and wished to remain anonymous. They 
were selected based on their positions in the company and experiences with deregulation. Two respondents 
were in senior management and three were in middle management. 
 
3.2  Job responsibilities 
Three are either current or former utility employees and two were directly involved in the utility 
deregulation activities in the state commission or as an advocate against deregulation. Their job 
responsibilities continue to focus on energy efficiency and energy advocacy. One respondent worked on the 
Citizens Utility Board as an attorney advising against deregulation, and others worked on a retail access 
task force working closely with the senior management of all the investor-owned utilities in the state. 
  
 3.2 Participant Experience 
The respondents have experience in the electric utility industry ranging from 19 to 30 years; the average 
length of time spent in this industry as 25 years. These respondents represented a variety of viewpoints 
within the electric utility industry.  
 
3.4 Other evidence available 
                                                 
18
 The actual name of the organisation has been changed in order to protect the identities of the respondents 
interviewed in this case study. 
 272 
In addition to the participant interviews, additional articles pertaining to deregulation in this state were 
reviewed and listed in Appendix D. The list of supporting data provides additional sources of information 
that were used to inform the case study and support the interviews conducted in 2006 and 2007. 
 
 
4. Experience with Organisational Change   
Most respondents described this organisational change as a corporate transformation, characterized by major 
shifts in the organisation‟s strategy, structure, systems, processes, etc. One respondent described it as „modular 
transformation‟, defined as a major re-alignment of a department or division. In all cases, the respondents 
indicated that this organisational change was widespread and confusing.  
 
4.1 Strategies initiated  
The utility was ordered to separate the transmission from the generation operations and then spin off the 
transmission company into a separate entity. The new structure required the utilities to „rip out the middle‟ 
of the company, which led to a massive corporate restructuring and reorganisation. But it was done without 
any clear communication or direction from senior management. The atmosphere, which was already 
described as „antagonistic‟, became even more so during this period. There were massive layoffs, and all 
employees had to reapply for their jobs. As one former utility manager said, „People had no clue and lived 
in constant fear‟.  
 
This corporate restructuring also led to a failed merger attempt with a neighbouring utility and a successful 
merger with another local utility, which doubled the size of the utility and expanded its overall operational 
scope. After the failed merger, the Board decided to change its leadership and brought it an „outsider‟ who 
had a completely different management style. This also led to a name change from Great Lakes Electric to 
Great Lakes Energies.  
 
The new organisation was formed as a way to gain regional, and eventually national, clout. The combined 





All the respondents viewed this change as coercive in that it was forced by the senior managers. The layoffs 
were handled in an especially cruel manner; employees from a division or department were invited to an 
off-site „retreat‟, only to be fired.  
 
There have been at least three examples of organisational change within the utility in the past 10 years. 
Case study respondents said that the new leadership and management style „turned the company upside 
down‟ and led to major readjustments and realignment, including a staff freeze and a cut of 10 to 15 percent 
of all utility management positions.  
 
Four of the five respondents viewed these strategies as ineffective. The focus changed from serving the 
community to selling more power. It focused on a more business-like approach. A current utility employee 
described this shift as „a 180-degree difference from the collaborative and collegial atmosphere that had 
been in place prior to the restructuring, when the CEO was approachable. Now, the new CEO has a “top-
down, my way or the highway” approach that doesn‟t fit well and there is discontent‟ within the 
organisation. Some employees could not adjust and left. In his view, this new style is a „step backwards‟ 
from the way they were prior to the reorganisation and industry restructuring.   
 
The GLE respondents were also asked to evaluate the company‟s mission and strategy, organisational 
structure and human resources management at the company on a five-point scale where a „1‟ rating meant 
they „Strongly Disagreed‟ with the statement, while a „5‟ meant they „Strongly Agreed‟ with the statement. 
 
4.2 Change Affecting Mission and Strategy  
Overall, the respondents gave GLE an average rating of 2.8, believing that the company did not define its 
mission and deploy appropriate resources to accomplish its mission. The respondents reported lower ratings 
on the other aspects related to conveying the corporation‟s mission and strategy. See Chapter 4 for a full 
discussion of these findings. 
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One former utility manager explained that there were conflicting objectives in place, and the corporate 
mission was interpreted differently by various departments or divisions, often in contradictory ways. 
 
4.3 Change affecting Organisational Structure  
The respondents indicated that GLE was most effective at balancing power among the groups, with an 
average rating of 3.6. But the respondents gave much lower scores to the other aspects that evaluated the 
effectiveness of its organisational structure, which is fully described in Chapter 4. The organisation was 
further hampered by its inability to change its structure, based on the legislation put in place that did not 
allow the organisation to „evolve‟. There was very little flexibility.  
 
The change in focus was most noticeable in the emphasis on meeting financial objectives. It was very task-
oriented, rigid and focused on „Wall Street not Main Street‟.  There was little communication between and 
among departments. One former employee described the organisation as being arranged in silos. There was 
also a pecking order in how departments ranked with senior management and that affected the 
organisational structure.  
  
4.4 Human Resource Management  
The company also received relatively low ratings regarding human management issues. While employees 
seem to have a clear understanding of the ways in which employee performance is measured, most of the 
other issues concerning human resources are still lagging. For example, none of the employees believed that 
GLE handled succession politics effectively. Jobs were expendable after the restructuring, since the focus 
was on only being number one in customer satisfaction, which favourably affected the company‟s stock 
price. A full discussion of these findings is in Chapter 4.  
 
 The respondents also identified two other problems: 
   
Engineering-oriented corporate culture: The utility had an „engineering mindset‟ that is closed and 
structured. Everything is flow-charted, but that culture does not work, in view of the changes in the 
industry. The utility continues to hire employees that reinforce this „broken‟ culture. 
  
Cronyism: The new CEO also changed the organisation‟s fundamental culture. The culture, prior to 
the industry restructuring, recognized the importance of energy efficiency and renewable energy. The 
new CEO does not have the same appreciation, which creates a tension. As one employee, whose 
responsibility is to develop renewable energy projects as required by the state commission, said, „My 
CEO doesn‟t believe in the job I do‟. 
 
The new CEO also brought in his „cronies‟ from his previous company as his top advisors. As several 
respondents observed, these employees do not have an understanding or appreciation of the company‟s 
history and mission to serve the community.  
 
 
5.  Utilities as Learning Organisations 
None of the respondents had heard the term „learning organisation‟. All of them doubted if this structure would 
be appropriate to the electric utility industry.  
 
5.1 Barriers to becoming a Learning Organisation 
The respondents viewed utilities as „least likely‟ to become learning organisations, citing the following 
barriers: 
  
1.  The organisational structure is too big and slow to change. As a current utility manager said, „It 
is a  
 Leviathan organisation and it is hard to get more agile and respond to changes‟. 
 
2.  The utility does not have a strategic focus. These respondents believed that learning organisations  
have to be strategic and take the long-term view. However, the focus in this organisation is to 
maximize profits for the next quarter, which is a deterrent to long-term strategic planning. One 
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respondent said that the utility was evolving into a learning organisation prior to the merger. After 
the merger, the company took a „headlong rush in the opposite direction‟. 
 
3.  The operating environment precludes this organisational structure. Utilities have to be stable 
and  
reliable, and this is why they were regulated initially. A learning organisation structure does not 
allow for a stable and reliable infrastructure, but rather one that is constantly changing and evolving.   
 
4.  The utility continues to use outdated theories, behaviours and infrastructure. This is reinforced 
by  
the view that the organisation is „stuck‟ in an engineering mind-set, and continually reinforces that 
behaviour. The utility is also still using operating and distribution equipment from the 1940s and 
50s, which makes it even harder to adapt to an ever-changing market.  
 
5.  Utilities are resistant to change. The respondents observed that these organisations are not focused 
on  
changing the structure to benefit the employees, but rather view reorganisation and restructuring as 
a cost-cutting approach. Therefore, the only change they experience is the negative effects 
associated with layoffs and cutbacks, without any progress made towards opening communications 
and creating a flatter organisational structure. 
 
6.  Change is driven externally, not internally. As the interviewed illustrated, outside pressures led 
to the  
reorganisation and restructuring that is the focus of this case study. The change was driven by 
national and legislative priorities rather than an internal drive to improve the company. These 
organisations are hesitant to implement change proactively. 
 
7.  The utility has lost focus on the customer. Removing the transmission function from the utility  
created a „hollow core‟ and further distanced the utility from the customers. It is now focused on 
selling power in the open markets, and making profits on the financial side of the house. 
 
  
6. Electric Utility Scenarios 
These respondents believed that that it would be difficult in today‟s environment for an electric utility to achieve 
the ideal. Several believed that the industry restructuring, caused by the attempted deregulation and subsequent 
merger and organisational restructuring, thwarted any chance for this utility to become ideal. Rather, it had the 
opposite effect by destroying the culture, vision, and sense of purpose that these utility employees felt before 
reorganisation. The respondents indicated that one municipal utility, Madison Gas & Electric, had come close to 
becoming an ideal utility organisation. But this is not a model that would be easy for investor-owned utilities to 
adopt.  
 
6.1 ‘Ideal’ Electric Utility Organisation of the Future 
Vision: The vision of this type of organisation would be wider and deeper. It would need to have a 
global perspective. More importantly, this perspective needs to be spread among the senior 
management team, rather than rest with just the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The ideal utility would 
have a visionary leader „whose heart is in the right place‟, one who has a commitment to the 
community and public service, rather than just the corporate bottom line. Its focus is that employees, 
customers and the community are all equally important to the overall corporate mission. 
 
Commitment: The ideal utility would also have to back up this vision with employees who are 
allowed „to push the envelope and be accepted‟. These employees will also have permission to fail. The 
ideal future utility employees may be outsiders who are „thought leaders‟ who can provide a different 
perspective and experience.  
 
Resources: The focus of the utility resources will be on the „greater good‟, an approach that is used by 
MG&E. The ideal utility knows and understands its market niche, and plays to that niche by 
establishing a strong and visible community presence. The ideal utility will also be committed to 
developing infrastructure to support renewable and energy efficiency projects, rather than focusing on 
just building additional generation plants. 
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6.2 ‘Likely’ Electric Utility Organisation of the Future 
None of the respondents believe that investor-owned utilities will evolve into the ideal. Rather they 
believe that these electric utilities will continue to focus on the short-term profit orientation dominated 
by Wall Street.  
 
Vision: The investor-owned utilities will continue to be hamstrung between the demands of short-term 
profitability that is favoured by Wall Street and the requirements to make large and long-term 
investments in power plants. Therefore, these respondents believe that the „likely‟ utilities will follow 
in the GLE model that focuses on a CEO-dominated culture that is reinforced by senior management, 
who are focused strictly on the short-term benefits. They do not believe there will be very many 
visionary CEOs at these utilities. 
 
Commitment: The utilities will make commitments only as required. There will no longer be the 
commitment of a lifetime job at a utility, as these organisations will be in constant change and turmoil. 
Rather, they will do what they have to but are no longer interested in „playing nice‟ with the 
Commission.  
 
Resources: The utilities will be focused on selling more electricity and therefore cultivate financial, 
rather than engineering, resources. The focus will no longer be on customers, but rather maximizing 
profits through efficiencies in generation as well as additional mergers and acquisitions to improve 
their market power. These employees will not have an understanding of the public service side of the 
electric utility industry, nor an appreciation for its history in the communities they serve. One 
respondent described the likely utility of the future as „sterile‟. 
 
 
 Sources of Evidence 
1. Interviewee participants – current titles 
1) Energy efficiency manager, Middle Management 
2) Executive Director of Non-Profit Agency, Senior Management 
3) Engineering and Energy Efficiency, Senior Management 
4) Utility Industry Attorney, Middle Management 
5) Former utility manager, Middle Management 
 
2. Organisation-focused secondary literature 
 
Newman, J., ---------- Utility Companies Plan Merger, 28 June 1999; Knight Ridder/Tribune Business 
News; 
 
--------Offers Plan to Spend More on Power Plants, Keep Regulation, 2/23/2001; Knight 
Ridder/Tribune Business News; By Lee Hawkins Jr., Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Knight 
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Case Study #3 – West Coast Utility 
This case study examines the effects that deregulation had on the employees in one particular department of a 
large investor-owned utility headquartered in California. This department provides a unique vantage point to 
examine deregulation since it is the only department in the organisation that straddles both the regulated and 
non-regulated aspects of the organisation. 
 
1.  Firm Background 
The Western Electric and Gas Company
20
 (WEGC) was selected for this research project for a number of 
reasons. It is one of the oldest and largest combination electric and natural gas companies in the United States. 
This company has approximately 20,000 employees and serves more than 12 million customers in a 70,000 
square-mile service territory. It is regulated by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), which is 
directly responsible for overseeing the utility‟s transition from a monopoly to a competitive energy provider. 
WEGC‟s experience and response to electric deregulation was consistent with other California organisations 
facing deregulation at the same time. The firm was also selected based on the researcher‟s professional 
knowledge of the organisation and its structure, and contacts with employees at both the senior and middle 
management.  
 
 2. Role of Deregulation  
Deregulation was the catalyst for the organisational change that is the focus of this investigation. A brief 
summary of deregulation in California is provided in Appendix D. The respondents described the changes 
caused by deregulation as completely demoralizing to the entire organisation. Deregulation affected every 
department and employee, leading to widespread layoffs and a complete restructuring of the entire organisation. 
These effects and the organisation‟s responses to this widespread change were the focus of the investigation. 
 
3.  Sources of Evidence 
Once the firm was chosen, the interview participants were selected and the focus of the interview was 
confirmed. The first part describes the process used to select the participants; the second describes the level of 
overall participant experience and the third outline s other sources of evidence used to support the facts in this 
case. 
 
3.1 Participant Selection 
All of the respondents were either current or former employees, and wished to remain anonymous. They 
were selected based on their positions in the company and experiences with deregulation. Three of these 
respondents were in senior management and two were in middle management. 
 
3.2 Participant Experience 
These employees have worked for the company for a significant period of time, ranging from six to 22 
years, with an average of 13 years. These respondents have developed a significant level of understanding 
of the company and its operational culture, both before and after the deregulation and restructuring in the 
late 1990s.  
 
3.3 Other evidence available 
In addition to the participant interviews, additional articles pertaining to deregulation in California were 
reviewed and listed in Appendix D. The list of supporting data provides additional sources of information 
that were used to inform the case study and support the interviews conducted in August 2004. 
 
 
3.4 Experience with Organisational Change   
                                                 




The respondents described their experiences with deregulation as being in constant change with no 
permanent infrastructure. All of these respondents viewed this change as „constant, unending change always 
in overhaul, great turmoil, starting in the mid 1990s‟.  
 
 
4. Experience with Organisational Change   
As a result of deregulation, the organisation had to reformulate its entire organisational structure, create new 
jobs and realign others.  
 
4.1 Strategies initiated  
Two WECG employees believed that the change was implemented by management in a „coercive‟ manner; 
managers forced or imposed change on key groups within the organisation. Another employee explained 
that the change at the top of the company was decided in collaborative, decision-making style. However, 
when a decision was made, it was then implemented through a coercive style. He observed that the 
company implied the change was a „common vision‟ but it really was a decision directed from the top and 
forced on the lower levels of the company. 
 
One employee admitted that the collaborative approach may not have been effective, given the sheer size of 
this organisation. She said that the collaborative change style was not effective in her own department. 
Another respondent describe the change an „Incremental Adjustment: Distinct, but minor modifications, to 
the organisation‟s strategy, structure, and/or processes‟. 
 
4.2 Change Affecting Mission and Strategy  
The WECG respondents were also asked to evaluate the company‟s mission and strategy, organisational 
structure and human resources management on a five-point scale where a „1‟ rating meant they „Strongly 
Disagreed‟ with the statement, while a „5‟ meant they „Strongly Agreed‟ with the statement. 
 
Overall, the WECG respondents believed that the company did deploy appropriate resources to accomplish 
its mission, with an average rating of 4.0. But the respondents reported lower ratings on the other aspects 
related to conveying the corporation‟s mission and strategy. See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of these 
findings. 
 
 4.3  Change affecting Organisational Structure  
The respondents indicated that WECG was most effective at integrating roles into organisational structure 
to best meet its goals, with an average rating of 3.6. However, these respondents gave much lower scores to 
the other aspects that evaluated the effectiveness of its organisational structure, which is fully described in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Failure to Communicate: The employees also pointed out that the WECG change strategies were not 
always effectively conveyed to lower-level employees.  
 
Internal Power Struggles: The change forced upon WECG also created internal power struggles at all 
levels within the company. This company tended not to forgive its employees for any previous 
missteps. An entire department was put in the „dog house‟ for a manager‟s mistakes, illustrating the 
risk-adverse corporate culture embedded throughout this organisation. 
 
No time for planning: WECG did not develop any orderly processes for implementing change in the 
organisation. It was so busy reacting to the regulatory changes that the company put little emphasis on 





 4.4 Human Resource Management  
The company also received relatively low ratings regarding human management issues. While employees 
seem to have a clear understanding of the ways in which employee performance is measured; most of the 
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other issues surrounding human resources are still lagging. For example, none of the employees believed 
that WECG handled succession politics effectively. A full discussion of these findings is in Chapter 4. 
 
The respondents also described another of challenges facing WECG with respect to its human resources 
issues. 
Aging workforce: The first major issue is an aging workforce. According to the company estimates, 
nearly 50 percent of all employees will be eligible for retirement in the next three to five years. While 
this creates a tremendous opportunity to fundamentally reshape WECG‟s corporate culture, it also 
indicates that this is a deeply entrenched culture, highly resistant to change. As employees retire or 
leave WECG, their core knowledge and expertise is also lost. This is of particular concern if there is 
not an orderly transfer of knowledge between new and veteran employees. 
 
Nepotism: WECG also has a history of nepotism in its hiring practices. This was something that was 
even encouraged as a way to maintain control and keep its culture intact. This nepotism has served to 
reinforce the old corporate culture and made the organisation more resistant to change.  
 
Need for new skill sets: Corporate restructuring and deregulation also created the need at WECG for a 
new kind of employee, one who is relationship-oriented rather than technically-oriented. These new 
employees also had to be much more business focused, with an ability to think strategically and 
develop long-term objectives. 
 
 
5.     Utilities as Learning Organisations 
 
5.1  Awareness of Learning Organisations 
None of the respondents were aware of the term „learning organisation‟. Once it was explained, these 
respondents believed that there were organisations that could become learning organisations in the private 
sector, but it would be difficult, if not impossible, for electric utilities to adopt this type of organisational 
structure. Only one respondent believed that electric organisations may, one day, achieve this type of 
structure.  
 
5.2  Barriers to Becoming a Learning Organisation 
The respondents cited several major barriers that would prevent investor-owned electric utilities from 
becoming a learning organisation: 
 Having to change the current business model for electric utilities, which relies on a limited and 
partially regulated structure;  
 Developing a workforce that is capable of multi-tasking and able to work in a more chaotic 
environment; and 
 Changing the overall conservative culture of the electric utility industry. 
 
5.3  Recommendations for becoming a Learning Organisation  
The respondents said that WECG would have to incorporate the following elements into becoming a 
learning organisation in the future: 
• Obtain permission from the public utilities commission to operate in this manner; 
• Recruit corporate leaders who are committed to making corporate transformation; and 
• Adapt the elements of this model that makes the most sense for utilities, suggesting that some parts 
of this model may not be appropriate for the still-regulated parts of the utility company. 
 
 
The model of a learning organisation was one the utility executives felt best described the types of 
resources that would be needed in utilities of the future: 
 The learning organisation is a great model for electric utilities …but it is not going to be an easy 
transition. … We need to have a creative /innovative/brainstorming utility that has the ability to have 




6. Electric Utility Scenarios 
  
6.1‘Ideal’  Electric Utility Organisation of the Future 
Vision: The respondents described the ideal electric utility‟s vision in terms of both articulating a 
mission and also developing the leadership qualities necessary to achieve that vision. The elements of 
this vision include defining clear-cut goals, being focused on customers and establishing clear 
communication within the organisation that fosters openness. 
 
Commitment: These employees also described the ideal level of commitment that will be required in 
the utility of the future. One of the most important issues will be to put systems in place that foster 
creativity and innovation. It would also encourage „learning moments‟ that allow employees the ability 
to ask and answer questions. This organisation would also encourage employees to learn new skills and 
work in different areas. 
 
Resources: The respondents indicated that the most important resources in the ideal utility are the 
employees who will be knowledgeable, creative and innovative. Most importantly, this employee will 
be able to multi-task efficiently. In the future, ideal utilities will need to develop the information 
technology (IT) resources necessary to manage complex utility operations. The organisational culture 
would also have to change and not be focused on „nepotism‟ but rather open and inclusive. 
 
 6.2  ‘Likely’ Electric Utility Organisation of the Future 
Vision: The respondents described the „likely‟ electric utility‟s vision in terms of both articulating a 
mission and also developing the leadership qualities necessary to achieve that vision. These elements 
included focusing more on the business issues and accountability, and customer satisfaction.  
 
Commitment: These employees also described the likely level of commitment that will take place in 
these organisations. This level of commitment is viewed as one in which senior management will have 
better responses to crisis and be able to communicate effectively with employees. These senior 
managers will also look more actively for ways to incorporate feedback and suggestions from both 
customers and employees. 
 
Resources: The respondents indicated that they believe electric utilities in the future will likely move 
to hiring staff with broader skill sets, which are important when communicating with critical 
stakeholders. 
 
Sources of Evidence 
1. Interviewee participants – current titles 
 
1) Supervisor of Monitoring and Evaluation, Senior Management 
2) Senior Policy Analyst, Senior Management 
3) Evaluation Manager, Middle Management 
4) Evaluation Manager, Middle Management 
5) Director of Evaluation, Senior Management 
  
2. Organisation-focused secondary literature 
„A Congressional Budget Office Paper, Causes and Lessons of the California Electricity Crisis‟,  
Congressional Budget Office Paper, pp. viii, ix. Congress of the United States. September 2001. 
 
„California‟s electric power crisis‟, Environmental Law, Ferrey, S. 2002., 22 March 2002. 
 
„Amid deregulation, utilities turn to IT to cut costs and satisfy customers – IT Helps Utilities Stay  
 Competitive (Industry Trend or Event), Information Week, Garvey, M., 11 September 2000.  
 
„Glynn Outlines National Energy Strategy,‟ Business Wire, 15 April 1998.  
 
„The past and future of electricity regulation‟, Environmental Law, Tomain, J., 22 March 2002. 
 
